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ABSTRACT 
   The rise of multiple social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter have sparked a debate within 
political sciences on the degree to which these new platforms influence the overall political system. For some, 
the expected impact is assumed to diversify the number of people who wield and influence political power, 
while for others the impact concentrates and solidifies power to those who could be considered as political 
elites. 
   The purpose of this thesis is thus to investigate the underlying assumptions surrounding this debate and to 
construct a theoretical understanding of how social media can influence political power relations. The research 
conducted in this area has thus far mainly focused on studying Twitter and not many studies exist that have 
examined Facebook. Moreover, considerable gaps exist within the Finnish context, and no studies exist there 
that have explicitly examined what direct political gains social media platforms are able to give to its users.  
   This thesis aims to fill these gaps by adopting a case study strategy on the 2015 parliamentary elections held 
in Finland by using quantitative techniques to estimate the impact that Facebook has had on the electoral 
performance of those candidates who have chosen to use it in their campaign.  
   The results of this study show that Facebook is indeed linked with electoral gains, and especially the ability 
of candidates to acquire Facebook ‘likes’ is a significant factor that can boost their electoral performance. 
Furthermore, not all candidates are equal in this, and it is non-incumbent politicians who have gained the most 
from Facebook during these elections. 
   These results highlight the fact that social media in general and Facebook in particular are important subjects 
of political study and that they do capture a resource that the candidates can use to impact political outcomes. 
Moreover, this has implications for the future of the status quo of political competition within Finland and 
might change how politics and deliberation are conducted in the future. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In 2008 Barrack Obama was running for the highest office in the United States, and the internet 
and social media was an integral part of his strategy to getting there. By using various methods 
from grassroots campaigning, fundraising to supporter mobilization, the way Obama utilized social 
media has become a prime example of how the platform can be used for electoral gains and later 
for more effective governance (Katz & Jain, 2013). Later, in 2016, a similar pattern would emerge, 
although the candidates could not have been more different from one other. While Donald Trump 
can be criticized on multiple fronts as a politician, one aspect in which he is universally given 
credit for is his masterful use of Twitter during his campaign. In contrast to Hilary Clinton Trump’s 
campaign was significantly less funded, the candidate was much less politically experienced and 
multiple scandals during the campaign trail lead most observers to believe that Trumps days were 
numbered and his presidency a near impossibility (Allen & Parnes, 2017). And yet, it did happen. 
It would be an overstatement to say that Twitter was the main element contributing to Trump's 
victory, but it allowed him to directly communicate with his supporters and, furthermore, to create 
controversial Tweets that perpetually gave him free coverage within the media. Actions such as 
these cannot be discounted as meaningless either.  
In other parts of the world, the events of 2011 and the Arab Spring gave fuel to the idea of 
cyberoptimism and lead some scholars to claim that “Twitter revolution” was a reality in many 
Arab states. Twitter, so the argument goes, gives citizens new tools to organize protests and 
crystalized public resentment towards governing regimes in authoritarian states. This, in turn, leads 
to stronger oppositional forces and, eventually, to regime changes and to democratization 
(Diamond & Plattner, 2012). Furthermore, social media has not only been claimed to mobilize 
oppressed citizens in authoritarian regimes; it accomplishes this in western democratic states as 
well. A study conducted in collaboration between political scientists and Facebook staff claims 
that a single message on Facebook’s platform can mobilize hundreds of thousands extra voters to 
the polls on election day. On 2nd of November 2010, during the US congressional elections, 
approximately 60 million users were shown a message of their friends who had clicked the “I 
voted” button, which was a new feature introduced by the experiment. The message was claimed 
to directly increase turnout by approximately 60,000 votes and a further 280,000 people were 
indirectly nudged to the polls (Bond et al., 2012).  
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Although all of the above are mainly anecdotal evidence about the influence of social media to the 
political sphere, it is by no means a controversial stance to claim that social media matters in 
politics. Social media platforms are worthy to take under serious investigation within the political 
context by the sheer number of global users alone. According to Statista1, the number of global 
social media users has reached 3.02 billion by January 2017, which at the time accounted for over 
40% of the world population2. However, social media matters to politics not only because of the 
sheer number of people using these platforms but because it presents a shift in how people 
communicate with one other. As I will argue during this thesis, social media platforms and the 
functionality brought by the Web 2.0 era have changed the nature of information dissemination, 
how that information is organized and processed by individuals, and how the same information is 
further distributed and modified outside from its original sender. These changes in the flow of 
information have a direct impact on politics because it redefines who controls, consumes and 
interprets information and thus meaningfully changes political calculus and power distribution.  
Indeed, the importance of social media has been noted by the academic field, and a lot of ink has 
been spilled on, for example, who uses social media, to what purposes it is being used for and how 
it affects wider populations. The topic can be problematic since it is characterized by rapid change 
and novelty. Social media is not a very old phenomenon, and it is very much a moving target. 
Facebook launched just over 13 years ago in 2004 and Twitter a few years later in 2006. Although 
the relative age of social media depends to some degree on how social media is defined, it is still 
young and somewhat limited by the amount and specifically by the focus of scholarly attention 
allocated to it. Furthermore, social media platforms change and develop constantly, which makes 
it hard for academics to keep up with it. For example, the algorithms that govern what is seen in 
the personal Facebook Feeds have changed drastically multiple times, and, furthermore, new 
features are continuously under development in various social media platforms in order to attract 
new users and to stay competitive against competition. Further problems and challenges for 
academic study arise from the fact that completely new platforms emerge and old ones die on a 
regular basis which creates caution to devote too much time to a single platform. 
                                                          
1 https://www.statista.com/ 
2 Data taken from www.worldometers.info 
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Many more challenges exist, but despite this social media is a phenomenon that I believe must be 
studied and efforts can be made to overcome the challenges related to it. The potential influence 
social media –and the internet in general– presents for politics means that we cannot have a full 
understanding of our contemporary political systems without incorporating it into the political 
theory. Unfortunately, while numerous empirical studies have been made about social media and 
politics, the theoretical side is not nearly as developed. Many previous studies have concentrated 
their efforts to describing social media use by various political actors, explaining social media 
adaption rates or investigating the content created within the platforms, but only a few have 
systematically tried to create a theoretical understanding of social media use that could explain 
how social media use changes political behavior, what goals various actors have and why certain 
social media strategies are more efficient than others. Additionally, the empirical side also has 
many gaps, which is mostly due to limitations regarding data gathering methods. For example, 
studies focusing on Twitter tend to be overrepresented because the platform is much friendlier to 
a scholar who wishes to use its data for research purposes.  
This thesis aims to fill these gaps on two fronts: by formulating an underlying theory on why social 
media can have an impact on political competition and by empirical investigation on how accurate 
the theory is in the context of Finnish parliamentary elections. Theoretical work on politics and 
social media is regrettably undersized undertaking, which is understandable given the age and fast-
changing nature of the topic. However, it is necessary to start building a theoretical framework for 
political social media use because without it we are limited in our understanding how influential 
social media truly is to politics and how it functions. There is no obvious path where such a 
framework should start, but my approach is to lean upon social choice theory and epidemiology in 
order to explicitly lay out the assumptions I have about the behavior of individuals and to construct 
a starting model that aims to explain why and how social media activity is influential. Without 
going too much into detail at this point (further details will follow throughout this thesis), the two 
basic assumptions behind my work are, firstly, that politicians are mainly interested in gaining 
votes in order to influence policy and, secondly, that ordinary citizens are rational actors in the 
sense that they wish to maximize their utility, ceteris paribus, and will avoid outcomes that are 
harmful to them.  
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A couple of things needs to be said about these assumptions before we can continue. For one, the 
rationality assumption can justifiably be criticized right off the bat by pointing out that it can be 
unrealistic and a poor description of human behavior. Recent advancements in behavioral 
economics have shown multiple ways in which the traditional understanding of rationality by 
economists does not hold up (such as when people make decisions under uncertainty3), which has 
led some to believe that such public behavior like voting is inherently irrational4. There is certainly 
merit to this train of thought, but it can lead to unjustified dismissal of rational action. While the 
traditional understanding of rationality in economics can be and should be criticized, it should not 
lead to the complete dismissal of the concept of rationality itself. Indeed, individual behavior can 
be seemingly irrational, but rational behavior can exist in the sense that behavior is consistent and 
aims to accomplish a certain goal within a context and with limitations. This is apparent within the 
concept of utility, which does not translate to strictly monetary gains –although that is how it is 
mostly presented– but rather it describes an outcome that is desirable to the individual. If we 
abandon the concept of rationality we lose or at least severely diminish the ability to understand 
and predict behavior because without rationality it is difficult to formulate goals and consistent 
strategies to achieve those goals5. Rather than abandoning the rationality assumption, my goal is 
to update and understand it within the context of political use of social media. 
Furthermore, the assumption that politicians are selfish vote-seekers who mainly aim to acquire 
influence can likewise be criticized. After all, politicians can have multiple other motivations for 
their actions besides strictly aiming to gain more power. However, if one aims to provide a 
predictive theory of potentially effective uses of social media, the main objectives of action must 
nevertheless be specified. If vote-seeking politicians is not the right assumption, what would be 
the alternative? It seems to me that it is hard to argue that more altruistic motivations, such as 
producing policies that are beneficial for the largest portion of the population or the simple desire 
to have a positive impact on the society, are either too vague or too optimistic to serve as an 
explanatory variable for behavior. For one, such motivations are almost impossible to 
                                                          
3 See, for example, the work of Kahneman and Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk (1979). 
4 Such claims are put forth by political scientists like Bryan Caplan (2011), who argued in his book The Myth of the 
Rational Voter that voters are irrational in the political sphere and have systematically biased opinions. 
5 Since it is not the objective of this thesis to combat the many criticisms pushed against public choice theory, I will 
not spend more time in justifying the approach. Such an undertaking would simply take too much space and would 
ultimately be counterproductive. For more interested and critical readers, I strongly suggest the work of Dennis 
Mueller: Public Choice III (2003) and specifically the last chapter for the more critical ones. 
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operationalize in a meaningful way since they vary greatly from one individual to another, are 
extremely hard to measure, and it is unclear how these motivations could explain larger trends at 
the aggregate level. Furthermore, it is somewhat naïve to think that vote-seeking politician is a 
poor assumption to explain the behavior of politicians. This is due to the simple fact that politicians 
who are not mainly interested in gaining votes tend not to stick around for long. If a politician 
ignores his prospects at winning the next election, he will very soon find himself outside of office.  
Theory is only as good as how well it explains or predicts behavior, and as such no theory can 
stand on a solid ground without empirical evidence supporting it. To this end, this thesis also 
presents empirical investigation that is aimed at testing the assumptions behind the theoretical 
framework constructed during this thesis. Data from the 2015 Finnish parliamentary elections 
functions as the testing ground in this case, and a variety of statistical models are used to explain 
the vote distribution among the candidates who have used social media during the elections. The 
starting point is that social media activity by the candidates can be used to acquire votes in a way 
that is independent of other factors. In other words, social media activity in itself can influence 
voters to give their votes for a candidate and it is not merely a proxy measure of some other factor. 
The focus of this thesis is thus placed on individual political candidates during elections, and the 
theoretical framework is ultimately built with this context in mind. This will surely place some 
limitations how widely the theory can be utilized outside from its context, but it will serve as a 
starting point from which it can be expanded and developed further. 
In summary, the main aim of this thesis is then to build a theoretical framework from which it is 
possible to understand why political actors use social media during elections and why it can 
influence voters to their side. This framework is then tested by investigating how politicians use 
and benefit from various online platforms to gain electoral support in the context of Finnish 
elections with the focus on candidates’ use of social networking sites. It is especially important to 
formally estimate how much social media activity directly translates to votes because, as Gibson 
and McAllister also claim (2015, p. 530), it is not enough to observe who are actively or creatively 
using social media for political gain, but we also need to see that it directly impacts political 
outcomes. If there is no evidence supporting this, then it is highly questionable how great of an 
impact social media has for political life and whether it is truly an important topic worthy of being 
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a subject of study by itself or whether it is merely a new communication tool with little to no novel 
impact on politics.   
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The emergence of interactive social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter have 
undoubtedly had an impact on how social interaction is conducted within societies. It could be 
argued, for example, that online interaction is increasing in contrast to face-to-face interaction 
since it is online where we now spend ever larger amounts of time presenting what we like, who 
we support, and who we are. Thus, the way individuals interact with one other is increasingly 
transferred from direct face-to-face communication into the online sphere where the rules and 
boundaries of interaction can be vastly different from their offline counterparts.  
The political and the public sphere have not escaped this phenomenon, and it is also in these areas 
that the new online platforms are incorporated in the way both politicians and citizens interact with 
each other and within the political system. However, while many recognize the increasing 
importance of online interaction in political life, it is little understood, and we still do not know 
whether this presents a profound change in how politics is conducted or whether it is merely 
enforcing existing rules and structures through yet another new medium. After all, almost all new 
communication technologies have been accompanied by optimistic voices who have claimed that 
this new technology will transform how we communicate, will create a new era of increased 
democratization, and will give more power to individual citizens (Wu, 2010). It is then worthwhile 
to first explain where social media came from and to summarize the existing theories on how social 
media is suspected to impact the political sphere. 
The theoretical background of social media has come largely from the discussion surrounding the 
differences and implications of the so-called Web 2.0 when compared to its earlier 1.0 version. 
The term “Web 2.0” was popularized by Tim O´Reilly and Dale Dougherty (O’Reilly, 2005) with 
the purpose of capturing how the logic and interaction between users of the World Wide Web and 
the Web itself have fundamentally changed from the early days of its implementation. During the 
Web 1.0 era, users could mainly engage with static websites and passively receive information 
from them. In contrast to this, Web 2.0 not only enabled users to access vast amounts of 
P O L I T I C A L  C O M P E T I T I O N  A N D  S O C I A L  M E D I A                 P a g e  | 9 
 
 
 
information, it also introduced the ability for users to create and share content themselves in a 
manner that does not require expert-level information or specified skills. In essence, this gave the 
ability to virtually anybody with internet access to communicate and interact globally and instantly 
with each other with little to no expertise or financial resources. In countries where the internet 
penetration rates are between 80 and 100 percent, and where smartphones and other ICT devices 
are widespread, this ability has had profound effects on how people and citizens live and act in 
their everyday lives. 
In the realm of political science and public behavior, the communicative abilities brought by Web 
2.0 have sparked a debate on what the impact of such abilities is on political life. Indeed, research 
on campaigning and political competition has produced four distinct theses on the effects of social 
media, which are usually used in opposition to each other. To illustrate these theses, Kim 
Strandberg (2013) has constructed an analytical framework (see Figure 1) which can be used as a 
theoretical tool to assess the relative impact of social media on the political status quo.  
The fourfold framework represents two distinct domains where social media can have an impact 
and consequently change the nature of political competition and action. The first domain, the on-
line structure, is highly related to elections and electoral performance research, and it asks whether 
social media and online campaigning tools normalize or equalize relations between different 
political actors. According to the equalization thesis, online campaigning creates a more even 
playing field for the actors involved because it enables actors with limited resources to reach wider 
audiences and to interact with more voters than they could reach solely through offline efforts. 
                                   Figure 1. Strandberg’s Analytical framework  
 
                                   Source: Kim Strandberg, 2013, p. 1335 
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Much of the traditional campaigning strategies are expensive to use effectively and can require 
large amounts of expertise and manpower, which are only available to political elites. In contrast, 
campaigning online and on social media gives cheap and easy-to-use campaign tools to candidates 
whose resources and campaigning expertise are relatively limited, thus giving them more of a 
fighting chance against the elites. However, the alternative view is that online campaigning does 
not necessarily differ significantly enough from its offline counterparts to break the status quo and 
will rather reinforce existing structures (Norris, 2001, pp. 218–221). This normalization thesis 
justifiably casts doubt on the ease-of-use of social media and its claimed low requirement of 
resources. Gaining large groups of followers and communicating effectively to large audiences 
becomes more complex as the scope increases and will most likely demand further resources as 
more and more individuals try to reach the same groups of people on the same platforms. As such, 
using social media effectively might not be as cheap and easy as it may initially appear, and the 
candidates with limited funding might still be left behind due to the more extensive resources of 
bigger parties and political elites. 
The debate between these two theses are still going strong, and empirical findings have found 
support both for equalization and normalization. For example, Gibson and McAllister (2015) have 
examined the issue using Australian surveys of election candidates conducted between 2001 and 
2010. The study found that in contrast to the web 1.0 era, when most of the empirical evidence 
pointed towards normalization (Gibson & McAllister, 2015, pp. 530–531), in the Web 2.0 era 
smaller parties, such as the Green Party, have been able to achieve significant electoral gain 
through the use of social media platforms in contrast to larger parties. For the authors, this in part 
supports the equalization thesis and suggests that where Web 1.0 was dominated by large parties 
and political elites Web 2.0 gives underdogs more opportunities.  
On the other hand, in Finland the findings are less encouraging. By examining the 2011 Finnish 
parliamentary elections, Strandberg (2013) found that while the use of various social media sites 
by a multitude of different candidates was extensive, the analysis leaned towards favoring the 
normalization thesis. According to the logistic regression analysis, it appeared that the highest odds 
for a candidate to exhibit extensive use of social media is associated with being an incumbent, 
having high levels of education, and being a member of a major party. Furthermore, in another 
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study focusing on multiple parliamentary elections from 2003 to 2015, Strandberg (2016) found 
that the most active social media users come from the bigger parties rather than from the smaller 
or medium-sized ones, and it was also noticeable that the experienced incumbent politicians, who 
were acting as members of parliament during the elections, were considerably more active users 
than non-incumbents. From these findings, Strandberg concludes that the longer trends, at least in 
Finland, seem to point towards the normalization thesis and that it is precisely the candidates from 
the bigger parties that are dominating campaigning over the internet and social media (Strandberg, 
2016, pp. 106–113). 
The second pair of the framework looks at social media from the viewpoint of voters. According 
to the so-called mobilization thesis, online interaction has the potential to provide information, 
organizational tools and more options for political engagement to those citizens who are 
marginalized or out of reach of political arenas and thus unable to participate in public life in a 
meaningful way (Norris, 2000, p. 218). As a result, social media can nurture new forms of political 
activity in which previously inactive groups will eventually be drawn into the public life and civic 
engagement. In opposition to this, the reinforcement thesis states that the claimed new forms of 
online political activity will, at most, be modest due to the fact that access and the required skills 
to use online outlets are divided within societies. Furthermore, even if skills and access were 
evenly distributed, online political engagement will still most likely be practiced by those who are 
already politically active and motivated. Hence, the new online possibilities for political 
engagement will do nothing more than reinforce the established patterns of activity and 
participation. 
If Strandberg’s analytical framework is considered in the sense of contrasting and mutually 
exclusive ideal types, then the possible outcomes A through D (see again Figure 1) can give a 
sense of how much social media has changed the status quo of everyday politics. In the event of 
outcome A, the significance of social media seems rather small, and it will most likely merely 
maintain the already existing gap between political underdogs and political elites. In the middle-
ground of outcomes B and C, the significance can be considered to be modest, depending on the 
relative scale of the change, while in outcome D, social media can have a rather large significance. 
In most cases, political research on social media tries to evaluate in which of these four 
compartments we are at the moment or whether we are moving from one compartment to another, 
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although research has by no means exclusively concentrated on providing answers to the 
normalization-equalization debate. In fact, the sheer range of different topics is quite vast and 
touches upon many aspects of political life. For example, in 2017 the Web of Science core 
collection comprised a total of 354 studies on social media in the political science category, from 
which 122 are from the United States, 55 from the United Kingdom, and 24 from Germany. The 
range of different topics can be seen in figure 2, which shows the most often used keywords as 
nodes where the size of the node is proportional to the number of times it has appeared within a 
research article. Links between the nodes indicate when the keywords have been used together 
within the same article, referred to as co-occurrence, and the years below the figure show the first 
time the keyword was used. As the figure shows, the articles included within the Web of Science 
core collection have studied social media in connection with elections, participation, campaigning, 
protests, and news, to name a few, with elections being a popular topic ever since 2010, 
participation and communication from 2012, and Twitter and Facebook more specifically focused 
on from 2014 onwards.  
                Figure 2. Co-occurrence network of keywords in political research of social media 
 
Note: Based on 354 articles from the Web of Science core collection. The research articles are from the 
political science category acquired by the search operator “social media” OR “social networking sites”. 
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It is then clear that social media is seen as an important research subject, and many researchers are 
contributing to advance our knowledge on social media within the political sphere. However, the 
existing research, by and large, is fragmented and has not received its fair amount of theoretical 
work that could connect many of the previous findings to an overarching framework and explain 
why social media use can benefit political actors. For example, studies have found that young 
politicians and women are highly active on social media and consistently aim to incorporate it into 
their political careers (e.g. Jungherr, 2016; Larsson & Kalsnes, 2014), but it is not clear why the 
young and women are more active or whether or not it is plausible to assume that their active social 
media presence will translate to political gains and, if it does, why this is the case. Furthermore, 
while Strandberg’s (2013) analytical framework gives us a useful tool to conceptualize many 
relevant questions regarding social media and politics, it gives us little guidance on how to answer 
these questions. In short, without a theory to guide us, the political study of social media is reduced 
to mere observational studies that cannot explain the phenomenon we are interested in.  
Given the scope of the topic, it is not obvious where this theoretical work should take place, but a 
promising starting point does present itself in democratic elections where political power and 
influence is most clearly seen. After all, it is during elections when the status quo can be 
challenged, and political actors are in the most immediate need to capitalize on their political 
resources and transform them into votes. If social media is shown to have an impact here, it clearly 
benefits political actors and can thus shape and influence political behavior and institutions. In this 
regard, a few studies have investigated directly how social media activity has impacted electoral 
outcomes (e.g. Baxter & Marcella, 2013; Kruikemeier, 2014; Spierings & Jacobs, 2014; Williams 
& Gulati, 2008), but within Finland, unfortunately, no such studies exist. This might come as a 
surprise, since, as Strandberg has observed (2013, pp. 1335–1336), several different factors make 
Finland an excellent country to study. Firstly, the relative role of individual candidates during 
campaigns is rather important in Finland. In the Finnish electoral system proportional 
representation is used in multimember districts where the voters can cast preferential votes for 
individual candidates who represent parties or electoral coalitions. In effect, this makes the 
elections not only a competition between parties but also a competition between individual 
candidates (Sundberg, 1997, p. 72). Secondly, Finland has both a high level of societal internet 
and social media penetration. Thus, a potentially large segment of the Finnish population is skilled 
in online interaction and is highly likely to be reached through online efforts. Furthermore, Finland 
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also has well-established data on both the use of social media for political purposes by the voters 
and the political candidates. These factors then make Finland an excellent case study, where the 
potential direct gains from social media use by the political candidates are likely to be observed if 
they exist at all. 
Thus, the research questions that this thesis aims to answer are closely related to investigating 
electoral success and to Finland as a testing ground. More precisely, the objective of this thesis is 
to answer one main research question: 
(1) How has social media affected the status quo political competition within Finland from the 
viewpoint of political candidates?  
Although this question could be gauged from the viewpoint of citizens and voters as well, in the 
interest of narrowing down the scope of this thesis it is reasonable to concentrate solely on political 
candidates and leave the reinforcement and mobilization theses from Strandberg’s Analytical 
framework out from the analysis. Moreover, even though political uses of social media surely are 
not solely constrained to politicians, they are the individuals that have the most immediate impact 
on the political system. To study them thus gives us the fastest path at gaining an intuition as to 
how social media impacts the political sphere.  
In addition to this main question, this thesis sharpens its focus through multiple sub-research 
questions that further narrow the scope of the thesis and connect it to the broader issues 
surrounding the normalization v. equalization debate: 
(1.1) Has social media activity impacted the electoral success of those political candidates 
who have integrated it into their campaign?  
(1.2) Are there differences between these candidates such that the benefit gained from social 
media clearly benefits some candidates more than others? 
(1.3) If the answers to questions 1.1 or 1.2 are positive, are there mechanisms internal or 
external to social media that can explain them? 
These questions are important to answer since they allow us to make inferences that help us to 
answer the main research question of this thesis. For social media to have an impact on the status 
quo of political competition, we need to first establish that social media can indeed result in some 
clear benefits. This is the point of the first sub-question. This line of thought once again echoes 
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Gibson and McAllister (2015, p. 530) who believe that it is not enough to observe who are using 
social media, but we also need to see that it directly impacts political outcomes if we are to argue 
that social media has a role to play within the political sphere. The second sub-question is more 
directly aimed at the equalization v. normalization debate and attempts to investigate who the 
political actors that benefit the most from social media are. Are they incumbent political elites or 
marginal challengers? After all, social media can only equalize political competition if it helps 
marginal actors more than incumbents. The final sub-question is geared towards setting a 
theoretical framework from which these results can become understandable and comparable 
outside of the Finnish context. Although all political systems are different from one other and the 
likelihood of social media impacting the political sphere varies from one country to another, we 
need a formal mechanism that is common from one context to another. Without it, it becomes 
almost impossible to set social media into the larger study of political science and incorporate it 
into the overall theory. What I argue here is that social media should not be solely an independent 
area of study, but its most valuable contribution to our understanding materializes only after it is 
connected to a larger field.  
To answer these questions, five concrete objectives will be set that will serve as a structure for the 
remainder of this thesis: 
1. To define the main topic of interest during this thesis, and to answer what social media is 
and how it differs from other communication technologies  
2. To establish a theoretical framework on how social media functions as a campaigning 
tool to be used by political candidates 
3. Estimating the impact that social media had on the vote share of the individual candidates 
who incorporated it to their campaign during the Finnish 2015 parliamentary elections. 
4. Investigating whether differences and patterns exist on how social media impacted 
different candidates 
5. Analyzing the results in terms of the normalization vs. equalization debate 
To elaborate further on these objectives, in this thesis it will first be necessary to define the topic 
and explore just what social media is and how it fits in the historical context of the development 
of political communication. Taken at face value, social media seems to represent a new way of 
political communication and could be used as a medium to reach voters both at the individual level 
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by directly communicating with voters and at the national level by broadcasting information to a 
selected population who have chosen to receive messages from a specific candidate. As it turns 
out, defining social media is not a straightforward task, and in consequence it becomes difficult to 
map out just how it can be used for political purposes. The task of the following chapter is thus to 
define our subject matter and to explore what tools, both familiar and new, it providers for political 
actors. 
Next, once the topic is properly defined, the thesis will move to establish a formal theory of how 
social media activity can translate into political capital. As we will see, social media can be used 
in numerous ways to impact the electoral success of various candidates, but there is at least one 
aspect common to all of them. As Jacobs and Spierings have argued recently (2016), the casual 
path to electoral gains through social media can be complex, a mixture of the different 
opportunities, characteristics and contextual aspects of any given political system, but establishing 
a connection between citizens is usually the first step in this chain. For social media to be useful 
to any political actor, they must first reach their potential audience. Only after this connection is 
made can social media be used, for example, as a crowd-funding tool as Obama did in 2008 (Katz 
& Jain, 2013). Without going in further details, it is argued during this thesis that the way social 
media establishes and spreads these connections is the key mechanism that can explain electoral 
success within social media and this mechanism is analogous to how diseases spread among 
populations. 
As objectives 3 and 4 are more empirical in nature, once the theoretical side of the thesis is 
completed I will proceed to analyze the Finnish 2015 parliamentary elections, their outcomes, and 
how the candidates used social media as a campaigning tool. This is the task of chapters six and 
seven where I will use candidate level data gathered from multiple sources and put the formulated 
theory under statistical tests, which will either validate the theory or suggest alternative paths for 
further study. Finally, the last objective brings the findings and the overall work of the thesis 
together and provides answers and conclusions to the research questions.  
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3. DEFINITION AND THEORETICAL USES FOR POLITICAL 
COMMUNICATION 
Although social media has not been around as a concept and a phenomenon for long, quite a few 
different platforms have emerged that are considered to be examples of it. From the late 1990s 
onward, social media platforms began to take shape and services such as Blogger (1999), 
Wikipedia (2001), Myspace (2003), Facebook (2004) Flickr (2004), YouTube (2005), and Twitter 
(2006) began to offer web-based tools that created new ways in which individuals could 
communicate online (Van Dijck, 2013). Although all of the above-mentioned platforms, and many 
others, have received scholarly study, it is surprising that, despite the growing interest to the topic, 
many of these studies tend to leave out the specifications of social media undefined and tend to 
rely on direct examples to illustrate what they actually mean by social media. The issue, however, 
might be more difficult than it initially appears. Identifying just what constitutes as social media 
is not a simple matter much in the same way as it is hard to define an abstract concept such as 
pornography. In most cases, it seems to be enough to state that “I know it when I see it” (Jacobellis, 
1964). 
The issue has not yet created a significant problem mostly due to the fact that a vast majority of 
social media studies have studied a single platform, which in most cases means studying either 
Facebook or Twitter. However, since the main goal of this thesis is to provide a theoretical 
understanding of political social media use, defining social media is a step that cannot be left 
unattended. While platforms such as Facebook and Twitter can seem as too dominant to disappear, 
many other online platforms have come and gone without many remembering them once they are 
left out of use (Myspace comes readily to mind). The study of social media thus cannot be a study 
of one or two specific platforms but must be the study of the overarching phenomenon above all 
else.  
 
3.1 What is social about social media? 
Gayo-Avello (2016) provides us a useful starting point which we can use to define the subject at 
hand. By contrasting two different attempts to define the phenomenon, Gayo-Avello shows how 
social media has both evolved as a concept, what remains constant within it, and what we have 
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perhaps largely missed in it. The first definition comes from Wikipedia written in 2006, where 
social media was defined as: 
  
Social Media is the term used to describe media which are formed mainly by the public as a 
group, in a social way, rather than media produced by journalists, editors and media 
conglomerates. (as cited in Gayo-Avello, 2016, What do I talk about when I talk about social 
media?, para. 2) 
  
The second definition came almost ten years after from Hogan and Melville (2015): 
  
Social media represent a set of communication practices that can typically be described as 
‘many-to-many.’ In contrast to broadcast media, consumers are typically also producers. In 
contrast to in-person communication, audiences are often ambiguous or underspecified. (p. 
421) 
Both definitions rely heavily on the notion of "user-generated content” where the consumers or the 
public is itself creating and distributing content to other individuals without involving a third 
intermediary party. This certainly is an important aspect of social media, but it does not seem that 
it is a sufficient one. After all, many tools developed during and after the so-called "Web 2.0 
revolution" fit the definitions: bulletin board systems, synchronous online chat, multi-user real-
time virtual worlds, and e-mail lists (Gayo-Avello, 2016). Thus, it is likely that both definitions 
have important omissions that they fail to include and, indeed, Gayo-Avello (2016) has identified 
two of them. Firstly, they do not place any emphasis on the importance of communication 
networks. Social media platforms allow their users to choose their communication networks to a 
varying extent by, for example, friending people on Facebook, following them on Twitter or 
subscribing to them on YouTube. As Gayo-Avello (2016, What do I talk about when I talk about 
social media?, para. 7) argues, we cannot talk properly about social networks without this 
characteristic. The second aspect is related to the fact that neither of the above definitions addresses 
the social part of social media. While the first Wikipedia entry hints at the social aspect by stating 
that media is formed “in a social way”, it does not continue to elaborate what this implies or why 
sociality is inherent within social media. Indeed, one might argue, as Nancy Baym (2015) does, 
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that there actually is nothing especially social about these online platforms since “any medium that 
allows people to make meaning together is social“ (p. 1). Social media is merely yet another way 
of creating meaning such as postcards, television shows, newspapers, books or telephones have 
been for a long time.  
For the purposes of this thesis, the final definition that Gayo-Avello (2015) arrives at works well 
at highlighting what social media is and how it can be used. In short, social media is “any 
communication tool that allows users to consume, share and create multimedia contents which are 
addressed to unspecified audiences, in a potentially many-to-many fashion” (What do I talk about 
when I talk about social media?, para. 14). This definition, while quite broad in nature, makes 
some important modifications to the earlier ones. It still keeps the concept of user-generated 
content and places emphasis on the many-to-many form of communication, but it does not make 
assumptions about the inherent “social” nature of the medium. Perhaps ironically this implies that 
the most important and novel part of social media is not social but is rather related to the way 
information and content are created and distributed among users.  
Furthermore, the definition also recognizes that while social media can be used to create and share 
user-generated content, it does not necessarily need to revolve around it. Social media can also be 
used to share and consume multimedia that is not originally created by the user but comes from 
professional sources such as newspapers or other multimedia companies. Indeed, professionally 
created news stories are quite commonly shared on Twitter and Facebook. Lastly, while the form 
of communication can have the potential to be characterized as many-to-many, but it also 
facilitates one-to-one and one-to-many forms of communication. Applications such as chatting in 
Facebook messenger or WhatsApp are good examples of one-to-one communication, and while 
posting on Facebook allows for multiple people to engage in conversation, the original poster can 
use it in a more traditional way and only send content to be consumed but will not further engage 
with the consumers.  
Within the political sphere, the most influential and most often studied examples of such social 
media platforms are Twitter and Facebook. There are multiple reasons why these two platforms 
are so dominant, but within the political sciences perhaps the biggest reason is related to the 
number of users who are on those two platforms and to the representativeness of their userbases. 
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According to Statista (2017), during 2017 Facebook was by far the most used social media 
platform with approximately 2,047 million users globally, followed by YouTube with 1,500 
million and WhatsApp with 1,200 million. Twitter is only 10th on the list, but, as previous studies 
have found, it is widely used by politicians and candidates (Jungherr, 2016), which makes it logical 
for political scientists to study it. According to Jose Van Dijck (2013), both of these platforms 
further represent a special type of social media that have unique uses and aims. Dijck calls them 
Social Networking Sites (SNS), which primarily promote interpersonal contacts between 
individuals or groups. The aim of SNS is to create personal, professional or geographical 
connections and it encourages weak ties with people who have little direct face-to-face interaction. 
Other types of social media platforms exist, but since platforms other than SNS are only rarely 
used by political actors (e.g. Strandberg, 2016) the focus here will be on SNS, and the terms “social 
media” and “social networking sites” will be used interchangeably from now on. With these 
caveats in mind, this is what I generally mean by social media during this thesis. 
3.2 Social media as a political tool 
How, then, does social media fit within the wider context of political communication? Although it 
is easy to imagine why social media could be useful as a political tool, the various functions it 
provides are not alone anything new. Political actors already have at their disposal many of the 
tools that social media provides, such as personal websites for one-to-many communication, email 
for direct engagement, and chat rooms or blogs for more interactive and many-to-many forms of 
communication. However, one could argue that social media presents something fundamentally 
new in political communication not because it offers anyone novel function but rather because it 
combines many of the previously available functions into an integrated platform, which is easy 
and free to use and thus is readily available to everyone from politicians to voters. It is this holistic 
property of social media that can potentially have an impact on political communication.  
Jacobs and Spierings (2016) argue that the main characteristics of social media can be summarized 
by five major aspects. First, the messages send on social media are unmediated. That is to say, that 
the way content and political messages spread within social media is not restricted, altered or 
prevented by gatekeepers or journalists who select what messages are newsworthy. By and large, 
even though most social media platforms impose some guidelines to what content can be 
published, individual users are autonomous in deciding what they post on the platform. Second, 
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social media platforms are also personal, even more so than many of the Web 1.0 applications. 
Almost all social media profiles are linked to an individual and allow multiple different ways for 
that individual to visualize and narrate his private and professional life. Moreover, since most 
profiles are in the personal control of an individual, the style of messaging and communication can 
be given a personal touch which reflects who that individual perceives himself to be. Third, one of 
the clearer ways in which social media differs from Web 1.0 applications is in its degree of 
interactivity. As the Jacobs and Spierings (2016) note, the option to involve others in your 
communication is typically a core feature of social media platforms. Various platforms accomplish 
this in different ways, such as directly commenting on the posts or tweets of other users, pulling 
users to the conversation via "@-mentions" in Twitter, "Tagging" in Facebook, or allowing quick 
reactions that indicate some form of engagement, such as liking or favoriting posts. In effect, this 
transforms users from passive receivers to active creators and influencers. Fourth, in respect to the 
political sphere, perhaps the most cited characteristic of social media is its cheapness and user-
friendly interface. Indeed, the authors believe that the cheap and easy-to-use factors of social media 
open up the potential gain deriving from social media to virtually everyone, since much of the 
potential of traditional online tools is diminished by the high costs and expertise required to operate 
them. Lastly, the speed and volume of information diffusion within social media are miles beyond 
that of traditional media. Since social media connects its users to large networks by allowing users 
to "friend" or "follow" others, it creates a large networked environment where users are usually 
able to see what their friends have created, liked, shared or commented upon. This opens up the 
potential for information to spread not only through first-degree contacts but also first-, second-, 
third-degree contacts and beyond. This feature can be extremely powerful and, as the authors note, 
if the "six degrees of separation" theory (Travers & Milgram, 1967) is indeed correct, and everyone 
is reachable within six steps, then information on social media can diffuse to a large number of 
people across all social strata, given that they are in the platform. (Jacobs and Spierings, 2016, p. 
22.) 
Seen through this lens, social media appears to serve a multi-function in political communication 
and competition and can be placed somewhere between the local and the national. To provide some 
historical context, Pippa Norris (2000, pp. 137–161) explains that the evolution of campaigning 
has gone through three distinct phases where changes in communication technologies have played 
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a major part driving the change from one phase to another. In a short summary, political 
campaigning has progressed from a premodern phase, which was prevalent during the mid-19th 
century until the 1950s, to a modern phase that started to take shape during the 1960s and lasted 
until the 1980s. The final postmodern phase began in the 1990s and continues to evolve, although 
some scholars have argued that new technologies such as social media are driving our societies to 
another still unidentified phase (Vergeer, Hermans, & Sams, 2011). During the premodern phase, 
campaigns were largely local and decentralized, where voters held stable social and partisan 
alignments that made it difficult for any politician to change pre-existing voting preferences. Thus, 
the main function of the party organization was to energize and mobilize their voter base to go to 
the polls and encourage their friends and family to do the same. The main methods used to do this 
were based on personal networks of volunteers and face-to-face candidate-voter communication. 
In addition, partisan newspapers favorable to the party ideology were used for information 
dissemination, which was reinforced with local posters, pamphlets, and radio broadcasts. 
The eventual progression moving the campaign methods away from the premodern phase was 
largely driven by the rise of television and regular publications of opinion polls. During the 1950s 
to the 1980s, the rising availability of TV-sets gradually sifted the main locus of communication 
from the partisan newspapers towards the national television broadcasts of the biggest TV-
channels and focused on the main national evening news. Consequently, the main task of the party 
organizations was now to achieve favorable coverage in the mainstream evening news, current 
affairs programs and leadership debates on television. The effect was reinforced by the fact that in 
most nations only few television stations were available to the public to watch and the politically 
relevant programs were tightly scheduled to specific time slots. This limited coverage helped party 
leaders to control and to lead increasingly national campaigns where the electorate participated 
mainly via passive spectatorship mediated through television. Increasingly, voters were less likely 
to encounter laboursome forms of political communications, such as face-to-face discussions or 
local meetings, and both their partisan alignments and social cleavages became less stable. 
The progression towards postmodern campaigning was again led by new developments in 
communication technologies, but also by the fragmentation of the mediascape (Chadwick, 2017). 
During the 1990s, a more diverse selection of different news sources appeared in the advent of 
satellite and cable television, talk radio, and 24/7 news bulletins. Furthermore, the internet 
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provided new opportunities for party-voter interaction. Due to the new communication 
capabilities, campaigns remained nationally organized but allowed decentralized operations. 
Regular opinion polls and focus groups helped the party organization to identify the most likely 
voters and to target them through direct mail, targeted ads, and narrowcasting within specific TV-
channels and timeslots. Norris (2000) argues that this symbolized a return to the localized and 
interactive forms of political communications, which was somewhat lost during the modern era. 
As she explains, developments such as political discussion groups on the net, party intranets, the 
availability of interactive political websites, and political uses of e-mail or list-servers all represent 
a midway point between local and national campaigning, and between passive and active 
participation. (pp. 147–149.) 
However, while the advent of the postmodern era greatly increased the available tools for political 
actors to communicate with the electorate, the fragmentation of information sources and the need 
to accurately identify and target potential voters made campaigning extremely expensive. Whereas 
before party organizations could rely largely on their existing resources and on the labor of their 
own staff and volunteers, the postmodern era requires professional staff to organize national 
strategies, coordinate decentralized operations and to conduct focus group research. 
Understandably, the rising costs concentrated political power to larger parties and well-funded 
individuals who could bear the costs of campaigning. (Norris, 2000, pp. 137–161.) It is still 
debatable whether or not social media is another development within communication technology 
that, like the television before, will drive the change towards a completely new stage of political 
communication, but it is certainly arguable that it offers many benefits for the candidates who have 
the ability to use them effectively. Perhaps the main benefit that social media provides is that it 
helps to manage the fragmented media environment of the postmodern era and reduces the costs 
associated with it. As an example, Facebook could be considered as a digital manifestation of the 
old reliance on volunteers to spread information. Whenever a candidate creates a post on Facebook 
it initially spreads towards the portion of the population that has voluntarily decided to receive 
information from that candidate. If this population then only consumed the message contained in 
the post and did not further interact with it with the functions provided by the platform, the spread 
of the message might end there. However, since one of the main function of social media platforms 
is to allow its users to further engage with the messages they receive, the users can help the 
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message to spread further to their own personal networks. This is done explicitly through functions 
such as sharing but can happen also implicitly without a clear intention for the user to do so. Liking 
a post on Facebook, for example, makes it more likely for that post to appear in the News Feeds 
of other users who are connected within the same network (DeVito, 2017). In both instances, the 
users are spreading information about the candidate without monetary compensation with or 
without their knowledge.  
Indeed, for some this mode of user-based information diffusion is one of the main aspects of social 
media that sets it apart from older technologies like the radio or television. One of the proponents 
of this idea are Jason Gainous and Kevin M. Wagner (2014) who argue in their book: Tweeting to 
power that all previous advancements in political communication were mainly about increasing 
efficiency and reaching a greater number of people through one-directional channels. In the older 
technologies, the audiences are passive recipients of political messages who have little direct 
influence on how and what information continues to spread to other viewers. The logic of 
information diffusion was mainly dictated by a small group of individuals who controlled the main 
broadcasting channels and who studied readily identifiable groups and decided how to best reach 
and influence them (Wu, 2010). Social media, however, changes this dynamic and opens up a 
whole new form of two-way communication, which was not previously realistically available for 
mass-audiences. Instead of passively receiving information and indirectly influencing its spread as 
a member of a homogeneous group, in social media both the receivers and producers of 
information can communicate with each other, which allows for the receivers to directly and 
instantly indicate his or her preferences and to gain direct control on what content is deemed as 
worthy of redistributing further and even have an impact on how information is processed in the 
older media channels (Chadwck, 2017, pp. 70–102). Furthermore, this dynamic also allows 
individuals to increasingly manipulate what kind of information and communication they are 
exposed to, allowing for selective exposure. 
As Gainous and Wagner (2014) argue, this leads to a new kind of communication logic, because 
whereas the producers of traditional media content had large control over the message and framing, 
social media is more user-driven and shifts more of the control from the media producer to the 
users and consumers of media content (Chadwck, 2017, pp. 70–102). As a consequence, 
communication becomes more complex and versatile than it was before. Furthermore, traditional 
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tools, such as newspapers or television broadcasts, are limited on how much content can be 
distributed to them and how many issues they can handle at a time. Social media, on the other 
hand, places no theoretical limits on the amount of content that can be distributed, nor does it place 
geographical constraints. Social media also transforms and adds new features in a much more rapid 
phase, which allows for new tools to emerge as the platforms develop. Indeed, since new tools can 
be continuously added to social media platforms, they can perform all the same functions that the 
traditional media outlets have previously done and to go beyond them: 
At its most basic level, social media captures all of the elements of the previous mediums. 
In operation, social media can distribute everything that television, magazines, radio, and 
newspapers do, and in a more timely manner with an easily accessible and interactive 
interface on demand (…). Beyond being simply a compilation of the previous mass media, 
the social media presents a mass, multidirectional conversation. One can respond to a 
video with a video. One can discover an issue, research that issue and respond to it, 
respond to the responses or even chat about it, and then distribute it to networks of other 
people from any of a multitude of mobile or fixed computing devices. (Gainous and Wagner 
2014, p. 7). 
Considering how vast this range of different functions is within social media platforms, it becomes 
apparent just how versatile and endlessly complex tool it can be. It is no surprise then, as Gayo-
Avello (2015, Social media in electoral campaigns) has noted,  that the tool has been used in 
numerous ways by political actors, such as to organize campaigns, raise funds, boost grassroots 
support, and to persuade undecided voters (e.g. Cogburn and Espinoza-Vasquez, 2011; Harfoush, 
2009; Jaeger et al., 2010); get feedback from the electorate (e.g., Meeks, 2003) and to engage in 
deliberation with the electorate (e.g. Enli and Skogerbø, 2013; Ross and Bürger, 2014). However, 
there is considerable variation within the use of social media for political purposes across 
countries, and politicians often do not use various platforms to their full potential by neglecting 
their followers or by avoiding interactions with them (Gibson et al., 2013; Roper, 1999; Stromer-
Galley, 2003). In broad terms, Foot et al. (2007) argue that there are four main practices which are 
commonly used by political actors during elections across countries both specifically in social 
media and more generally in the internet.  
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First, there is Informing where political actors use online tools to provide information about the 
central figures of specific campaigns, policy, and ideology relevant information that they use 
during public discourse and about the election process itself. Examples of this can be seen in 
candidates’ biographies on the net, announcements on their positions on different issues and when 
candidates provide information about when, where and how to vote. Second, Involving refers to 
actions that are meant to get users to engage with the campaigners. Features such as calendars 
about future campaign events, the option to subscribe to additional sources of information, outlets 
for volunteering or contributing money are examples of these actions. Third, Connecting refers to 
any attempt by the campaigners to bring users towards other political actors. These attempts can 
be purely cognitive, like contrasting candidates to their challengers, or by providing hyperlinks 
that lead to further connection channels,  such as email. Lastly, Mobilizing aims to transform users 
into volunteers and advocates. Like in the premodern era of campaigning, this can include giving 
materials to be distributed either online or offline and involve tools for supporters to publicly 
express their support for the candidate. (Foot et al., 2007.) 
In addition to these, Gayo-Avello (2015, Agenda setting) has also noted that social media is well 
suited for agenda setting. In this regard, social media can be appealing to many marginal political 
actors, since it allows for them to bypass the traditional media, which they cannot access either 
due to lack of resources or inherent lack of interest by the media to cover them. Twitter, in 
particular, is useful in this regard, since political tweets can inject issues and views into the public 
domain that journalist may feel the need to cover (Graham, 2012).  
Since the possibilities offered by social media are indeed vast, it is reasonable to assume that there 
is a significant learning curve associated with political social media use. Thus, political actors need 
time and learning to use social media effectively as a political tool. Moreover, it can be the case 
that the usefulness of social media will vary among different political parties, actors, and elections. 
The tools offered might not be useful to a party that relies on a portion of the electorate that has 
only a marginal presence on social media, for a candidate who does not know how to cope with 
the multiple functions that social media offers, or in high-profile elections where competition is 
conducted mostly in other mass-media platforms. Thus, every political actor needs to conduct an 
internal cost-benefit analysis and decide how heavily to invest in social media. Since the results of 
this analysis are likely to depend on the actor in question and on the time period, no single answer 
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can be given how actively social media will be eventually used nor how much it benefits those 
who use it.  
Furthermore, the mechanisms that drive the decision for political actors to invest in social media 
are dynamic in nature and change alongside with the overall population that uses social media for 
political and other purposes. Jacobs and Spierings (2016) suggest that this dynamic is captured by 
what they call the Motivation-Resource-Based Diffusion Model. The model presumes that at first, 
when social media is still a novelty, it mainly benefits political actors from smaller parties6 because 
they lag behind electorally and can be expected to have more incentives to try new communications 
and campaigning tools. This motivation drives them to experiment with social media, which will 
eventually lead to greater efficiency and incrementally greater benefits from its use. In contrast, 
larger parties are in more secured positions, and since their current efforts seem to be sufficient to 
keep them in their large party status, they see little reason to adopt new tools in their early stages. 
During this early-adoption phase it can then be expected that some form of equalization takes place 
and several smaller parties benefit from social media while the bigger parties remain at their old 
methods. Roughly, this situation is prevalent when approximately 10–15% of the entire population 
uses social media in some form. Once some time has passed and early-adopters are seen to benefit 
from social media, other bigger and better-financed parties take notice and encouraged by the 
positive results are motivated to invest in it. This process is further magnified when a larger portion 
of the population starts to have various uses of social media and the public who are on social media 
becomes more diverse.  
The situation has now crucially changed because the dominant position of the large parties is 
threatened, and the environment transitions to a widespread-diffusion phase. During this phase, 
the large parties are likely to observe that an increasing number of their voter-base is on social 
media and that, even worse, their minor party rivals have taken positions in there while their own 
presence is insignificant in comparison. To balance the situation, bigger parties are then expected 
to take a larger interest in the platform. The problem faced by these larger parties, however, is that 
                                                          
6 This reference to “small parties” is a bit of an oversimplification of the arguments advanced by Jacobs and Spierings 
(2016). For one, the theory they have advanced does not simplistically imply that all smaller parties will benefit from 
social media or have more motivation to start using it. Rather, the fact that multiple parties who are more prone to 
start using social media due to their ideological foundations or other charasteristics are also quite often marginal 
parties. This is especially the case with the so-called “postmaterialist” parties. 
P O L I T I C A L  C O M P E T I T I O N  A N D  S O C I A L  M E D I A                 P a g e  | 28 
 
 
 
success on social media is largely a practice of trial and error, and it is plausible that minor parties 
are at an advantage to gain greater benefits due to their gathered experience during the early 
adaption phase. Fortunately, this experience can be bought and transferred to parties that have the 
resources to acquire them. For example, parties who have the necessary resources can hire 
professional consultants, social media managers, and to push their ads and posts via paid 
advertising. As Jacobs and Spierings (2016, p. 33) put it: “Resources enable [big parties] to catch 
up”, and hence the term “resource” is in the name of the model. In contrast to early-adoption, it 
can be expected that normalization rather than equalization will take place during this time because 
larger, mainstream political actors adopt social media at a high speed. Finally, what Jacobs and 
Spierings call the laggard diffusion phase, almost everyone is to some extent on social media and 
even the most traditional and change-resistant parties will start to adopt it. However, these laggards 
often lack the resources and expertise to benefit from social media and will thus remain behind, 
normalizing their position as a smaller party. This model will then eventually predict that in the 
beginning social media leads to equalization for some, but at the end normalization for most actors. 
It is important to point out that this model is implied to work both at the aggregated party level and 
down below at the individual candidate level. In theory, social media can provide an arena to which 
marginalized political groups can gain ground because the gatekeepers that kept them out of the 
game are largely absent (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999; Enyedi, 2008).Thus, especially lesser-known 
politicians and traditionally underrepresented groups have an incentive to invest in social media in 
order to gain more name recognition, build alternative networks, and try to enter into the traditional 
media (Lasorsa, Lewis, & Holton, 2012). These individual-level dynamics are equally important 
as are the aggregate party level dynamics. Indeed, I largely agree with Jacobs and Spierings (2016, 
p. 11), who state that the power balances between individual politicians and intraparty competition 
are crucial in shaping the degree and practices of personalization and representation and thus 
fundamental to the functioning of our democratic systems. If we leave the individual level outside 
of the equation, we risk underestimating the impact that social media may have.  
Given these possibilities, it seems plausible that social media represents a fundamental change in 
political communication – at least once enough time and learning have passed –  and perhaps, as 
a result, has changed how political competition is conducted among western democracies. The 
mere possibilities and existence of these tools, however, does not directly imply that political 
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actors will start to use them or will eventually gain from their usage. Furthermore, as illustrated 
above, while social media is a versatile tool, and in most cases free to use, it is also extremely 
complex and requires significant effort from the political actors who need to learn how to make 
the best use of it. The issue is further complicated by the fact that different actors can have different 
situations, access to resources, and degrees of pre-existing political power, which ultimately 
change how social media is used. It is then beneficial to further investigate the current empirical 
evidence we have on how the existing platforms are currently used, who uses them, and what direct 
impact this usage has thus far had on electoral gains. The next chapter reviews the current literature 
on what we know in this respect, and it is later used to work our way towards an overarching 
theoretical model that can be used to explain some of the results the literature has previously 
arrived at. To elaborate further, the model adopts the view from Jacobs and Spierings that 
individual-level interaction is equally important as are party level dynamics and aims to explain 
how individual politicians acquire political capital through social media that they can transform to 
votes on election day. This work is needed since while the Motivation-Resource-Based Diffusion 
Model created by Jacobs and Spierings allows us to explain why certain political actors start to 
invest in social media at various stages it says little on why and when such investments can be 
beneficial. Before going too far ahead, however, we will move on to the literature review.   
 
4. LITERATURE REVIEW  
As previously mentioned, social media has received a fair amount of scholarly attention during the 
past ten years. Since political campaigns are one of the more direct channels through which 
political actors can influence the political sphere, it is no surprise that elections are one of the main 
research areas of political social media research. In general terms, research related to elections can 
be broken down to three main topics: explaining social media adaptation rates, analyzing content 
and patterns of use, and estimating the impact of social media on electoral outcomes. It seems 
logical to first explore who are the political actors that first start to use social media, or, in the 
terms of Jacobs and Spierings (2016), have the motivation to start investing in it. Thus, we shall 
start there and later on move towards content and patterns of use and end up with the impact this 
has had on election outcomes.  
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4.1 Social media adaptation rates 
First, many researchers, especially in the early years of social media research, have been interested 
in how, what, and why politicians start to use social media for political purposes. This question 
has become ever more salient as political actors around the western world have increasingly started 
to have social media accounts. Many studies have documented an increasing trend of social media 
adaption in the UK (Jackson & Lilleker, 2009), Germany (Marcinkowski & Metag, 2014), France 
(Koc-Michalska, Gibson, & Vedel, 2014), Denmark (Hansen & Kosiara-Pedersen, 2014), and in 
Norway (Kalnes, 2009), for example. Theoretically speaking and based on earlier research on 
online campaigning and personal website use of political candidates, it could be argued that certain 
individual characteristics of political candidates (such as sex, race, and age), party voter base and 
regional power relations between parties can explain whether or not political actors start to adopt 
social media as a political tool. For example, a study by Esterling et al. (2005) observed that in the 
United States the age of the candidate and district characteristics explain a sizable portion of the 
variance of the use and quality of personal websites. In general, younger individuals and candidates 
in more competitive districts have had the most visible online presence. Furthermore, the study 
also noted that the candidates in rural areas are more prone to have quality websites, which might 
be an attempt to overcome the difficulty related to communicating with a geographically dispersed 
constituency.  
 
In the age of social media, the importance of the competitiveness of elections has likewise been 
used to explain social media adaption (Lassen & Brown, 2010). In highly competitive elections 
candidates need to use resources extensively to remain relevant and visible to their constituency, 
and many effective tools to accomplish this are either highly expensive or only available to 
incumbent and experienced candidates. For example, paid advertising on television or on 
newspapers can have a positive effect on electoral gains, but only a minority of the candidates can 
afford them (Ansolabehere, Iyengar, Simon, & Valentino, 1994; Huber & Arceneaux, 2007; 
Ridout, Shah, Goldstein, & Franz, 2004). Thus, any tool that gives candidates with relative minor 
resources a cheap way to communicate with voters and to advertise themselves should be 
appealing. Furthermore, the more uncertain the election outcome is for an individual candidate, 
the more likely it is that all available tools will be utilized in the fear of losing elections. Empirical 
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findings support this line of thought; in the US 2006 midterm congressional elections candidates 
running in competitive races were the most likely to update their Facebook profile and it had a 
significant effect on whether or not a Senate candidate campaigned on Facebook (Williams & 
Gulati, 2007).  
 
External factors specific to a certain time period can also play an important role in explaining why 
and when certain candidates choose to use social media. One well-documented example is the 
minority or opposition party status. Members of such parties can be drawn to alternative media 
outlets when traditional media has either lost interest in covering them or are unable to gain media 
coverage because ruling parties dominate media landscape (Lassen & Brown, 2010; Vergeer & 
Hermans, 2013). In countries where voters can cast preferential votes to specific candidates, the 
above argument can be extended to individual candidates and their personal characteristics. Just 
like a minority party can have difficulties in gaining media attention from traditional outlets, 
individual candidates that belong to minority groups can face similar difficulties. 
 
The empirical findings, however, do not seem to support the suggested effect from a minority 
status. In the Netherlands, for example, the candidates running in the 2009 European parliament 
were more likely to adopt Twitter if they came from parties that were successful in past elections, 
suggesting that minority status is not a predictor of social media adaptation. Furthermore, the same 
study found that candidates who used Twitter belonged to the top quarter of the party candidate 
list, which further casts doubt on whether a minority status actually leads to social media use. 
(Vergeer, Hermans, & Sams, 2011.) It could be argued that this is a special case of intranational 
European elections, but similar findings have been reported on national elections as well. Vergeer 
& Hermans (2013) investigated whether candidates from less established and smaller parties were 
more likely to use Twitter as a campaigning tool during the 2010 Dutch general elections, but 
found no empirical evidence to support this hypothesis. The same study did, however, find that 
candidates who came from parties that had lost seats in the last general elections were more likely 
to subscribe to Twitter. This could indicate that other external factors other than minority status 
could be more important in explaining social media adaptation. Parties that are experiencing heavy 
losses could be more willing (or more desperate) to use any kind of new tools in an attempt to find 
new ways to reach voters since the old tools seem to be losing their effectiveness.  
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The ideology of the party has also been suggested as an explanatory variable. One of such 
arguments come from Vergeer & Hermans (2013), who argue that since the ideology of the party 
reflects their ideas about how society should be organized, what societal goals should be pursued, 
and how these ideas should be realized, it will also factor in how these parties utilize new media. 
According to Vergeer & Hermans (2013), this can be seen within liberal parties who appear to be 
early adopters of online campaigning tools. This can be partially explained by their liberal attitude 
that allows their candidates to design their campaign more freely and in a more individualized 
way, which in turn makes social media platforms such as Twitter a natural tool to use. There seem 
to be some merit to this hypothesis, since there are empirical findings showing that liberal parties 
have been the most extensive users of Twitter (Vergeer, Hermans, & Sams, 2011) and that 
conservative parties use social media less frequently (Baxter & Marcella, 2013), although there 
have not been many more studies that try directly to use ideology to explain social media 
adaptation. Furthermore, in their own analysis, Vegeer & Hermans (2013) found that ideology had 
no effect on whether or not Twitter was used as a campaign tool, suggesting that this argument 
does not stand on a solid foundation. 
 
The most robust factors that have been found to meaningfully impact adaptation rates seem to be 
more closely related to a handful of personal traits related to individual candidates. Firstly, it seems 
that the uppermost elite candidates are more prone to start using social media as a political tool. 
This finding is supported by the fact that past electoral success of the party, larger finances, and 
upper list position give higher probabilities for an individual party member to adopt and use social 
media platforms (Lassen & Brown, 2010; Williams & Gulati, 2007; Verger, Hermans, & Sams, 
2011; Vegeer & Hermans, 2013). Other important characteristic seems to be, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the age of the candidate. In general, younger candidates are more likely to have a 
social media account (Lassen & Brown, 2010). At least two explanations can be made on the 
relevance of age the simplest of which is that younger people are overall more likely to use social 
media, and because of this social media is a more familiar tool to use for younger candidates. The 
other explanation is related to the expected voter base of young candidates. Young politicians are 
likely to target young voters who are more reachable through social media, which could mean that 
the potential gains of social media use are greater for younger candidates. 
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However, as it has been pointed out by Hoffman, Suphan, and Meckel (2016), examining the 
characteristics of individual candidates, parties, and campaign conditions does not tell us why 
certain politicians choose to utilize social media or explain what their motivations are to do so. 
Hoffman et al. (2016) aimed at filling this informational gap in their study of the 2011 Swiss 
parliamentary elections. The study found three distinct sources of motivation: promotion, 
information seeking, and entertainment. The most important motive out of the three is the 
promotion motive, which includes the candidates desire to create attention for relevant topics and 
distributing political messages, thereby increasing the personal profile of the candidate. The 
second most important motive is “information seeking”, which includes actions related to 
collecting information on the political climate, seeing what others are talking about and 
understanding the electorates’ interests. The final, and least important, motive encompasses 
entertainment uses, such as having fun and passing the time.  
 
Taken together, these findings suggest that social media is a normalizing force within the political 
sphere and will more likely reinforce existing power relations rather than break it down. From the 
viewpoint of rational choice theory, this phenomenon should not come as overly surprising, given 
if we assume that social media use can result in electoral gains. Those political actors with most 
resources, experience, and status within the party are better situated at taking the full advantage 
from new campaigning tools, since, as already explored above, they have the ability to hire 
personnel to first learn how to use them and later manage them. It is then natural that vote-seeking 
politicians will use any tool that gets them more votes and those who remain at the top are the ones 
who are able to identify and sufficiently use promising new tools. This fits fairly well to the 
motivation-resource-based diffusion model from Jacobs and Spierings (2016), in that while some 
marginal actor might benefit from social media in its early days, later these differences are evened 
out and incumbents will use social media platforms in increasing numbers.  
 
Lastly, apart from the personal candidate characteristics, the observed differences in the 
aggregated levels of social media adaptation within different parties seem to be more closely 
related to the demographic layout of the voters, rather than to the ideology of the party as such. It 
is likely that the reason why progressive and liberal parties have been both more likely to have and 
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to use social media accounts in contrast to conservatives is a result of what voters these parties 
target. Liberal and progressive parties tend to target younger, urban and more tech-savvy voters, a 
group who plausibly are also more likely to be on social media and to use it to search political 
information. Conservatives, on the other hand, target vastly different groups who are less likely to 
use social media and thus the expected gains from such platforms are likely to be minimal.  
 
4.2 Analyzing the intensity and patterns of use 
Once political actors start to use social media, the next logical step is to investigate how often and 
in what ways such tools are used. In this regard, we are lucky to have a multitude of findings from 
different countries and elections. Starting from the United States, by far the most popular social 
media platform used by political actors is Twitter, although it took some time to gain popularity 
among politicians. In 2009 well below half of the members of Congress used the platform. At the 
time there were a total of 159 members using Twitter: 39 Senators (39%) and 120 Representatives 
(28%). Furthermore, Twitter was mainly used to distribute one-directional information, which 
often can be characterized as self-promotion where the candidate sends, for example, tweets with 
links directing the user to blog posts written by the candidate. A second popular activity related to 
either announcing a type of activity the politician was currently engaging in or updating real-time 
their current location. This type of activity usually included tweets such as where the 
Congressperson had for lunch and where, updates when he is having meetings with constituents, 
corporations and other groups, and information from and about events they attended. Together 
these two types make up 82% of the 200 most recent tweets from the Congresspersons listed on 
TweetCongress7 on 6th of February, 2009 (69 people in total). While one of the early hopes placed 
on Twitter argued that it would enable a more personal connection with citizens and politicians, in 
these early stages communication and interaction was a rather limited activity. Direct 
communication with constituents accounted only for 7.4% of the tweets (338 in total), suggesting 
that the platform was mainly used for self-promotion. (Golbeck, Grimes, & Rogers 2010.)  
Meanwhile, Australian politicians exhibit much of the same patterns of behavior, and between 
2009 and 2010 political actors in Twitter were much more likely to use it for broadcasting rather 
                                                          
7 A grass-roots organization aimed at increasing interaction between the congress and US citizens through twitter: 
http://www.tweetcongress.org/about  
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than for conversation. A study by Will J. Grant, Brenda Moon and Janie B. Grant (2010) observed 
that, within the 10-month observation period, most of the tweets sent by political actors were 
isolated statement without reference to any other tweet or Twitter user. More conversational tweets 
(replies and retweets) were clearly a less popular activity overall. Interestingly, politicians from 
the Green party represented a clear exception to this case. In general, Green politicians send more 
conversational tweets, although mostly to their own party members, and additionally followed 
more people on twitter than politicians from other parties.  There is no clear reason why this 
difference was observed, although Grant suggests that this might either result from the strategic 
attempt by the greens to maximize the reach their tweets were able to get, which suggests better 
intuition on how Twitter is used effectively or due to the less professionalized cohort of politicians 
within the party. The pattern of Twitter behavior by the Greens is much closer to the average 
Australian citizen, which can lead us to believe that many Green politicians are somewhat closer 
to them than to professional politicians. 
In the Nordic countries, the patterns of use do not largely deviate from the above findings. The 
activity among Swedish and Norwegian politicians on Facebook and Twitter seem to be rather low 
outside of elections. A sample of 570 politicians shows that during non-election periods the median 
amount of posts or tweets are close to one per day. However, those who are active seem to 
contribute a significant amount of the overall content created by politicians, and the distribution 
of the number of tweets and Facebook posts is highly skewed. (Larsson & Kalsnes, 2014.) The 
same was also true in the Australian context, where a minority of politicians sent over 1,000 tweets 
within a 10-month period but most contributed with only one tweet or none at all (Grant et al., 
2010).  
Interestingly, those who were active social media users in the Nordic context seemed to be, as 
Larsson and Kalsnes put it, in ‘challenger’ positions. The most active politicians tended to be 
younger, in opposition and out of the political limelight (Larsson & Kalsnes, 2014). This contrasts 
with the early research on social media adoption, where the well-positioned politicians were more 
likely to open up a social media account. Perhaps continuous and active use of these accounts is 
something that challenger politicians have a greater interest in and perceive more benefits from it 
than the established politicians do, at least in the Nordic context. Alternatively, the result can arise 
from differing needs. Opening a social media account requires only minimal effort, whereas 
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maintaining it is something that requires a constant use of resources, which is something that the 
established politicians might want to spend elsewhere. As mentioned previously, challenger 
politicians frequently face more restrictions on how they can engage in political competition and 
remain relevant to the public. As such, social media is one of the few tools they can use, whereas 
established politicians have many alternatives and are thus more likely to spend their efforts 
elsewhere. 
During elections the patterns of use remain partly the same, but some changes appear as well. For 
one, the intensity of use increases significantly, which is perhaps not a surprising result since all 
politicians have more incentives to communicate with voters. For example, Vergeer, Hermans, 
and Sams (2011) show that the candidates running for the Dutch 2009 European Parliament were 
more active on Twitter during the campaigning season than outside of it, which suggest that the 
platform is mainly used as a campaigning tool. Furthermore, it appears that a more social approach 
to campaigning becomes increasingly difficult as the size of the network grows: the more people 
follow the candidate the less likely it is that the candidate will also follow their supporters. This 
again provides confirmation that social media is used rather unsocially by politicians and that the 
platforms mainly exists to inform citizens. Interestingly, Vergeer, Hermans, and Sams (2011) point 
out that those parties that could potentially benefit the most from the platform had only little 
interest in it. Candidates that came from small and newer parties (such as Libertas, Newropeans, 
Solidara and Liberal Democrats) were among the less active parties on Twitter.  
During the 2010 Swedish parliamentary elections, Larsson & Moe (2012) provide further evidence 
that patterns of use differ during elections. Whereas challenger politicians were more active users 
outside of campaigns, during them it appears that Twitter is an outlet mainly for the elite political 
actors or for individuals affiliated with mainstream media or political life in general. Furthermore, 
the overall communication method during these elections was in favor of one-directional 
communication: merely 7% of the messages in the sample of tweets were replies. While this holds 
true in general, some minority parties presented a more conversational style of tweeting. For 
example, the Pirate party and Feminist party were more active in both directly mentioning another 
Twitter user and within the retweet networks, which are used for interaction rather than for one-
way broadcasting.  
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In the United Kingdom, similar findings largely correspond with the results from the above-
mentioned studies. For example, in Scotland, during 2010, the candidates running for the UK 
Parliament rarely responded to the comments posted by voters in their Facebook pages, and there 
was a general reluctance to respond to “difficult” policy questions or critical comments. 
Furthermore, the content published by the candidates themselves frequently lacked any direct 
references to policy issues. (Baxter & Marcella, 2012.) Likewise, results from the country overall 
showed that the main strategy employed by the candidates was to use Twitter for one-way 
communication and to inform the public about the campaign and party affairs, such as about 
events, strategies, promotion, and polling. Policy issues remained largely at the background and 
only three percent of tweets were considered as position taking where a candidate posted his/her 
opinion, argument or the party position on a political issue (Graham, Broersma, Hazelhoff, & van't 
Haar, 2013).  
Similar findings were uncovered by Parmelee and Bichard (2012), who studied a sample of 4,174 
tweets collected from candidates in 12 competitive 2010 US races from 1st of October to 2nd of 
November. The findings showed that tweets regarding candidates’ ideology or describing 
policy/issue positions was the least popular tweet within the sample (contributing only 4.7%). 
During these elections, by far the most popular style of communication was giving general 
information about the campaign. As Parmelee and Bichard (2012) suggest, this emphasis is likely 
a way for the candidate to keep voters aware and involved with campaign activities and progress. 
Furthermore, tweets were also likely to contain mostly negative information regarding opponents. 
Apparently, Twitter can provide a platform where many candidates feel comfortable spreading 
negative messages about their competitors in the hopes of disqualifying them in the eyes of the 
electorate. This could be, however, a unique characteristic of the political environment within the 
United States, and it remains to be seen how popular negative social media campaigning is outside 
of it.  
As in other countries, some notable differences between parties do exist within the United 
Kingdom and on the patterns of their social media use. Mainly, there were a group of candidates 
who were significantly more active in interacting with voters and aimed at mobilizing, helping and 
consulting them. As Graham et al. observe (2013), these candidates largely came from the Labor 
party and from the Liberal Democrats, whose percentage of interactive Tweets were 47 and 42 
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percent respectively. Graham et al. (2013) believe that these findings illustrate that Twitter can be 
used to involve people in the political process by two ways: either broadcasting information on the 
campaign or providing a platform for interaction and mobilization. 
Together, the studies presented above highlight at least three different aspects how social media 
has been used by political actors in recent years. First, it is abundantly clear that political actors 
most of the time do not use social media platforms to interact or to provide two-way 
communication with citizens and voters. The vast majority of tweets and Facebook posts are used 
for one-way communication and politicians only rarely answer to other users when they try to 
interact with them. This holds true almost regardless of what country election or time period we 
are talking about. However, it is important to focus on the fact that while this holds true in the 
aggregate, some clear differences are found between different groups. Candidates coming from 
smaller, liberal and younger parties have shown more interactive approach towards their political 
social media behavior and this might work in their favor. Lastly, what politicians talk about on 
social media is largely disconnected from policy discussions. The content created by politicians is 
in many cases characterized as self-promotion, announcements on the campaign trail or updates 
on what they are currently doing, where they are at and who are they with. While policy is not 
entirely absent, it does fade into the background and is perhaps even actively avoided by some 
politicians (Baxter & Marcella, 2012). In this light, social media is far from the digital public 
sphere some have hoped it would become (Shirky 2011). Here, it seems, is not the place where 
politicians and citizens can come together to discuss to one other nor policy to be debated among 
differing viewpoints.  
 
4.3 Investigating impact 
As previous studies have shown us, social media is being used as a political tool, more actively by 
some than by others, but these observations alone do not shed much light on how this activity has 
impacted the political sphere. If anything, the findings presented seem to suggest that not much 
has changed after all; a clear majority of politicians are not encouraged to interact more with voters, 
and social media is used mostly for one-directional broadcasting and self-promotion much in the 
same way as television and online campaigning has been used before (Bimber, 2003). However, 
there are some exceptions to this and, although the mode of communication is not all that different 
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from what has been seen before, the fact that many candidates from minority parties and from 
challenger positions are the most active social media users and use interactive methods could lead 
to changes in the balance of power between candidates. However, for this to be true, social media 
activity needs to have a significant impact and bring political gains for its users. As the following 
studies illustrate, in many countries this is indeed what we see. 
As early as 2006, a study from the US midterm elections has shown that social media is associated 
with electoral performance, although the relation seems to be indirect. A study conducted on the 
2006 US Congressional candidates investigated whether or not Facebook activity had a significant 
impact on the candidates’ vote shares (Williams & Gulati, 2007). Using multivariate regression, 
where Facebook Activity was coded as a "1" if a candidate accessed and updated his or her profile 
in any way and coded a "0" if s/he did not, the study found that activity in itself did not seem to 
have a significant impact. When controlling for a number of electoral variables, it was found that 
incumbents or challengers who updated their Facebook profiles did not perform any differently 
than those who did not. However, while activity in itself did not seem to be significant, the number 
Facebook members who registered as a supporter of the candidate8 had a significant effect on a 
candidate’s final vote shares, particularly for open-seat candidates. The pattern of this effect was 
characterized by diminishing returns; increasing the number of supporters from 100 to 200, for 
example, adds approximately 1.1% to an incumbent‘s vote share, but to add another 1.1% requires 
200 more supporters and yet another 1.1% requires 400 additional supporters. For Williams and 
Gulati (2007), these results suggest that rather than having a direct electoral impact, Facebook is 
capturing the underlying enthusiasm and intensity of support for a candidate in the form of 
Facebook supporters. In this case, the members of a community who are more enthusiastic about 
their choice are more likely to publicize that support and then take the time to do it, which manifest 
itself within Facebook. 
Continuing with the investigation, Williams and Gulati looked further to presidential elections in 
the US and studied the impact Facebook had on the 2008 presidential nominating contests. As 
before, multivariate regression models were used to explain each candidate’s popular vote share 
for all state nominating contests. The findings here are similar with respect to congressional 
                                                          
8At the time Facebook offered a “Endorsements” feature that allows its users to indicate support for a U.S. political 
candidate, which can be shared with the user’s friends or publicly with everyone. 
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elections, and Facebook support was again found to be an important indicator of electoral success 
that is independent of traditional measures such as expenditures, media coverage, and organizing 
activities (such as campaign events). However, while direct activity yet again was not an important 
variable in itself, the absence of it could diminish the impact that the number of Facebook 
supporters had. For those candidates who made little effort to use Facebook and integrate it into 
their campaign strategy, the number of Facebook supporters had a near zero impact on the vote 
share. (William & Gulati, 2008.) This implies that, at least for high profile elections, activity within 
Facebook does matter and supporters alone do not guarantee electoral gains. 
While it is interesting to see that social media variables are associated with electoral gains, the 
above studies do not tell us what type of social media activity is most likely to result in favorable 
outcomes. In this regard, Parmelee and Bichard (2012) have shown that the type of content 
candidates spread in Twitter also appears to have some influence on election outcomes. The 
analysis conducted on 4,174 tweets indicated that the types of tweets send by campaign losers 
featured topics relating to campaign strategy, ideology, or personal issues. On the other hand, 
campaign winners were more likely to feature replies, ‘@’ mentions and to have URL links. 
Parmelee and Bichard (2012) suggest that these results can be explained by arguing that voters are 
not all that interested in seeking information about the personality or ideology of candidates in 
Twitter but are rather seeking ways and information on how to get personally involved. Thus, the 
reason why the winning candidates are more likely to send out replies, ‘@’ mentions and URL 
links is that these kinds of tweets offer at least some level of increased interactivity and engagement 
for the voter who as a consequence feels more involved in the campaign.  
In Europe too, the relationship between social media activity and electoral gains has been explored. 
In the Netherlands, Kruikemeier (2014) has explored the relationship between the style of usage 
of Twitter by political candidates and whether or not this usage has transformed to electoral support 
for these speciﬁc candidates. Looking at a sample of 40,957 political tweets from 177 candidates 
during the 2010 Dutch national elections (the sample was collected during the ﬁrst 3 months before 
the elections and approximately 2 months after the elections), Kruikemeier (2014) found that 
Twitter use during the elections had a significant effect on the number of votes they received, 
although, as similarly observed in the US, followers seem to matter more than active use. On 
average, the dummy variable indicating whether or not a candidate used Twitter during the 
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campaign was associated with a 10% increase in preferential votes and the dummy was able to 
give a 9% increase in the variance explained after control variables such as incumbency, sex of the 
candidate, candidates’ prominence in the media, and position in the party list were controlled for. 
It is telling, however, that once this simple dummy is replaced with the total number of tweets a 
candidate created during the campaign, the impact of this variable is not only insignificant but also 
negative, which implies that excessive tweeting can actually hurt the candidate. What seems to be 
more important, is the number of followers the candidate has, which is associated with a 17.1% 
increase in votes for a point change in the average amount of followers a candidate had during the 
campaign.  
Furthermore, Kruikemeier (2014) also studied different patterns of Twitter use and their effects on 
preferential votes and found that more interactive users (candidates who used more ‘@’ mentions) 
are found to gain more votes, although both the impact and significance is lower than the variable 
measuring the average number of followers. Kruikemeier (2014) argues that this result indicates 
that interactivity is one of the reasons why social media activity can bring electoral gains. 
Following an argument from Lee and Shin (2012), Kruikemeier (2014) proposes that this kind of 
interactivity induces social presence, which is defined as the degree to which individual feels that 
another communicator is present and there is an opportunity to engage in an actual conversation. 
Social presence consequently leads to higher intention to vote for a candidate who is able to create 
it. In short, interactivity leads individuals to support a candidate because it leads to the feeling that 
the candidate is closer to you. Unfortunately, while ‘@’ mentions did indeed seem to have an 
impact, it is not known to whom these mentions were made. It is quite possible that the candidates 
are not interacting with potential voters, but are rather communicating with other party members, 
their supporters or with rival candidates. Evidence for this can be found in the US where ‘@’ 
mention feature was regularly used by candidates to mention the Twitter accounts of their 
endorsers (Parmelee & Bichard, 2012). If this represents an overarching trend in other countries 
as well, this pattern of behavior would be indicative of something quite different than increased 
social presence among voters. 
An alternative viewpoint comes from Spierings and Jacobs (2014) who argue that social media 
can have two main effects for preferential votes: a direct and an interaction effect. Firstly, the direct 
effect implies that social media can serve as a showcase or a campaign poster. Platforms such as 
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Facebook allow users to add personal details about themselves and as such allow for personally-
centered campaigns that give voters information on the life and interests of the politician. In 
addition, merely having a social media account can signal to voters that the candidate is up-to-date 
with current trends and thus is shown to be a “modern” candidate. As Spierings and Jacobs (2014) 
note, this direct effect implies that the more followers a candidate has the larger the effect on votes 
can be since following acts as an implicit endorsement of the candidate. Secondly, the interaction 
effect assumes that a mere social media presence is not enough. In addition to having a large 
number of followers, the candidates need to maintain communication with them as well. In short, 
this line of argument proposes that followers only materialize to electoral gains when a candidate 
actively mobilizes them.  
These effects were explored within the same 2010 Dutch national elections from which 
Kruikemeier also drew his sample, but this time another social media platform specific to the Dutch 
context was used alongside with Twitter for the analysis. The dataset used by Spierings and Jacobs 
(2014) include all 493 candidates of the 10 parties that had won at least one seat in the parliament 
and data from their Hyves9 and Twitter social media profiles. The results from the data showed 
that the direct effect of having a Twitter account is significant but limited in comparison with 
Hyves. Every 1,000 followers on Twitter yield some 190 extra votes while the same number of 
followers in Hyves gives 1,343 bonus votes, but this is not statistically significant. Spierings and 
Jacobs (2014) suspect that the lack of significance in Hyves is due to the highly skewed data: 69 
% of all Hyves followers came from just two candidates. While followers alone do not seem to do 
much, in contrast with the findings that Kruikemeier (2014) arrived at, social media activity can 
increase its impact. According to the ordinary least squares results (OLS), the interaction term 
between the number of followers and the number of tweets sent was statistically significant and 
each tweet published during the campaign gives 11 extra votes per 1,000 followers. Similar results 
were found in Hyves users and with a somewhat larger effect. From this, the authors conclude that 
social media can have a modest effect on the number of preference votes a candidate receives, but 
this impact is the largest when the social media profiles are actively used. 
                                                          
9 Hyves was the largest social media platform in the Netherlands at the time and is equivalent of Facebook with 
broadly similar functions (Spierings & Jacobs, 2014).  In the Netherlands, Hyves had roughly 8 million users, Facebook 
4.5 million users and Twitter around 2.5 million users (Oosterveer, 2011). 
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While the studies above demonstrate that social media is indeed associated with electoral gains, 
they leave us a puzzle to ponder upon. First of all, since all of the above studies have been cross-
sectional and quite plausibly subject to omitted variable bias, it is unclear whether social media 
variables capture an independent effect that can have a direct impact on electoral gains or are they, 
as Williams and Gulati (2007) have suggested, merely a proxy for the underlying enthusiasm and 
intensity of support for a candidate. However, the fact that in a number of cases social media 
activity is a significant variable in explaining vote shares and the finding that the interaction effect 
between the number of tweets and number of followers substantially increases the impact on 
preferential votes are promising indicators. These results show that while social media can capture 
underlying support for the candidate, that support can be maximized through active use of social 
media platforms and thus political use of social media is an independently important element in 
political competition. Indeed, looking back at the Obama campaign, one of the reasons why the 
campaign was successful was due to mobilizing uses of social media platforms that were used to 
inspire further support among followers, organize supporters towards grassroots campaigning and 
canvassing or acquire further campaign donations (Katz & Jain, 2013). 
Whatever the case might be, by the very least these results show that social media is an important 
topic of study within the political sphere and it clearly does capture some kind of resource that 
political actors can acquire and transform to political gains. Based on these previous studies, it 
seems to be the case that during elections social media is mainly used as a one-way communication 
channel to the electorate, where candidates give information about their personalities, campaign 
activities, and self-endorsements. However, in many instances the level of interactivity varies 
among different politicians and some, such as many green party candidates, utilize the interactive 
features much more than others. Moreover, the interactive features have also been found to be 
associated with candidates who are the winners of elections and especially ‘@’ mentions on 
Twitter can have a direct impact on the number of votes a candidate receives. Thus, it is highly 
plausible that interactivity is one of the main variables that determine whether or not a candidate 
can successfully use social media for electoral gains.  
However, the reason why interactivity should matter is open to debate. Both Kruikemeier (2014) 
and Parmelee & Bichard (2012) hypothesize that the interactive features bring voters closer to the 
campaigns, either by making the individual candidate feel closer to voters or by giving voters more 
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tools to participate directly with the campaign, but there are other plausible reasons. One 
alternative explanation, which is not often brought up, is highly related to the algorithms that 
govern how each social media platform works and what content is shown to what types of users 
and how many will be able to see it. As explained earlier, one of the main novel changes that social 
media has brought to political communication is the increased importance of individual users, who 
can now impose greater control both on what kind of information they receive and what content is 
deemed worthy to be redistributed to other users. Thus, it is clearly important to consider the 
impact of social media not only through the actions of candidates but also through how other users 
interact with the content that is produced by the candidates. Interactivity, then, is not only an 
indication of social presence but is also an important variable that controls how content spreads 
within a social media network. Producing a @ mention, for example, subjects all individual users 
who follow the Twitter account to which the mention was made and thus increasing the reach the 
tweet has (Wang et al., 2013).  
Indeed, it is precisely here where I believe we encounter one of the fundamental building blocks 
that allow us to explain why social media activity can transform into electoral gains. Whatever the 
eventual usage of the platform may result in, the success of it is fundamentally dependent on who 
is able to observe the efforts of the candidate. If a candidate invests in social media, but cannot 
attract attention to it, it is likely that these efforts will be in vain. Thus, the main resource that a 
candidate must have to be successful on social media is the level of visibility that his messages are 
able to achieve within the electorate. Following this logic, it is important to have a better 
understanding how the algorithms of social media platforms decide what content is seen to other 
users and how this content can be spread from one user to another. For practical reasons it is not 
desirable to go through in great detail every algorithm that has been created to numerous different 
social media platforms, and, furthermore, for theoretical purposes, it is enough to concentrate on 
a single platform. The main arguments created here, in the context of a single platform, can be 
transferred and altered, if necessary, to other contexts as well. Since Facebook is the most often 
used platform for both citizens and political actors within Finland (Strandberg, 2016) we will then 
turn our attention to it and explore in greater detail how it distributes content to users. Using this 
information, we can then finally arrive at a formal model that illustrates how the platform provides 
electoral gains. 
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5. REACHING VOTERS THROUGH INFECTION  
To develop further the idea of visibility as a necessary condition for successful political use of 
social media, a study from Taina Bucher (2012) illustrates the algorithmic power that Facebook 
has on its users and explains why visibility and attention are the main ways in which Facebook 
allocates influence. After this, DeVito (2017) gives us further understanding how the News Feed 
algorithm works within Facebook, which enhances our intuition on what is shown in the Feed and 
how other users spread various content from user to user, either explicitly or implicitly. Indeed, 
the way information spreads in Facebook can be rather similar as for how diseases spread among 
populations. Like diseases, content on Facebook spreads through effective contacts with 
individuals who have encountered social media content and interacted with it. Liking a post on 
Facebook, for example, allows for the post to spread out to the personal network of the person who 
interacted with it (DeVito, 2017). Actions such as these are thus similar to an infection where one 
individual first spreads the disease to people who he is in contact with and then expands even 
further as these new infections are able to spread the disease through additional contacts.  
This mode of information diffusion is surprisingly similar to the premodern phase of campaigning 
described by Norris (2000, pp. 137–161) where campaigners heavily relied on volunteers who 
would go canvassing from door to door, and who also aimed to influence their friends and relatives. 
What differs, however, is that many of the users who interact with social media content on 
Facebook are not, in most cases, entirely aware that the act of liking a post will spread the content 
further or did not intentionally meant to spread it. After all, liking something on Facebook can 
have multiple other motivations behind it, and the desire to give the post more visibility is just one 
possible motivation. As such, campaigners on Facebook need to consider how “infectious” their 
messages are, and, furthermore, they need not rely on volunteers who knowingly and actively will 
contribute to the campaign. It is enough for them to get other users to engage, to interact with the 
messages they send and to get their political diseases out to the world. To see how this helps us to 
understand social media within the political sphere, we have to first discuss in more detail how 
Facebook and its algorithms work.  
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5.1 Algorithms and prisons, how visibility is allocated within Facebook 
By building on the theory of visibility and power created by Michel Foucault, Bucher (2012) 
argues that social media represents a space of "constructed visibility" where space is purposefully 
designed such that individuals are made seeable and, furthermore, seeable in a specific way. In the 
famous example of Jeremy Bentham's prison Panopticon, the prisoners residing in the prison are 
made visible by the observatory tower at the center of the circular building, and while one person 
in the tower can observe any individual prisoner, none of the prisoners can see who is in the tower 
or, more crucially, whether or not anyone is in the tower at all. A space constructed in this way 
projects power over the prisoners who are forcefully made visible and must therefore always act 
as if they are being observed. (Foucault, 1975.)  
For Bucher (2012), this kind of material or technical structuring of visibility is especially 
interesting and relevant in terms of social media. Like the Panopticon, social media platforms are 
designed to make objects visible or invisible based on a criterion that the owners of the platform 
ultimately decide. In the Panopticon the threat of visibility impacts the prisoner's behavior to self-
regulate themselves and internalize the rules of the prison. Furthermore, the threat is felt and 
distributed equally to all prisoners, since all prisoners are equally likely to be seen, and thus the 
mechanism of constructed visibility works in the same way for each individual. Bucher (2012) 
contrasts this to the non-physical space in Facebook, where the visibility of individuals is likewise 
constructed with a purpose, but where individuals are not all in equal position. The algorithm that 
dictates who or what is seen in the individual news feeds of other Facebook users is a complex 
mechanism that accounts, among other things, how strong relationships individual users have to 
one other, how users interact with content and what Facebook itself decides should acquire greater 
attention. 
For individual users this is important since whereas the prisoners in Panopticon are living under 
the threat of visibility in Facebook the opposite is true: users are under a threat of invisibility. This 
is especially true for politicians who need visibility like a resource which they can later capitalize 
as electoral support or to agenda setting within the public discourse. Indeed, a whole industry has 
emerged around "News Feed Optimization" where marketers, media strategists, and PR firms 
advice how to remain relevant and visible on Facebook and on other platforms. However, in order 
to acquire visibility, politicians need to follow the logic embedded in the architecture of Facebook 
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and to learn how to act in the space of constructed visibility. It is here where we can start to see 
one of the ways in which social media platforms can shape and influence the political sphere. If 
social media tools become crucial for political actors, then the platform can decide and guide the 
type of behavior that is needed from those actors by rewarding them with increased visibility and, 
as a consequence, with more political capital. 
The way Facebook's algorithm works is rather complex, and there is no public knowledge to which 
we could consult to learn accurately how the Facebook's News Feed functions or what determines 
what content is seen by individual users. Facebook keeps the algorithm governing the process out 
from the public view and even those within Facebook may not have a clear picture of how it works 
at the individual level (Napoli, 2014). However, while the exact procedure remains a mystery to 
most of us, some public information on the most general functions are available from sources such 
as Facebook’s Newsroom blog, Facebook’s patent filings, and from Facebook’s Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). Perhaps the most efficient way to summarize what we know about 
the Facebook News Feed algorithm is to start with one of its earlier version, which was in use until 
sometime around 2013. 
Before it was declared "dead" in 2013 (McGee, 2013), the general understanding was that the 
News Feed was governed by an algorithm called "EdgeRank". EdgeRank was governed by two 
main elements: Objects and Edges. Objects refer to any status updates, uploaded pictures or other 
items that can be inserted into the feed. These objects, in other words, are the content that is created 
and shared within Facebook. Edges, on the other hand, are any relational interactions that other 
users make with Objects, for instance through "liking" or "commenting".  The system works with 
these two components and assigns ranks to the edges, hence the name, and determines the overall 
likelihood that an object appears on an individual user’s feed.  
As Bucher (2012) explains, EdgeRank is like the algorithmic editorial voice of Facebook that 
determines what is shown to users by drawing on different factors relating to the Edges. While we 
do not know all variables that determine the rank of an Edge, at least three different components 
were understood to be in the key roles. The first variable is referred as Affinity. This value aims to 
capture the nature of the relationship between any two individual users. One important factor that 
determines this value is the degree to which two users are in interaction with one other. For 
example, checking a specific user’s Facebook profile on a regular basis or sending private 
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messages with him will increase the user’s Affinity score with respect to that person. The second 
value is Weight. Not all edges are equal, and some types of interaction are weighted more by 
Facebook than others. The Weight is determined by multiple factors, such as on how popular the 
edge is overall and how important Facebook itself considers it to be, but in most instances, or at 
least according to Bucher (2012), the weight Facebook places on different edges such as likes, 
comments, and shares seem to be based on the level of effort. The logic behind this is fairly simple: 
chatting requires more effort than commenting, which in turn requires more effort than liking, 
which requires more than just viewing. Thus, the more effort one spends the more important that 
edge should be. The final factor is Time Decay which simply refers to the recency of the edge. 
Here older Edges are considered less important than new ones. 
The final EdgeRank is calculated based on the multiplication of these three measures: Affinity, 
Weight and Time Decay. Each object receiving higher ranked edges will have better chances at 
appearing in the news feed. This system is based on the assumption that not all users are equal, 
and it matters who you are friends with, what type of content you typically interact with, and what 
types of edges you personally create. For example, a user who typically likes content with videos 
in them will receive more videos in the future and if a number of your friends are interacting with 
a particular object, it is very likely that you will see it too. What is more, the weight given to certain 
Edges is directly shaped by Facebook based on their internal goals, which can change over time 
and thus change how the news feed works in an any given time period. In this way, the algorithm 
is not only a model that works through fixed assumptions on what the users want, but it is also a 
future-orientated in that it can be used to direct action to specific ways that are seen as valuable by 
Facebook. This can be seen in the way Facebook promotes new products, such as the "Questions" 
feature or "Places" by ranking interactions with them higher than others. (Bucher, 2012.) 
However, as noted above, the EdgeRank is apparently dead (McGee, 2013). Facebook has 
continually moved away from the simple weight measures used in the EdgeRank to a more 
machine learning approach where the content one sees on Facebook is continuously influenced on 
how each individual behaves and interacts in Facebook. In a telephone interview Lars Backstrom, 
an Engineering Manager for News Feed Ranking at Facebook, estimated that there are as many as 
“100,000 individual weights in the model that produces News Feed.” (McGee, 2013). Affinity, 
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Weight and Time Decay are not irrelevant in this system and are still important factors, but many 
more have equal importance.  
Since Facebook prefers to keep most of the factors included in the current form of the algorithm 
secret, it is difficult to evaluate how far away Facebook has moved from EdgeRank, and thus it is 
almost impossible to know for sure what users can do to maximize their visibility on the platform. 
However, while the algorithm itself is out of reach, Facebook still publishes press releases, blog 
posts, presentations, patents and other documents that are valuable in giving us further intuition on 
what are the main attributes governing the feed. In this regard, a study conducted by DeVito (2017) 
is of great value since it is one of the most recent attempts by scholars to study how Facebook’s 
News Feed works. In his study, DeVito conducted a content analysis from the main sources of 
public documents that Facebook itself has created that deal with the News Feed. The aim of the 
analysis was to investigate the core aims of the algorithm. The result of this analysis produced a 
list of algorithmic values that most likely influence the current News Feed. These values, in 
descending order of importance, are: (1) friend relationships, (2) explicitly expressed user interests, 
(3) prior user engagement, (4) implicitly expressed user preferences, (5) post age, (6) platform 
priorities, (7) page relationships, (8) negatively expressed preferences and (9) content quality. 
As DeVito notes, all nine of these algorithmic values can be reduced down to personal significance 
where Objects are deemed more important if the algorithm thinks, for example, that it has a high 
impact to the user, the user has explicitly expressed interest in it (such as liking political pages) or 
if the user’s friends follow similar patterns. Thus, this modern News feed is a constantly updated, 
personalized model that updates its outputs based on prior behavior, the behavior of friends and 
based on the sub-groups of users the algorithm decides you personally belong to. (DeVito, 2017).   
Out of all the values the algorithm considers, friend relationships seem to be the most important 
factor. One of the more interesting documents pointing to this direction comes from the technical 
patents. For example, the main features of the News Feed are described in detail in the US patent 
8,583,690 (Sittig & Zuckerberg 2013), where it is explained that the timeline module uses 
relationship data to generate personalized stories within the News Feed. As DeVito (2017) argues, 
this, and many other similar patents, confirm the fact that friend relationships are the core 
algorithmic value that decides what content is seen, and that it also moderates and informs all the 
other values. In short, those with whom the user is connected with, have higher affinity ratings 
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with, and exhibit the same kind of behavior are important influencers of what appears in the users 
personal News Feed; the objects that these individuals interact with will have a high probability of 
appearing in the individual user’s Feed. 
Taken together, although the Facebook algorithm can be complex and nuanced, it seems that the 
most important factor that candidates need to take into account when they aim to acquire visibility 
on Facebook is the degree to which other users interact with content that they create. Time and 
again, multiple different sources indicate that relationships between different users are the main 
catalysts that dictate how far messages from a political candidate are able to reach. Although 
Facebook can be used in a more traditional manner, such as creating a large degree of followers 
who voluntarily receive messages and then broadcasting to them in a one-directional manner, 
creating communication strategies that encourage users to interact and engage with the content 
makes it more likely that political messages spread further from this first-degree follower base and 
to reach far wider audiences. In this way, information spreads like a disease and continue to spread 
from user to user who continue to interact with it. Although we cannot accurately know just how 
this process works and how an individual message spreads in a particular network, we can, 
however, attempt at creating generalizations from the information available and use it to gain 
intuition on how social media has been used before, what potential it offers and what strategies 
can be used to acquire visibility on Facebook.  
From this point onwards, I will continue with the disease analogy and use it for the purpose of a 
more explicit and accurate theory building. It turns out that epidemiological modeling is not an 
unfamiliar approach in social media studies, and it is there where I draw tools to explain how 
activity on Facebook can transform into visibility and consequently into political currency. 
 
5.2 Political candidate as a disease – SEI model of candidate spread 
In epidemiological modeling, individuals are usually divided into various compartments 
depending their epidemiological status (e.g. susceptible, exposed, infected, etc.). Individuals in 
each compartment transit between them via mutual contact at given average rates, such as from 
exposed to infected. The main purpose of these kinds of models is to describe and predict the 
average progression of the disease by tracking how many people are in each compartment. The 
same method is also used outside the realm of epidemiology and has been applied to model more 
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abstract phenomena, such as the spread of ideas (Bettencourt et al., 2006) and spread of news and 
rumors on Twitter (Jin et al., 2013), for example.    
Similarly, political candidates campaign on social media can be viewed in this way. Once a 
candidate creates content on a social media platform and posts it online, it first reaches the 
voluntary followers who have decided to receive content from the candidate. This initial number 
may be large enough to have an electoral impact, but as exemplified by Facebook, this need not 
be a necessary condition. If the content a candidate posts is contagious enough, other users will 
start interacting with it, which leads them to become infected and for the content to spread further 
to second-degree networks and can create new infections along the way. Formalizing this 
relationship into a mathematical form gives us a useful tool that allows us to investigate how 
political candidates are able to reach potential voters and how and why individual candidates can 
differ in this endeavor.  
To create such a formal model, I will build upon the foundation of epidemiological modeling. The 
model starts with a candidate 𝐶𝑖 (the metaphorical disease) who spreads through a population 𝑁 
which is divided in to three compartments: the susceptible (𝑆) who have not yet heard of the 
candidate, the exposed (𝐸) who have heard of the candidate from social media, but do not interact 
with the content created by this candidate, and the infected (𝐼) who interact and spread the content 
further. Using Facebook as an example, an individual is considered to be susceptible if he or she 
has not liked the official Facebook page of the candidate and has not interacted with any of the 
candidate’s posts. In other words, the susceptibles have not encountered the candidate on Facebook 
in any way. Exposed are defined as individuals who have read at least one post or other content 
created by the candidate or have liked his official Facebook page or made a Friend connection 
with him and have thus indicated explicitly that they want to receive messages from the candidate. 
Lastly, infected are individuals who are reacting to the content created by the candidate through 
actions such as liking, sharing or commenting. Although in practice sharing, liking, and 
commenting will have a varying impact on how widely the interacted content spreads, in the 
interest of simplicity the scope of their spread is assumed to be the same on average in this 
simplified model10.   
                                                          
10 Furthermore, we do not have accurate information available on how these different actions impact the spread of 
information, which is likely to further depend heavily on other variables such as friend relationships, age of the 
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The process through which candidate 𝐶𝑖 spreads to the population 𝑁 is similar to Jin et al’s. (2013) 
process of how news and rumors spread on Twitter, but with significant differences. The process 
is described in figure 3, where 𝐸 and 𝐼 recruit from the susceptible compartment 𝑆 with different 
probabilities:            
           Figure 3. SEI model of candidate spread 
 
• At the start of the process, the infected compartment has at least one infected, the candidate 
𝐶𝑖, who creates and spread content denoted as 𝑐. As the number of published content 
grows, the interaction between the infected and susceptibles can lead to two different 
outcomes: the susceptibles to become infected or exposed. 
• The first arrow leading from 𝑆 to 𝐼 in figure 3 describes the attempt by the infected to 
recruit from the susceptible compartment at the rate 𝛽 which is defined as the effective 
contact rate. Since neither contact with diseases nor with posts on Facebook 
deterministically always leads to infections (a post can appear on a News Feed, but 
completely disregarded or unnoticed by the user) the parameter 𝛽 is further compiled from 
the total contact rate (the total number of potential voters reached per one unit of content 
regardless of whether or not they actually noticed the content), denoted 𝛾, multiplied by 
the probability that the content is consumed, denoted 𝑙. Thus, 𝛽 is the effective contact 
rate: 𝛽 = 𝛾𝑙. 
                                                          
content and how many users have overall interacted with the content. Thus, it is not possible to put precise 
assumptions into this model. However, it could be assumed that on average the scope of the impact will be roughly 
greater for some reactions (or edges in the EdgeRank terminology). For example, it could be assumed that sharing 
will result in a wider spread than commenting and commenting to wider spread than liking. This assumption will be 
explained further below and tested empirically during this thesis. 
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• However, in most cases consuming content does not directly lead to individuals 
immediately spreading it further. Because of this, susceptibles move directly to become 
infected only at probability 𝑝 and at 1 − 𝑝 move to the exposed compartment.  
• If exposed, the parameter 𝜀 describes further effective contact with the infected, through 
which the exposed can transit to the infected compartment. In the context of Facebook, it 
is reasonable to assume that 𝛽 < 𝜀 since the already exposed individuals are likely to be 
more willing to engage with content that comes from a familiar source. Furthermore, being 
exposed to a candidate in Facebook usually implies that the exposed individual has friends 
who actively engage with the candidate or that the individual has liked the candidates 
official Facebook page. Both of these increase the priority, and thus the effective contact 
rate, that the Facebook algorithm assigns to the candidate’s content in the individuals News 
Feed. 
• In most cases, infections do not last indefinitely, and at some point individuals leave the 
infected compartment. In social media too, individuals usually do not continue to spread 
every piece of content published by a candidate. Thus, the parameter 𝜌 denotes the rate at 
which individuals stop spreading content and move to the exposed compartment instead.  
• In most epidemiological models the system has vital dynamics which determine the rate 
of which the population exists and enters the compartments via deaths and births. 
However, in this application the covered time period is assumed to be rather short: the 
average time of an election cycle. Thus, the total population size 𝑁 is assumed to be 
constant. 
 
Table 1. Parameter definitions of the SEI model 
Parameter Definition 
β S-I contact rate 
ε E-I contact rate 
ρ Departure rate from I to E 
p S->I Probability given contact with the Infected 
1-p S->E Probability given contact with the Infected 
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The process is described mathematically by the following set of ordinary differential equations 
where the sizes of each compartment are defined as derivatives with respect to the number of 
content published.  
 
𝜕𝑆
𝜕𝑐
= −𝛽𝑆
𝐼+𝑧
𝑁
      (1) 
𝜕𝐸
𝜕𝑐
= (1 − 𝑝)𝛽𝑆
𝐼+𝑧
𝑁
− 𝜀𝐸
𝐼+𝑧
𝑁
+ 𝜌𝐼  (2) 
𝜕𝐼
𝜕𝑐
= 𝑝𝛽𝑆
𝐼+𝑧
𝑁
+ 𝜀𝐸
𝐼+𝑧
𝑁
− 𝜌𝐼   (3) 
𝑁 = 𝑆 + 𝐸 + 𝐼 + 𝑧    (4) 
 
In standard epidemiological models, the proportion of infectious contacts is 
𝐼
𝑁
 and thus the rate of 
increase for infectious individuals is 𝛽𝑆
𝐼
𝑁
. However, since the process in this instance is described 
in the terms of number of content published and not in terms of time, and since the candidate 
creating the content is himself considered to be infected, the term includes a constant 𝑧 and 
becomes 𝛽𝑆
𝐼+𝑧
𝑁
. The constant 𝑧 not only describes the candidate himself, but also any additional 
personnel or other devoted followers who will spread content created by the candidate indefinitely. 
While parameter 𝛽 controls the rate at which the candidate becomes known to the susceptibles, the 
term 𝜀𝐸
𝐼+𝑧
𝑁
 determines the rate of increase of infected from the exposed compartment and the term 
𝜌𝐼 the rate at which the infected stop spreading content. 
From equations 1-3 it becomes clear how effective different social media campaign strategies are 
when the goal is to reach a maximum number of potential voters. Consider a population of 10,000 
individuals where the candidate 𝐶𝑖 is initially the only one belonging to the infected compartment 
(𝑧 = 1) and 50 individuals are initially exposed to him. When the following parameters are set at 
𝑝 = 𝜀 = 𝜌 = 0 and the candidate is forced to reach voters solely through his own initial contacts 
and he cannot create infectious individuals who would help the candidate to spread his messages, 
the rate at which susceptible are requited to the exposed compartment is rather linear and the 
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infected population remains constant at 1. Thus, values change only within equation 1 and 2, and 
equation 2 is reduced to 
𝜕𝐸
𝜕𝑐
= 𝛽𝑆
1
𝑁
. 
In contrast, when parameter 𝑝 is allowed to vary at 0 < 𝑝 ≤ 1 the increase of the infected 
population can have drastic consequences for the diffusion of knowledge about the candidate. 
Figure 4 displays the population changes of each of the compartments with the above set initial 
values, with different values for 𝑝 and where 𝜀 = 𝜌 = 0 and 𝛽 = 1. As it can be seen from the 
figure, when 𝑝 = 0 the candidate needs to have a significantly high effective contact rate because 
he alone is spreading messages to the overall population. With higher values of 𝑝 the candidate 
can gain more visibility within social media even with a low value for 𝛽, and with probability 
approximately larger than .30, the candidate is able to reach the total population once he has send 
approximately 50 messages to the population. Naturally, this is only an extreme case where the 
infected will continue to spread content indefinitely, and in practice parameter 𝜌 will control the 
effect the number of additional infected can have. 
By using these equations, we can define the differences between different candidates and how 
effective their social media campaigns can be in terms of the number of voters reached, and thus 
how likely it is that the platform can change the status quo political competition. Firstly, it seems 
natural to assume that various candidates have varying degrees of how “infectious” they are and 
how skillful they are at creating engaging content. In other words, their value for 𝛽 will differ and 
is likely to be context dependent as well, as the previous research has shown us. For example, one 
might assume that at certain elections politicians who are critical of immigration will be more 
infectious when the political climate at the time places high prominence to issues revolving around 
foreign and immigration policy. Furthermore, others will differ due to more constant conditions, 
such as being born at a time when social media usage was common and thus have higher 
understanding and ability to use such platforms effectively.  
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        Figure 4. SEI model simulation 
 
Note: Initial population values start at z = 1, S = 10 000, E = 10 and I = 1. The rest of the parameters are set at: 𝜀 = 𝜌 = 0, 𝛽 = 1. 
Likewise, the probability that susceptibles will become infected is largely dependent on the type 
of content that a candidate decides to produce. In various social media platforms, the type of 
content a user creates will have a significant impact on how likely it is that it will be shared. For 
example, when a published content includes a URL link to further content, it is generally more 
likely to be retweeted on Twitter (Suh et al., 2010). Beyond of the characteristics that a candidate 
has and how he operates on social media, the spread of a candidate also depends on the 
characteristics of the audience he targets. For example, not everyone is on social media, and those 
candidates whose support base either does not use or are not active on social media will be less 
likely to become infected.  
Finally, although social media is partly seen as an attractive campaign tool due to the perceived 
low costs associated with it, campaign funds can make a difference. Funds can be spent in almost 
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every area discussed thus far, such as paying a consulting company to advice or to directly create 
engaging content. Funds can also be used to hire personnel to manage candidate’s social media 
accounts, establish a constant number of infected who will always spread the content to their 
networks, and to oversee what topics and type of content are likely to be shared and interacted 
with at any given moment during the campaign. Considering that these options are available, it 
can be the case that only candidates with large enough funds are the ones who will benefit the most 
from social media platforms. If this is the case, then social media will most likely reinforce the 
status quo rather than break it. 
The following section will consider the arguments put forth thus far about the status quo changing 
nature of social media and formalizes them through the constructed SEI model. These serve as 
initial hypotheses on what effects social media campaign has had on Finnish elections and the 
subsequent section will test them with regression analyses based on multiple datasets gathered on 
the 2015 parliamentary elections.  
 
5.3 The normalization v. equalization debate revisited, again 
From the perspective of the SEI model, the normalization v. equalization debate and the previous 
findings related to it can be interpreted in a new light. For one, the model suggests that there are 
two main ways in which social media can be used as a political tool. The first way is to rely on the 
passive exposed part of the population and attempt to achieve as large effective contact rate (value 
for 𝛽) as possible. The situation is familiar to the days of modern campaigning described by Norris 
(2000, pp. 137–161), where mass communication was used to spread messages in the evening 
news during prime-time television. Social media can be similarly used, if the candidate has a large 
pool of exposed individuals who have, for example, liked the official Facebook page of the 
candidate. In effect social media then functions as the press agency of the candidate and, provided 
that the exposed have favorable opinions of the candidate, they can be mobilized to vote on election 
day, spend financial aid to help the candidate or go door to door to campaign for the candidate. 
Indeed, as we have seen, the number of social media followers have been significant in explaining 
the vote share that individual candidates have received (Kruikemeier, 2014; Spierings & Jacobs, 
2014; Williams & Gulati, 2007; Williams & Gulati, 2008). Furthermore, this effect is amplified if 
the candidate sends more messages through social media (Williams & Gulati, 2008; Spierings & 
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Jacobs, 2014). This, according to the SEI model, can be explained by arguing that sending out 
more messages leads to increased visibility of the candidate and, in general, the more visible the 
candidate is during elections the more likely it is that he will find some voters who are willing to 
support him. In addition, increased number of messages also imply more effort from the candidate 
and can be indicative of active ways to mobilize the support base of the candidate or attempts to 
influence the perceptions of voters. While this effort does not automatically lead to electoral 
support, it is an important precondition for the candidate to gain full advantage of his followers 
and is thus directly linked to electoral gains. 
These aspects lead us to expect that, in general, political candidates who have more individuals in 
the exposed population and send more political messages on social media will perform better 
during elections. In the context of Facebook, the exposed can be operationalized as the number of 
people who have liked (or friended) an official Facebook page of a political candidate, which 
allows us to formulate the first two hypothesizes on how social media activity transfers to electoral 
gains: 
1) The number of Facebook Friends will have an impact on the number of votes a political 
candidate receives on election day 
2) This impact increases as the candidate sends more messages on Facebook 
The second way in which social media can be used as a political tool relies more heavily on the 
infected population and on the probability that the messages send out by the candidate will be 
shared and interacted with (as in when the parameter 𝑝 varies from 0 < 𝑝 ≤ 1). As we have seen, 
one of the clear ways in which social media differs from traditional media is in the way messages 
are distributed among populations. Here social media differs particularly from traditional media in 
that the effective contact rate in social media is much more dependent on the candidate himself. 
To elaborate further on this, one of the reasons why television commercials, for example, are 
expensive for candidates to create is because they have to be send out to independent broadcasters 
who control what content is shown on their communication channels and who make their revenue 
by selling the attention of their established viewership. In the context of the SEI model, the 
broadcaster can credibly demonstrate that they can achieve a high effective contact rates with a 
multitude of different voters on which the candidate can capitalize on, but only if the price is right 
(Wu, 2016). On social media, on the other hand, that attention and visibility must be acquired by 
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the candidate himself. Here, the audience does not exist as a given, and the candidate needs to 
spend effort and resources to create the audience necessary to achieve effective contact rates that 
are worthwhile for campaining purposes. 
However, social media has its advantages. In particular, unlike traditional broadcasters, social 
media has the ability to create infectious users which can compensate for a relatively small contact 
rate when compared to professional broadcasters. As the SEI model demonstrates, if a candidate 
is able to create content that is engaging enough there is a possibility that it will quickly spread far 
beyond the initial exposed population and reach voters that might not be reachable through other 
ways. As the number of the infected grows and they further recruit from both the susceptible 
population and from the already exposed, the reach that a message created on Facebook can 
accomplish grows exponentially as the effective contact rate is multiplied by each new additional 
infected. This demonstrated in figure 4 where the rate at which the susceptible population 
diminishes becomes greater as the probability of creating infected individuals becomes larger. 
Intuitively, this mechanism is fairly simple. If we think of the infected population as copies of the 
candidate himself, then each new infected will multiply the original parameter 𝛽 and leads to 
exponential growth11.  
It is easy to see why this is useful for the candidates. The infected do not (usually) require payments 
from spreading the candidate’s messages and if the number of infected is sufficiently high, even 
relatively low values for 𝛽 can spread political messages widely with fraction of the costs 
associated with traditional media. Furthermore, this allows political actors to use social media in 
more efficient ways and should be especially optimal for self-promotion, which is, as we have seen 
in the literature review, one of the most often used method to use social media. Since self-
promotion aims to influence the perceptions that voters have on the candidate, increasing the 
infected population should be one of the most promising ways to maximize its impact. Focusing 
solely on the exposed population is limited in that those who have explicitly decided to receive 
political Facebook messages from the candidate are very likely to already view the candidate 
favorably. Thus, spending more resources on self-promotion on them is counterproductive and 
unnecessary. Concentrating efforts to increace the infected population, on the other hand, can reach 
                                                          
11 It is true that this assumption will most likely not hold in real life and that is likely that political candidates will 
have, on average, a bigger reach than ordinary citizens have. However, this does not distract from the main point of 
the model that the infected act as catalysts for the ability of political messages to spread in an exponential manner.  
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voters who would not normally receive any information about the candidate and who are on the 
fence who to vote for.  
This leads us to expect that not only will increase in the size of the infected population have an 
impact on electoral outcomes, its effect should as well be greater than increasing the exposed 
population. In order to test this, the infected population is operationalized as the number of people 
who have liked, commented or shared any post on Facebook which has been created by a political 
candidate. With this, we can arrive at three more hypothesizes to be tested: 
3) Those candidates who have a greater ability to acquire likes, comments, and shares on 
Facebook will perform better electorally than those candidates who do worse in this 
respect 
4) This impact will be, on average, greater than the impact associated with the exposed 
population outlined in hypothesis 1 
5) However, as for the exposed population, this impact will be greater as more posts are 
sent in Facebook 
The reasons for the fifth hypothesis are largely the same as they are in the second hypothesis, in 
that the number of messages indicate effort and is an important precondition for electoral impact, 
but the infected are also completely dependent on the messages that the candidate sends in 
Facebook: by the very definition the infected can only exist if there is content on which individuals 
can interact with. 
The infected, however, are likely to differ from one other, and some will have a larger network to 
which political messages can spread than others have. Thus, the type of infected that the candidate 
is able to acquire will impact his average effective contact rate. Moreover, the public knowledge 
about the Facebooks News Feed algorithm leads us to suspect that liking, commenting and sharing 
have differing impacts on how they help Facebook content to spread within networks. Because of 
this, we should expect that different types of infected will be more optimal in spreading political 
content to the overall population than others, and candidates could create more efficient social 
media strategies by intentionally aiming to create certain types of infections. Unfortunately, a 
complete study on how this mechanism works is beyond the scope of this thesis and, furthermore, 
the data necessary to investigate this in detail is not publicly available. However, the research 
described earlier by Bucher (2012) suggest that the importance Facebook places on different 
P O L I T I C A L  C O M P E T I T I O N  A N D  S O C I A L  M E D I A                 P a g e  | 61 
 
 
 
interactions is based on the level of effort: chatting requires more effort than commenting, which 
in turn requires more effort than liking, which requires more than just viewing. Thus, the more 
effort a user has to spend on interaction, the greater the spread of that content should be. In 
addition, sharing is a function explicitly meant to spread external content to the individual network 
of the users, which suggest that shares should be the most effective type of infection. From these, 
I expect that: 
6) The impact that the infected population will have on the vote shares of individual 
candidates will depend on the type of interaction from which the infection is created 
from 
7) This impact will be largest for infections resulted from Facebook shares, followed by 
comments and will be the smallest for likes 
Hypotheses one through seven establish the main mechanisms how social media activity can 
transform into visibility and, as a result, to opportunities for electoral gains. These can then be 
used to gain answers to the question does social media have an impact to the Finnish political 
competition and has it affected the electoral success of those political candidates who have 
integrated it to their campaign. However, they do not allow us to directly tackle the normalization 
v. equalization debate and remain silent on who are the political candidates that benefit the most 
from social media. In this regard, previous empirical findings and theoretical work from other 
studies and are of great use and give us feasible assumptions to be tested, which can be interpreted 
through the SEI model.  
Firstly, it seems to be the case that one of the most common characteristic of an electoral candidate 
who frequently benefit from social media and who usually do not belong to the political elite are 
younger cohorts. As we have seen in the literature review, younger politicians are actively using 
various social media platforms and are quite plausibly the ones who can gain the most from such 
platforms. The reasons for this were previously hinted at earlier in the thesis, but in terms of the 
SEI model this pattern is understandable through two main mechanisms. First, the younger a 
politician is the more likely it is that he or she has been using social media in their pastime and 
become familiar with its functions, norms of use and intuition on how to create engaging content. 
Thus, it is reasonable to assume that younger cohorts will have an increased ability to achieve 
higher levels of effective contacts, where the messages they send are consumed and not simply 
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ignored by their network. Similarly, greater use-experience of social media can plausibly extend 
to a greater ability to create content that other users want to like, share and comment on, which 
creates infected individuals who spread their messages further. If hypotheses 1 and 3 hold true, 
then this should lead to young politicians to gain more from social media and provide an advantage 
to the older incumbent politicians.  
This argument can be generalized a bit further. Since the underlying reason why younger 
politicians are able to gain more from social media is derived from their greater experience, it can 
be established as an assumption on its own: those actors who have used social media longer than 
others will have greater knowledge what messages are consumed and interacted with on social 
media. This, in turn, gives them a better opportunity to receive electoral gains from their social 
media use. In the Finnish context, it has been established that those candidates who use social 
media for political purposes during campaigns are not, as the normalization thesis would imply, 
marginal political actors, but rather are highly educated, incumbents, and come from the major 
Finnish parties (Strandberg 2013; 2016). These findings favor the normalization thesis and suggest 
that the incumbents are more experienced in social media campaigning and should thus be better 
able to gain electoral benefits from them.  
These considerations lead to the following hypothesizes: 
8) Younger political candidates will gain more electoral benefits from Facebook than 
older candidates 
9) Incumbents will gain more electoral benefits from Facebook than non-incumbent 
candidates 
The final hypothesis set in this thesis is closely related to the most often cited benefit of social 
media: its nature as a cheap and easy-to-use tool for political communication. Throughout this 
thesis, we have seen both empirical and theoretical results that cast considerable doubt on how 
easy it really is to use social media for political gains and how cheap it will be in the end. Social 
media, truly, requires large amounts of effort, time and expertise to be used effectively and this 
effort might not be achievable by marginal political actors. As Jacobs and Spierings (2016) have 
argued, incumbent politicians and large parties with extensive resources can buy expertise and 
personnel to manage their social media accounts, which can both lead to impact almost every 
parameter in the SEI model. Money can be used to increase the effective contact rate and the 
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probability of creating infected individuals by consulting companies that specialize in social media 
platforms who can advise how to create as engaging content as possible. It can also be used to 
maintain a steady population of infected who continue to spread political messages in exchange 
for a fee.  
Taking these options into consideration, it is hypothesized that: 
10) Financial resources are able to boost the impact that campaigning on Facebook has on 
electoral outcomes 
These hypotheses 1 through 10 are investigated with a dataset that includes information on the 
Facebook activity of those candidates who actively used Facebook for their 2015 campaign. In 
combination with information on election outcomes from Statistics Finland, multiple OLS 
regression analyses are used to estimate and test the validity of the outlined hypotheses. The 
following section presents the dataset in detail, after which the results of the data analysis is 
presented. 
 
6. RESEARCH METHODS AND DATA 
In order to put the SEI model to the test, this thesis adopts a case study research strategy and uses 
the 2015 Finnish elections as a testing ground. As outlined by Strandberg (2013, pp. 1335–1336) 
multiple reasons make Finland an excellent country to study and test social media theories. For 
one, the Finnish population is using social media tools in high numbers and Finnish political actors 
have started using them variedly from 2011 onwards (Strandberg, 2016). Hence, in Finland social 
media is an attractive political tool and quite plausibly has a great influence on the Finnish 
electorate. Furthermore, since the questions of this thesis are ultimately concerned with causal 
relationships and aim to make broader generalizations to larger population, the chosen data 
analysis method is an empirical, statistical analysis conducted on the Finnish population who have 
run in parliamentary elections. Other elections could have been considered, but since the 
parliamentary elections are the most impactful in terms of their political outcomes, it is preferable 
to first concentrate on them. If Facebook has an impact on these elections, it is highly plausible 
that the platform can influence the Finnish political system and the overall status quo of Finnish 
political competition. 
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The main method used to test the hypotheses outlined above relies on multivariate OLS 
regressions, which can be used to establish whether or not a statistical relationship exists between 
the candidates social media activity and their final vote counts. More precisely, the OLS 
regressions are designed to test the assumptions suggested by the SEI model by operationalizing 
the model’s parameters as observable candidate level variables. In this case, the main depended 
variable is the natural logarithm of the vote count that the candidates received after the elections. 
Since the raw vote count is a highly skewed and the majority of the candidates received extremely 
low counts and very few are able to collect staggering numbers in comparison, this creates 
significant problems for the OLS regressions which are very responsive to the influence of outliers. 
The log-transformation eases this problem by creating a distribution that resembles the normal 
distribution more closely. In addition to this technical point, the log-transformation also makes the 
results more comparable to other elections and to other countries. Since the log-transformed 
depended variable can be interpreted in terms of percent changes (how many percent the candidates 
vote count would increase given a certain set of independent variables), it is easier to compare 
these relative percent changes to other contexts where the number of voters, election districts and 
the number of total votes are different.  
The main dataset used in this study comes from the 2015 Finnish parliamentary elections and 
includes data on all of the 2,146 candidates who were running at the time. However, since the main 
interest in this thesis involves only those candidates who have active social media accounts and 
since Facebook is solely focused on, the main analysis will be conducted on the sub-population of 
those candidates who had an active Facebook account. Including all candidates would in effect 
inflate the numbers of passive Facebook users, since any candidate who does not have a Facebook 
account would automatically receive zero values on any Facebook variables. This would lead to 
biases in the statistical analyses due to artificially inflated zero values, and thus the non-active 
candidates are excluded.  
Statistics Finland provides information on Finnish election results, which shows that four parties 
collected the vast majority of the overall votes during the 2015 elections. The four most successful 
parties accumulated approximately 73.5% of the total vote out of which the Centre Party, National 
Coalition and the Finns Party eventually formed a coalition government after the elections. This 
data is supplemented with data from the election compass created by the national broadcasting 
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company Yle. The election compass is an online tool that helps voters to gain information on the 
candidates and to make their choice between them. The election compass includes an optional 
questioner that the candidates can fill out and give voters information on their background and 
political views. This data is particularly useful because it allows us to have multiple control 
variables on the candidates that can be used in the upcoming analysis. More information on these 
variables will be provided further below. 
 
6.1 Main variables 
The main independent variables for this study come from Facebook's application programming 
interface (API), which can be used to access the social media activity and performance of every 
candidate that had a public Facebook profile on the platform. This data was originally collected by 
a private data analytics company 99Analytics and was used for a multidisciplinary research project 
made in collaboration with the University of Helsinki, Helsinki Institute for Information 
Technology (HIIT), and the University of Jyväskylä (Nelimarkka, 2015). The dataset includes 
social media data from the candidates Facebook activity (how many posts they created); how many 
friends (followers) the candidates had at any given period during the data collection; and on their 
social media performance in the form of how many Facebook likes, comments and shares each of 
their posts received.  
The parameters of the SEI model are operationalized based on the above mentioned social media 
variables. Mainly, the overall activity of a candidate is defined as the average number of Facebook 
posts that the candidate sent per day, and the candidates exposed population is defined as the 
median number of Facebook friends that the candidate had during the campaign. Since the number 
of friends that a candidate has varies considerably during the observation period and is particularly 
influenced by outliers who have extremely large friend counts, the median was chosen over the 
mean to avoid problems related to highly skewed data. Furthermore, since the SEI model assumes 
that each message sent by the candidate has a possibility to create infectious individuals who 
spread the message further, and since it is assumed that infections resulting from likes, comments 
and shares will have a different impact on the dependent variable, the ability of a candidate to 
create infections is operationalized as three different variables: the mean number of likes, shares, 
and comments that a candidate received for every Facebook post sent. It is true that this 
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operationalization will not completely capture the described mechanism suggested by the SEI 
model, and it is plausible to assume that many candidates have a particular set of Facebook users 
who regularly like, comment or share their posts. Thus, each of these three variables can have 
significant overlap between them and having high average like or share rates do not necessarily 
indicate the ability to create a high number of individual infections. However, with the available 
data, this is the best possible proxy to use as the ability of the candidate to create infections, and it 
is reasonable to assume that these three variables correlate highly with the infectious population 
each candidate was able to create during the campaign. Moreover, other centrality measures 
besides the mean could be considered, such as the median, but this can create a significant problem 
for OLS regressions. This point will be elaborated further below. 
As it has been already noted by Spierings and Jacobs (2014), the problem with cross-sectional 
studies such as this one is that it is difficult to have any definite answers on the issue of causality. 
Even if the social media variables presented above will prove to have a significant impact on the 
number of votes that each candidate receives, this relationship is extremely likely to be riddled 
with omitted variable bias which leads us to observe mere correlations instead of true causations. 
Candidates who create successful social media campaigns and then perform well electorally should 
be wary of drawing straightforward causal connections between the two because it is very likely 
that it is not the whole story. Instead of any causal mechanism, the relationship can be established 
because, for example, these candidates are well-known due to their pre-existing popularity and this 
factor contributes positively both to their electoral performance and to their popularity on social 
media. In short, a simple bivariate analysis omits important alternative explanations which act as 
lurking variables to which both electoral success and social media success is correlated with. It is 
not possible to completely rule out this omitted variable problem with the cross-sectional dataset 
at our current disposal, but data from the Yle election compass provides us with multiple control 
variables that at least mitigate the problem. Following Spierings and Jacobs (2014), this study aims 
to control for the most often cited variables that contribute to the electoral success of a candidate 
and to see whether social media still has an impact even after alternative influences are controlled 
for. In this regard, this study controls for the overall experience a candidate has, his or her position 
on the candidate list, the size of the party from which the candidate comes from, and the available 
campaign resources that the candidate can use for campaigning.  
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The experience of candidates is important to include into the OLS models at least for the following 
reasons. First, those candidates who have experience in running on prior elections have an 
advantage in their recognizability. Previous campaigns allow candidates to build up their presence 
within the electorate and, even if they are not voted into office, they will most likely be more 
recognizable to those voters who pay attention during elections than those candidates who are 
running for the very first time. Secondly, this experience also provides important knowledge on 
how campaigns are run effectively and what activities are most important to prioritize. Moreover, 
this experience can accumulate over time and some candidates can even use a familiar campaign 
team that knows the candidate and has experience from multiple campaigns. This knowledge and 
continuity can prove to be vital for the eventual success of the candidate and will likely influence 
how effectively the candidate is able to use social media for campaigning purposes.  
As with experience, the position of the candidate on the candidate list can provide significant gains 
for electoral performance. The logic behind this is fairly simple and is based on the assumption 
that a significant portion of the voting population will make use of shortcuts to make their voting 
decision easier to make. Since most voters are faced with a decision problem between multiple 
different candidates, most voters will not take the time to familiarize themselves with every 
available option. Instead, voters may first filter out most candidates based on their preferred parties 
and then observe these candidates present in the list starting with the first one and working their 
way down until they have found one or more most preferred candidates. If this process is followed 
by a substantial number of voters, it gives a significant advantage to those who first appear on the 
list. Additionally, studies have found that for some this process is indeed followed, but the initial 
filtering is further conducted by only voting for the female candidates (e.g. Wauters, Weekers, & 
Maddens, 2010). In this case, the individual candidate per se is not as important as it is to vote for 
a female candidate. These voters often look for the first woman on the party list and simply vote 
for that candidate. 
It is clear that campaign funding greatly impacts electoral performance and that this is the main 
resource that any candidate has. Those with more money to spend will have more options to 
conduct campaign activities, advertise themselves in multiple media channels, and to hire 
professional staff to help them to win votes. This benefit easily extends to social media, where, as 
has been discussed previously, funds can be spent to create more engaging content, increase the 
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spread of the messages artificially through paid advertising, and to hire personnel who maintain 
the candidate's social media profile continuously. As such, it is important to control for the 
available funding that each candidate has available and to see whether social media can have an 
impact that is independent of these funds. 
Furthermore, the size of the party to which the candidate belongs can give meaningful resources 
to the candidate in the form of knowledge and campaign infrastructure. Those who come from 
larger parties benefit from the guidance and help of the party officials and can tap into the 
collective resources that the party organization has to offer for its individual candidates. Indeed, 
interviews with the staff of the major Finnish parties suggest that the party organizations can try 
to systematically help their candidates in social media campaigning and to transfer the cumulative 
knowledge they have about the platform into their members and candidates. If then the main party 
is heavily invested in social media campaigning, it is likely to encourage all of its candidates to 
use it and, if the resources exist, to provide help on its use. (Railo & Ruohonen, 2015.)  
These main control variables are gained from two sources: from Statistics Finland and from the 
election compass constructed by Yle. The overall experience was captured by two dummy 
variables that tap into the candidates incumbent status and their prior experience in campaigning. 
The first dummy variable indicates whether or not the candidate was a member of the parliament 
during the election (1 = yes) and the second dummy indicated if Statistics Finland showed that the 
candidate was running during the previous 2011 election (1 = yes). The list position effects were 
likewise captured through two variables. The first is an integer number that indicates what position 
each candidate had on their party lists, 1 indicating first place. The second variable is a dummy 
that shows if the candidate is a first woman on the list (1 = yes). Candidates’ resources are gained 
from the election compass which provides the self-reported campaign funds of the candidate. The 
compass allowed candidates to indicate their funding level on an ordinal scale with the following 
options: "under 1,000€", "1,000–5,000€", "5,000–10,000€", "10,000–20,000€", "20,000–
50,000€", and "over 50,000€". However, since only few observations exist in the extreme values 
and only few candidates reported spending over 50,000€ (as it can be seen in the tables below), 
the funding variable was recoded as a variable with three levels where the above values are 
combined into larger categories. Thus, the funding variable includes the following values: “under 
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5,000€”, “5,000–20,000€”, and “over 20,000€”.  This ensures that each level has enough 
observations for the statistical analyzes used in the later stages of this study.   
Furthermore, the size of the candidate's party is included as an ordinal variable with values "large", 
"medium", and "small". This categorization is based on the number of seats that the parties held 
after the previous 2011 elections. Traditionally, Finland has three big parties that have largely 
remained dominant within the parliament, but the 2011 elections represented a significant change 
in this long-running trend. After the elections, the Finnish party system could be divided into three 
major clusters based on the number of seats they held: the Centre Party, National Coalition, Social 
Democratic Party, and the Finns Party. Together, these four parties held 160 seats out of the 200 
available in the parliament (80%). After this major cluster, four parties were able to acquire seats 
from the remaining 20 places: the Left Alliance, Green League, Swedish People's Party, and the 
Christian Democrats. Thus, these two clusters constitute as "large" parties and "medium" parties 
respectively. In addition, the Finnish party system has a number of smaller parties that have 
remained outside of the parliament. During the 2015 elections, a total of nine parties placed 
candidates that did not have any seats in the parliament at the time. These parties are assigned to 
the "small" parties. In addition to these main control variables, the following variables are also 
included to account for the most common socioeconomic factors that the candidates possess: their 
gender, education, and age. 
 
6.2 Data and descriptive statistics 
Before we continue to the main analysis of this thesis, it worthwhile to first explore the main 
variables in detail, describe the dataset, and to show the descriptive statistics of the overall 
population. The main reason for us to do so is associated with the self-reported nature of the Yle 
election compass data and with technical difficulties regarding the social media data collected by 
99Analytics. In both cases, the unique characteristics of these two data sources has led to missing 
observations and resulted in a dataset that falls short of being a full sample. In order to estimate 
the external validity of the results arriving from this dataset, then, we need to examine how 
representative the dataset is of the overall population we desire to study. Unfortunately, we do not 
have many variables at our current disposal from which we have full information on all of the 
candidates who were running during the 2015 elections. However, we do know the age, party, 
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gender, mother tongue, and vote count of each individual candidate from Statistics Finland. In 
addition, the Yle election compass provides us further background information from the control 
variables described in the previous chapter.  
Table 2 first shows the descriptive statistics on the entire population of the 2,146 candidates who 
were running in the 2015 election. The table shows that the candidates were mostly men, possessed 
a degree from high education, self-reportedly spend less than 5,000€ in the campaign, and came 
mostly from the four largest parties. In particular, this table draws attention to two issues regarding 
the data that is used in this thesis. The first issue arises from the fairly large portion of NA’s in the 
education and funding variables: approximately 20% out of all candidates did not wish to reveal 
information either on their education or on their funding. Both of these variables are gained from 
the Yle election compass, and thus the NA’s are caused by candidates who either did not participate 
in the election compass at all or did not wish to answer these particular questions.  
The second issue is apparent in the number of Facebook addresses that the candidates reported in 
the Yle election compass. The Yle data shows that only approximately 69% of the candidates 
reported having a Facebook address. This proportion does not match the official estimate of 
candidates who had a Facebook profile during the elections, which is 73% (Strandberg, 2016). The 
disparity between these two numbers might be due to the self-reported nature of Yle data. Some 
candidates might not have revealed their profile addresses in the election compass questionnaire, 
forgot to put it in or only created a profile after the questionnaire was filled out and did not update 
the questionnaire later on. At any rate, the difference is only four percent and does not cause any 
major concerns for the validity of the Yle data. However, the presence of missing cases in the 
education and funding variables cause a greater concern and could lead to biases in the regression 
analyses if it is not caused by a random process and is related to value of the variable from which 
the data is missing (for example, when a candidate is less likely to report his funding if he has large 
funds to report). However, since the current project is mainly concerned with those candidates who 
use social media, the missing observations are only a problem if they extend to the sub-section of 
the population who are active social media users. 
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Table 2.  
Descriptive statistics on the background variables of the 2015 
parliamentary election candidates 
Variable   n 
Share of all 
candidates 
Gender 
F 847 39.47% 
M 1299 60.53% 
Education 
Primary 48 2.24% 
Vocational 350 16.31% 
Upper secondary 187 8.71% 
Higher education 1018 47.44% 
Other 81 3.77% 
NA's 462 21.53% 
Funding 
Under 1 000 € 450 20.97% 
1 000-5 000 € 496 23.11% 
5 000-10 000 € 251 11.70% 
10 000-20 000 € 245 11.42% 
20 000-50 000 € 245 11.42% 
Over 50 000 € 16 0.75% 
NA's 443 20.64% 
Party Size 
Large 861 40.12% 
Medium 721 33.60% 
Small 533 24.84% 
No party 31 1.44% 
List Position 
1 180 8.39% 
2 156 7.27% 
3 148 6.90% 
4 137 6.38% 
5 129 6.01% 
Other 615 65.05% 
Dummy Variables 
Personal website 1491 69.48% 
Facebook profile 1475 68.73% 
Twitter profile 1031 48.04% 
Campaign experience 743 34.62% 
First woman on the list 104 4.85% 
Incumbent 168 7.83% 
 
Indeed, the problem seems to be somewhat alleviated when only the candidates from which we 
have social media data are considered. From this subpopulation, only 9.71% did not report their 
planned funding expenditures, and 10.7% did not wish to disclose their educational backgrounds. 
In order to explore possible connections with other variables from which we have full data, the 
education and funding variables were recoded as dummy variables showing who answered these 
questions, and then Chi-Square test was conducted on each of the other control variables outlined 
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in the previous chapter. The associated p-values were all non-significant, which suggests that the 
remaining missinges is not related to any of the other variables we have information on. It is quite 
possible that some other factors influence candidates not to reveal this information, but due to lack 
of data, it is not possible to investigate further connections. We are left to use these variables with 
due caution and to take solace from the fact that only a relatively few values are missing. 
Further issues that need to be addressed come from the social media data gathered by 99Analytics. 
Since this thesis is mainly interested in the effects of campaigning, the time periods falling outside 
the campaigning season are left out of the analysis. The final observation period, then, covers 
approximately four months starting from 1st of January and ending at 18th of April, the final day 
before the elections. From this period, 99Analytics gathered as many Facebook addresses from 
those political candidates who used it in their campaign as possible. However, some candidates 
Facebook addresses were missed or could not be retrieved during the data collection due to 
technical difficulties. Because of this, the dataset is not complete and includes a total of 1,128 
candidates, which amounts to 52.6% of the entire candidate population. Given that the official 
estimate of candidates who had a Facebook profile during the elections is 73% (Strandberg, 2016) 
this suggests that 20.4% of the desired population is missing. However, since these missing 
observations are mostly due technical difficulties, it is likely that the missing observations are 
missing at random and will thus not skew the regression results. Nevertheless, these missing cases 
should be examined more closely and to see how well the used dataset represents the population 
of those candidates who had Facebook profiles during their campaign. 
The confidence on the available dataset is increased by the fact that the population from which we 
have full data on seems to resemble those candidates who reported having a Facebook account 
quite well. Table 3 shows the distributions of the main background variables from those candidates 
who reported having a Facebook account in the Yle election compass (the main population) and 
those from which we have full data, i.e. those candidates from which we have social media data 
and who reported their funding and education levels in the Yle election compass, (the sub-
population). None of the observed differences between these proportions and averages goes over 
by a factor of two and the ratio of these values keep fairly close to 1.0 in most cases.   
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Table 3. 
Comparison between the main population and the sub-population 
Variable   
Main 
population 
Sub-
population Sub/Main 
Gender 
F 42.1% 47.2% 1.12 
M 57.9% 52.8% 0.91 
Age 
mean 43.0 40.6 0.94 
median 42.0 39.0 0.93 
Vote 
Count 
mean 1383.3 1861.4 1.35 
median 478.5 860.5 1.80 
Language 
Finnish 92.3% 92.4% 1.00 
Swedish 6.3% 6.9% 1.09 
Other 1.4% 0.7% 0.52 
Education 
Primary 2.0% 1.1% 0.53 
Vocational 18.2% 16.2% 0.89 
Upper secondary 11.5% 12.2% 1.06 
Higher education 64.0% 66.9% 1.05 
Other 4.3% 3.6% 0.83 
Incumbent 
No 90.6% 91.8% 1.01 
Yes 9.4% 8.2% 0.87 
Party Size 
Large 54.7% 47.0% 0.86 
Medium 28.6% 44.0% 1.54 
Small 16.7% 9.0% 0.54 
Funding 
Under 1 000 € 21.2% 15.4% 0.73 
1 000-5 000 € 30.0% 31.8% 1.06 
5 000-10 000 € 16.0% 17.4% 1.09 
10 000-20 000 € 15.5% 15.6% 1.01 
20 000-50 000 € 16.2% 18.4% 1.14 
Over 50 000 € 1.2% 1.4% 1.21 
 
However, the clearest difference between these populations comes from the size of the party; 
candidates from the smaller parties are clearly underrepresented in the sub-population. There are 
almost less than half fewer candidates from smaller parties in the sub-population than there is in 
the main population and, correspondingly, candidates coming from the medium-sized parties are 
over-represented in the sub-population. This causes the clearest threat to the external validity of 
this study and it should be kept in mind that the lack of small party candidates can bias the 
upcoming results. However, since further data collection is not an option, a simple listwise deletion 
was performed to handle the missing value problems. This results in a final dataset that includes 
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844 observations, which remains as a sizable sample size and can be used to estimate OLS 
coefficients. 
A set of selected background and social media variables of these 844 observations are summarized 
in table 4, which shows descriptive statistics on the age, final vote counts and Facebook variables 
of the candidates included in the final dataset. In comparison to table 2, which shows the total 
population of the running candidates, those with active Facebook profiles seem to be, on average, 
two years younger with a mean age of approximately 41. In addition of being younger, candidates 
with active Facebook accounts seem to perform better electorally as well since their average 
number of votes received is almost 400 higher than in the overall population. In terms of their 
Facebook activity and performance, most candidates sent around 100 messages during the 
campaign from 1st of January until the final day before elections in 18th of April. The intensity of 
these messages was fairly low, however, and most candidates sent only one message per day. In 
contrast, most Swedish and Norwegian politicians exhibit the same level of activity during non-
campaigning periods and tend to send one tweet or post per day (Larsson & Kalsnes, 2014). Since 
in most countries social media use is the most passive during the non-campaigning period, it is 
likely that one tweet or post per day is a rather inactive messaging pattern within the Nordic 
context. Interestingly, the descriptive statistics in table 4 seem to suggest that most candidates did 
not deviate much from this overall messaging pattern. Both the range and standard deviation in the 
total number of posts and average number of posts send per day remain fairly low, and it is 
common that most candidates did not deviate from the average number of total posts more than by 
93 posts. In addition, only one candidate sent on average more than seven posts per day whereas 
most sent only one. 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of selected social media and background variables 
  n mean median range sd skew 
Age 844 40.59 39.00 54.00 11.41 0.32 
Votes 844 1861.43 860.50 30743.00 2651.69 3.69 
Total posts 844 113.90 90.00 822.00 92.69 1.99 
Average post per day 844 1.04 0.83 7.54 0.85 1.99 
Total likes 844 1970.61 735.00 70695.00 4685.79 7.14 
Total comments 844 142.07 52.00 4179.00 328.10 6.43 
Total shares 844 108.76 38.00 4279.00 282.36 8.02 
 Friends 844 509.74 270.00 10324.00 916.12 6.30 
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However, while the level of activity was largely consistent among all candidates, the same cannot 
be said about their performance. The number of likes, comments, and shares each candidate 
received during the observation period deviated largely from one other, and, for example, where 
one candidate could gather more than 70,000 likes during the campaigning period the majority 
could gather only about 735 likes. Furthermore, the figures in table 4 suggest that likes are the 
most common response to the posts send out by the candidates. The median of the total number of 
comment and shares are fairly close to one other, 52 and 38 respectively, whereas the median 
number of likes is over 14 times greater than either of the two. It seems that commenting and 
sharing takes more effort and consideration from voters who in response distribute them more 
carefully to the candidates. In the context of the SEI model, this suggests that the infectious 
population is divided into at least two sub-populations in Facebook, and it is likely that those who 
are turned into the infectious population by creating likes are different in terms of their social 
media behavior. Furthermore, if hypothesis 7 holds true and comments and shares can spread 
content further than likes can, then these smaller numbers might be misleading. It remains to be 
seen whether a greater impact can compensate for the smaller numbers of comments and shares. 
Similarly, the number of friends that the candidates had deviated greatly from one other. Most 
candidates had just 270 friends, or exposed in terms of the SEI model, but some had significantly 
more than that, which is apparent in the skewness of the friend distribution. 
As mentioned previously, in order to operationalize the ability for individual candidates to increase 
their infectious population through their Facebook activity, the average number of likes, comments 
and shares are used to represent the average performance for each individual candidate. As it can 
be seen from table 4, however, each of the social media variables are highly skewed and especially 
the number of shares that the candidates were able to acquire for their messages has a long range 
and an extremely long right tail, suggesting very few large numbers of shares for few candidates 
and a multitude of candidates that only received a couple of shares. This skewed distribution can 
be problematic for further analysis because it can distort averages due to a couple of extremely 
high values. This is an especially acute problem when calculating the mean, and this gives us 
reason to consider alternative centrality measures that are not as sensitive to outliers. One obvious 
alternative would be to use the median over the mean since it does not place as much weight to 
few high values as the mean does. However, in this case, the median is not without its problems. 
The main issue here is that the median contains a lot less information and undervalues candidates 
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who are able to create few successful posts in terms of likes, comments or shares. To see why this 
is, consider two plots displayed in figure 5, which show the like distributions of two candidates, 
and their mean and median values. The first plot shows the like distribution from Alexander Stubb 
who was by far the most popular candidate in Facebook during the 2015 elections and accumulated 
a staggering 164,106 likes during the observation period, over two times more than the next best 
performing candidate who collected a total of 70,697 likes. The figure shows the mean value of 
Stubb's likes in red and the median value in blue.  
 
                                    Figure 5. Like distribution of Alexander Stubb and Kristiina Salonen 
 
As the plot shows, Stubb indeed has a few outlier values which gathered considerably more likes 
than most of Stubb's posts, but it is worth noting that at the same time by far the most common 
value is a round zero. Stubb sent a total of 214 posts on Facebook during the observation period, 
but 40 of them (18.7%) did not perform very well and did not receive a single like from other 
Facebook users. As such, the high values at the right end of the tail pull the mean towards them, 
but at the same time the zero values pull it back towards the center. The median is considerably 
smaller than the mean (547 and 766.85 respectively), but this is mostly due to the zero values 
P O L I T I C A L  C O M P E T I T I O N  A N D  S O C I A L  M E D I A                 P a g e  | 77 
 
 
 
which have a high influence on the median. The influence of zero values might not represent a 
considerable problem if Stubb was a representative example of most candidates Facebook 
performance. However, most candidates could not muster the same kind of support and follower 
base as Stubb could. 
Kristiina Salonen represents a more typical case, whose Facebook metrics are fairly close to the 
overall average. She posted a total of 118 messages on Facebook, approximately one per day, and 
received 1,597 likes for her efforts. As can be seen from her graph, the mean and median number 
of her likes give us quite different information. While her median of two likes would suggest that 
she did not perform very well on Facebook, the distribution on the graph shows that this low 
number is mainly due to the high number of zero values.  
As Salonen demonstrates, social media performance, at least in Facebook, is a hit and miss 
endeavor, where most of the posts do not resonate with voters, but a few of them are able to make 
a considerable impact after many trials and errors. The median obscures this fact in many cases 
and can even completely hide the few successes that candidates have had on Facebook and result 
in zero values with zero information on their performance. This point is even more crucial for the 
other two metrics.  Comments and shares are extremely rare, and most posts do not generate them 
at all. The median, then, would hide their impact in a vast majority of cases. Indeed, the magnitude 
of this problem is quite severe for comments and shares since the median would turn positive mean 
values into zero median values in almost 90% of all cases! Based on this reasoning, the mean value 
is preferred over the median and will be used as an operationalization for the candidates ability to 
create infectious users. 
 
7. EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
Now that all main independent variables are justified and described, it is time to turn to the 
regression analyses and start explicitly testing the hypotheses outlined above. This testing is done 
through multiple OLS regressions, which test whether there is an observable connection between 
the social media variables used in this study and the log-transformed vote counts of the individual 
candidates included in the final dataset of 844 observations. The structure of this chapter follows 
closely hypothesizes 1 through 10 and aims to provide answers to each of them in turn. The first 
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set of regressions are designed to test the overall reliability of the used variables and to see whether 
or not our main social media variables are able to explain the log-transformed vote counts even 
after the control variables are included as explanatory variables. Then, the stability of the model is 
evaluated, and its reliability confirmed in that it follows the basic assumptions behind OLS 
regressions. Once we have established confidence in the model, the hypothesizes are tested 
explicitly via a multiple sets of statistical tests on the regression coefficients regarding our main 
social media variables.  
To start this investigation, table 5 shows the unstandardized coefficient estimates, standard 
errors12, and the associated t-Statistics for the regressors of the first two models which include the 
control variables and the main social media variables. As can be seen from the first Control Model, 
even before any of the social media variables are included to the regression, the control variables 
already explain a sizable portion of the variance associated with the log-transformed vote counts. 
The Control Model has both normal and adjusted R-squared values at around 66%, indicating that 
the included nine control variables are already able to explain well over half of the variance 
associated with the vote distribution.  
Out of all of the control variables included in the Control Model, by far the most impactful variable 
is the level of campaign funding the candidate reported spending. Since the main dependent 
variable is in logs, the estimated coefficients indicate a percent change in votes for a unit increase 
in the specified independent variable. In the case of our funding variable, in contrast to those 
candidates who spent less than 5,000€, those who spend around 5,000 to 20,000€ could expect to 
see almost 90% boost in the number of votes they received and those who spent more than 20,000€ 
could increase their vote count by 157%. Similarly, both the incumbent status and campaigning 
experience provided a helpful edge over those who were non-incumbents and did not have 
experience from the previous 2011 campaign. Incumbent status provided a significant 104% boost 
and experience around 30% boost.  
                                                          
12 Almost of the models reported in this thesis displayed a degree of heteroscedasticity, which can influence the 
standard errors of the coefficients and thus influence their associated p-values. However, each regression was run 
twice with the normal standard errors reported by the stats v3.4.3 package in the R programming language and with 
heteroscedasticity-consistent White standard errors reported by the lmtest package (Zeileis, 2017). The standard 
errors did not deviate to a large degree in any of the regression models and the associated p-values always remained 
the same regardless of which of the two standard errors were used. Thus, the reported standard errors are calculated 
with the usual formula and do not adjust for heteroscedasticity.  
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Table 5. First set of regression models  
 Dependent variable:           
 
log(votes) Control Model  SM Model 
    Coefficient SE t-Statistic   Coefficient SE t-Statistic 
SM
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s Average Post Per Day        0.128 *** 0.030 4.258 
Friends      0.000 0.000 1.539 
Average Likes      0.011 *** 0.003 3.983 
Average Comments      -0.020 0.033 -0.600 
Average Shares        0.029 0.017 1.640 
C
o
n
tr
o
l V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
Age -0.010 *** 0.002 -4.016  -0.006 * 0.002 -2.530 
Male -0.142 ** 0.055 -2.582  -0.123 * 0.051 -2.407 
List Position -0.007 0.004 -1.910  -0.009 * 0.004 -2.549 
First Female 0.100 0.133 0.751  0.118 0.122 0.964 
Incumbent 1.040 *** 0.110 9.420  0.766 *** 0.107 7.170 
Campaign Experience 0.296 *** 0.061 4.891  0.268 *** 0.056 4.778 
Education: Primary 0.241 0.288 0.839  0.206 0.265 0.778 
Education: Vocational -0.060 0.151 -0.400  -0.079 0.139 -0.565 
Education: Upper Secondary -0.073 0.161 -0.456  -0.163 0.148 -1.104 
Education: Higher Education 0.194 0.141 1.368  0.110 0.130 0.845 
Funding: 5,000-20,000 € 0.893 *** 0.066 13.497  0.717 *** 0.063 11.437 
Funding: Over 20,000 € 1.567 *** 0.086 18.143  1.273 *** 0.084 15.201 
Party Size: Medium 1.036 *** 0.096 10.739  0.941 *** 0.090 10.429 
Party Size: Large 1.439 *** 0.105 13.714  1.419 *** 0.098 14.477 
(Intercept) 5.262 *** 0.194 27.150   7.239 *** 0.217 33.295 
 n 844    844   
 R-squared 0.667    0.7195   
 Adjusted R-squared 0.661    0.7133   
  F-statistic 123.4 ***       116 ***     
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
Note: The models include three dummy variables: First Female (First Female in candidate list = 
1), Incumbent (Candidate served as an MP during the election = 1), and Campaign Experience 
(candidate was running in the previous 2011 elections = 1). Education, Funding and Party Size 
are categorical variables, where reference categories are:  
Education = Other; Funding = less than 5,000 €; Party Size = Small. 
 
Interestingly, male candidates seemed to be at a somewhat disadvantage during the 2015 election 
and in general received 14% fewer votes than women did. Here, it is important to recall that the 
population on which these regressions are based on include only those candidates who have active 
Facebook accounts. Indeed, there were considerably more women in this population than there 
was overall among all candidates during the 2015 elections. it could be the case that this difference 
is reflected in the regression estimates and perhaps filtering out all of the non-Facebook users 
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corresponds to other background variables which select highly performing women. Furthermore, 
there seems to be no connection between electoral performance and education; those with lower 
educational degrees performed no worse than those with degrees from high education. The list 
position effects similarly seem to have no impact. 
When we turn our attention the second model which includes our main social media variables, we 
can see some notable patterns. First, the five social media variables are able to increase the 
performance of the model. The adjusted R-squared increases by additional 5.21% which is a 
statistically significant increase at p < .001 level according to F-test which compared these two 
models. Furthermore, all of the control variables retain their significance levels except for age and 
gender variables. Both are reduced to be significant only at the very lowest p < .05 level and the 
magnitude of their coefficients are reduced as well. Some further changes appear within the list 
position effects since list position turns into a significant variable, although at a very low level. It 
remains to be seen how robust this variable is during alternative regression models.  
However, the more important findings are not seen in the estimate changes within the control 
variables but are present within our main variables of interest. Even though our five social media 
variables seem to be able to improve the model, only two of these variables seem to have any 
impact on the vote distributions: the average number of posts that a candidate sent per day and the 
mean of likes their posts received. However, a closer inspection of the model residuals reveals that 
the SM model is riddled with problems that cast doubt upon the reliability of this simplified model. 
The main problem is that multiple observations with unusually high vote counts are performing 
much worse than linear OLS model above would suggest. Figure 6 shows the Residual vs Fitted 
plot in the upper right corner, which shows the residuals from the social media model and contrasts 
them with the fitted values from the same model. What is clearly apparent from this plot is that a 
number of observations at the right end are distributed in a pattern that is not completely random, 
which casts doubt upon how appropriate the basic assumptions behind OLS regression are. 
Furthermore, it seems that the model is very prone to the influence of outliers and three candidates 
(Niinistö, Sipilä, and Rautavuori) have a significant leverage over the model and greatly influence 
the coefficient estimates, which can be seen in the Residuals vs Leverage plot at the upper left 
corner of figure 6. The plot shows the associated Cook’s distance values for each observation and 
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indicates cases that are beyond the suggested threshold (1 in this case) and highlights that 
especially candidate Rautavuori has a large impact on the model. 
 
Figure 6. Diagnostic and scatterplots of the SM Model 
 
 
All of this leads to the conclusion that this model is poorly specified and that the coefficient 
estimates cannot be fully trusted. Moreover, the fact that the model is highly influenced by few 
extreme values and given that a number of observations are performing worse than a linear 
relationship would suggest, gives us reason to suspect that the relationship between the included 
social media variables and log-transformed votes is non-linear and that their effect will eventually 
reduce as their values increase. Indeed, looking at the plots presented at the bottom corner of figure 
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6 shows the relationship between logged votes and the five social media variables is highly non-
linear and closely resembles a concave function. Thus, the reason behind the non-significant 
variables in the previous social media model is likely to be due to functional misspecification and 
needs to account this non-linear relationship. Multiple different options exist to accomplish this, 
but this study opts to continue with logarithmic transformations13. In effect, transforming all of the 
social media variables shifts their distribution to the right and creates a distribution that follows a 
normal distribution more closely. This reduces the impact that the few outlier values have to the 
model and transforms the model specification into a log-linear model where the linear assumption 
of the OLS should hold more reasonably.  
However, the log-transformation of the main independent variables brings some interpretational 
difficulties. Because the independent variables no longer represent their original values, the 
interpretation of the regression coefficients changes from the first SM model presented above. In 
short, regressing a log-transformed independent variable to a log-transformed dependent variable 
can be interpreted as how many percentages the dependent variable changes for one percent change 
in the independent variable. Or, using econometric terminology, this represents the degree of 
elasticity between these two variables. This added complexity to the model is explored in more 
detail below, but, in the interest of the hypotheses to be tested with these models, for now it is 
sufficient to concentrate on the direction of the relationship between our variables and on their 
compared magnitudes.  
Indeed, as the figure 7 shows, the log-transformation is able to improve the stability of the model 
and helps both with the linear assumption and with reducing the influence of outliers. The residuals 
of this log-linear model are more randomly distributed than the simple linear model, outliers do 
not have as much influence on the coefficients, and the relationship looks, more or less, linear for 
likes, comments, and shares. However, posting intensity and the number of friends the candidates 
had on average are not as clear-cut as the rest of the social media variables, as is shown by the 
scatter plots in the bottom corner of figure 7. The few observations at the left end of these two 
                                                          
13 Other solutions do exist. For one, adding a number of polynomial variables in addition to the main social media 
variables, such as 𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠2, could account for the existing non-linearity. However, this would result in multiple 
additional regressors which can cause multicollinearity problems and decrease the accuracy of the model or even 
prevent us from making inferences which coefficients are significantly larger from zero. Using log-transformation on 
the independent variables, however, allows us to keep using the same number of regressors and to avoid the 
aforementioned problems.  
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plots suggest that some candidates were able to acquire fairly large number of votes, even though 
they posted relatively infrequently on Facebook or did not possess a large following of Facebook 
friends. 
Figure 7. Diagnostic and scatterplots of log-linear SM Model
 
 
Furthermore, the plots that include the post and friend variables suggest that a dual relationship 
exists within these two variables: at first, the relationship is negative and turns upward only after 
a certain threshold of Facebook activity or friend following is achieved. Thus, while only few 
observations deviate from the overall positive pattern in the post and friend variables, it is 
worthwhile to explicitly test the hypothesis that even the log-linear model does not completely 
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meet the linearity assumption and has a negative relationship first and turns into a positive one 
only later on. To test this, table 6 shows the regression estimates of two log-linear social media 
models where the first assumes that all of the five social media variables impact votes linearly and 
the second model tests the assumption that the log(posts) and log(friends) variables still have a 
non-linear impact.  
In comparison with the first social media model from table 5, the first noticeable differences in the 
log-linear models presented at table 6 is that where the original model improves the explained 
variance by 5.21% the log-transformed model is able to go further and improve upon the control-
only model by 8.95% (statistically significant at p < .001). Furthermore, three out of the five social 
media variables are now turned into statistically significant at a very high .001 level. As before, it 
seems that being active on Facebook does pay off. Increasing the number of posts a candidate 
sends per day, say, by 10% has an estimated increase of 1.5% for received votes. Not a huge 
impact, but still beneficial. In addition, this relationship seems does not seem to have additional 
complexity, since the added quadratic term in the second logged SM model is not significant.  
However, considering previous findings from the Netherlands and from the United States, it is 
interesting that the amount of Facebook friends does not seem to have any independent impact on 
the vote shares of the candidates in any of the models presented thus far. This variable is able to 
reach a significant impact only after adding a quadratic term in the second logged SM model, but 
it does so in the very lowest .05 level and still the impact is only significant for the quadratic term. 
Thus, the impact that the amount of Facebook following the candidates have seems to be spurious 
and it is questionable how far-reaching claims can be made on the significance of this variable 
based on this data. Nevertheless, the results strongly indicate that the importance of Friends on 
Facebook is much lower for electoral performance in Finland than the importance of Followers is 
on Twitter in countries such as the Netherlands and the United States. Whether this is due to 
country-specific differences or is more related to the underlying differences between the user base 
and interface of Facebook and Twitter remains to be seen and cannot be answered with the data at 
hand. Indeed, this finding reveals a potentially worthwhile avenue for further research and gives 
us further reason to suspect that there are systematic differences between Facebook and Twitter in 
the electoral context that should be investigated further with dual data from both platforms.  
P O L I T I C A L  C O M P E T I T I O N  A N D  S O C I A L  M E D I A                                                                P a g e  | 85 
 
 
 
  Table 6. Second set of regression models 
 Dependent variable:                
 log(votes) Control Model  1st Logged SM Model  2nd Logged SM Model 
    Coefficient SE t-Statistic   Coefficient SE t-Statistic   Coefficient SE t-Statistic 
SM
 V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
log(Posts)      
 0.151 *** 0.031 4.821   0.177 *** 0.038 4.683 
log^2(Posts)     
  
    0.029 0.021 1.405 
log(Friends)     
 0.064 0.038 1.689  -0.242 0.128 -1.889 
log^2(Friends)     
  
    0.029 * 0.012 2.468 
log(Likes)     
 0.307 *** 0.053 5.842  0.297 *** 0.053 5.612 
log(Comments)     
 0.000 0.038 -0.011  -0.012 0.039 -0.316 
log(Shares)       0.099 *** 0.029 3.411   0.099 *** 0.029 3.414 
C
o
n
tr
o
l V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
Age -0.010 *** 0.002 -4.016  0.001 0.002 0.384   0.001 0.002 0.421 
Male -0.142 ** 0.055 -2.582  -0.118 * 0.049 -2.424  -0.113 * 0.048 -2.341 
List Position -0.007 0.004 -1.910  -0.010 ** 0.003 -3.089  -0.010 ** 0.003 -3.098 
First Female 0.100 0.133 0.751  0.000 0.116 0.857  0.111 0.116 0.956 
Incumbent 1.040 *** 0.110 9.420  0.731 *** 0.098 7.442  0.704 *** 0.100 7.071 
Campaign Experience 0.296 *** 0.061 4.891  0.297 *** 0.055 5.440  0.283 *** 0.055 5.181 
Education: Primary 0.241 0.288 0.839  0.291 0.247 1.179  0.281 0.246 1.142 
Education: Vocational -0.060 0.151 -0.400  -0.009 0.132 -0.068  -0.008 0.131 -0.061 
Education: Upper Secondary -0.073 0.161 -0.456  -0.124 0.140 -0.882  -0.130 0.134 -0.928 
Education: Higher Education 0.194 0.141 1.368  0.153 0.123 1.241  0.145 0.123 1.182 
Funding: 5,000-20,000 € 0.893 *** 0.066 13.497  0.518 *** 0.061 8.490  0.513 *** 0.061 8.442 
Funding: Over 20,000 € 1.567 *** 0.086 18.143  0.921 *** 0.083 11.110  0.908 *** 0.083 10.969 
Party Size: Medium 1.036 *** 0.096 10.739  0.717 *** 0.095 7.587  0.747 *** 0.095 7.893 
Party Size: Large 1.439 *** 0.105 13.714  1.212 *** 0.100 12.115  1.247 *** 0.100 12.429 
(Intercept) 7.740 *** 0.231 33.452  4.531 *** 0.258 17.537   5.287 *** 0.404 13.084 
 n 844     844    844    
 R-squared 0.667    0.7562    0.7588   
 Adjusted R-squared 0.661    0.7505    0.7526   
  F-statistic 123.4 ***       134.5 ***       123.1 ***     
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
Note: The models include three dummy variables: First Female (First Female in candidate list = 1), Incumbent (Candidate served as an MP during the 
election = 1), and Campaign Experience (candidate was running in the previous 2011 elections = 1). Education, Funding and Party Size are categorical 
variables, where reference categories are: Education = Other; Funding = less than 5,000 €; Party Size = Small. 
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Taken as a whole, the results related to the Friend variable gives us a reason to doubt the first 
hypothesis formulated in this thesis and it seems that Facebook followers have a minimal impact 
at best and a completely zero effect at worst.  
However, the Friend variable could still have a meaningful impact on votes through interaction. 
As it was the case in the study conducted by Spierings and Jacobs (2014), adding an interaction 
term to the regression model can test the hypothesis that the relationship between the number 
followers the candidate has on Facebook on the log-transformed vote counts is different for those 
candidates who are more active in creating posts or tweets. In short, those who are more active on 
social media can mobilize their followers and gain electoral gains from this interaction. In this 
case, this amounts to arguing that: log(votes) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1log(posts) + 𝛽2log(friends) +
𝛽3(log(posts) × log(friends)). Here it is assumed that the impact that the Friend and Post 
variables have are dependent on each other and can thus be used to test hypothesis 2. However, 
while the regression output is omitted here (the specific results can be found in the appendix), the 
interaction term between Facebook posting activity and number of Facebook friends is not found 
be statistically different from zero. This result suggests that, unlike in many of the previous studies, 
even increasing the effort a candidate spends on Facebook does not seem to be able to mobilize 
followers to vote on election day. Hypothesis 1 and 2 are thus not supported.  
The same, however, cannot be said on hypothesizes 3 and 4. As it can be seen from table 6, the 
ability to create infectious users through Facebook likes and shares have a clear impact on the vote 
distribution. This is most notable in the ability to generate likes for created posts: a 10% increase 
in how many likes a candidate is able to acquire for each of the posts created is associated with 
3.07% increase in votes, over two times more than what could be expected from solely creating 
more posts per day. The first logged SM model also reveals a significant impact on the average 
number of times each post is shared. However, the impact is the lowest of the three significant 
variables, and the same 10% increase in shares results only to approximately 1% increase in votes. 
These results support hypotheses 3 and 4, and it indeed seems to be the case that those candidates 
who are able to acquire more users to the infectious population have a better chance to gain votes 
on Facebook. Moreover, this impact clearly outperforms the impact that the number of friends (or 
the number of exposed) the candidate had during the campaign. As for hypothesis 5, the results 
are largely the same as with the Friend variable. Adding an interaction term between how many 
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times a candidate sends posts per day and how many likes or shares a candidate received on 
average is not statistically significant (estimates in the appendix). Increased activity is then not 
able to boost the influence that likes and shares have, which leads to not give support to hypothesis 
5.  
Perhaps the most intriguing result thus far comes when the relative impact of likes, comments and 
shares are compared. As hypothesis 6 assumes, these three interactions do indeed behave quite 
differently from one other and have a vastly different impact on the vote distribution of the 
candidates. However, the arrived results are almost completely opposite to the ones predicted by 
hypothesis 7. The effect of creating likes does not have the smallest impact. It is by far the most 
influential social media variable within our models and it is certainly not dwarfed by the influence 
of creating comments. Indeed, comments do not seem to have any impact whatsoever. The beta 
coefficient for the comment variable stays non-significant for both models and cannot be 
established to differ from zero. Thus, receiving a consistently high number of comments for each 
post created does not seem to be related to electoral performance. This finding casts some doubt 
upon arguments which tend to emphasize the importance of interaction and communication during 
campaigning on social media. Rather than creating conversation, a more optimal path to gain votes 
on Facebook is to acquire as much attention and reactions in the form of Facebook likes and shares 
as possible. From this, hypothesis 6 is supported while hypothesis 7 is partially supported. 
In the context of the SEI model, this makes intuitive sense in that both likes and shares are the 
clearest factors that determine the spread that a post on Facebook is able to achieve. While 
comments can be assumed to require more effort form users, the evidence that they impact the 
reach of Facebook posts is far from conclusive and is based solely on the work from Bucher (2012), 
which is already several years old – a lifetime in the lifecycle of software algorithms. The results 
found here, then, can be due to the relatively weak weight that the Facebook's News Feed algorithm 
has placed on them during these elections or from a number of other changes and tweaks Facebook 
has done with the News Feed.  
Other plausible explanations, of course, also exist. For one, whereas likes contain a relatively low 
amount of information on the intentions that the user had when generating the like reaction, 
comments can be extremely noisy variables and indicate any number of different factors on the 
campaign performance that a candidate was able to maintain on Facebook. In short, it is difficult 
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to tell what exactly a high number of comments per post actually reveals about the candidate or 
about the campaign. It could mean that the candidate has been able to tap into very relevant issues 
that resonate with multiple different voters and that the campaign successfully facilitated a space 
to discuss these issues on Facebook. On the more negative end on the realm of possibilities, a high 
level of commenting activity can as well be indicative of increased outrage felt towards the views 
of the candidate or of negative feedback that the candidate has gotten from scandals during the 
campaign trail. We cannot tell which is which from just raw comment counts. This can result in 
multiple different effects that average each other out and leave us the impression that comments 
do not matter electorally. As is often the case, more data is needed to explore this matter in more 
detail and the content of the comments themselves need to be investigated in order to distinguish 
positively contributing comments from those that most likely indicate harm for the electoral 
prospects of the candidate. 
Since likes and shares are the most clearly influential social media factors contributing to the vote 
distribution, it is worthwhile to investigate their impact more closely. As previously mentioned, 
the log-transformation of both dependent and independent variables change the interpretation of 
the coefficient estimates, and they cannot be directly interpreted in their original units. One of the 
biggest reasons for this is that the log-linear model does not describe a constant change in y for a 
unit change in the original values of x. This is because the impact that the log-transformed units 
have on y depends on the original value of x, which, in this case, decrease as x gets larger. In other 
words, increasing the average number of likes a candidate received per post from 10 to 20 will 
have a greater impact than increasing it form, say, 20 to 40. The same remains true for the impact 
that shares have. To illustrate the impact of the like and share variables, rather than describing the 
impact that any conceivable change in x values have on y, it is more intuitive to show a plot that 
describes how a unit change on the average number of likes and shares a candidate receives per 
post impacts their vote distribution. This is seen in figure 8, where the x-axis shows the mean value 
of likes and shares in their original units and the y-axis shows how large percent change in votes 
can be expected from these values. The figure is derived from the second logged SM model and 
uses actual values of the mean number of likes per post that the candidates have within the dataset.  
The figure illustrates how quickly the impact of likes diminish as their values grow larger, and at 
the start attempts to gain more likes per post can result in substantial gains. Achieving more than 
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one percent boost to votes can be accomplished by as little as 50 likes per post. However, this 
impact quickly diminishes, and getting a 1.5 percent boost already takes approximately 150 likes 
per post. Even if a candidate is able to match the staggeringly popular Alexander Stubb in terms 
of how many likes each of the individual posts is able to collect (Stubb's average is 766.85) this 
does not even pass a 2 percent threshold. In this light, the ability for likes to generate votes is an 
increasingly difficult task to achieve. Since most candidates could manage averages of 7.78 likes 
per post, it looks like the help Facebook provided during the election was less than 1 percent for 
most candidates.  
                                      Figure 8. The impact of Likes and shares on votes 
 
In addition, if gaining votes through likes is a cumbersome task, it is even more difficult with 
shares. Even if a candidate could manage to gain 50 shares for each of the posts that he sends, 
which is unlikely given that the even the best performing candidate in this regard could only 
establish a mean of 36.9 shares per post, this would result in a less than 0.5 percent increase in 
votes. Moreover, the result found here are somewhat doubtful as the range given in figure 8 well 
exceeds the maximum value of the average number of shares present in the dataset. The model, 
thus, does not give reliable estimates on what happens after the highest mean of 36.9 is surpassed, 
but it illustrates just how likely – or rather how unlikely – a candidate is to gain a significant 
electoral advantage if his main social media strategy is to generate a lot of shares. Of course, it 
could be the case that shares can have a greater impact if candidates become better at generating 
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them. Thus, the potential of shares to impact election outcomes can be a dormant force waiting to 
be used by a skillful candidate, but based on these findings this seems like an unlikely option.  
The findings thus far give us good intuition on the main mechanisms by which Facebook activity 
is connected with electoral performance, but they do not tell us much about differences between 
groups. Although the control variables show that being an incumbent and having larger 
campaigning funds are connected with larger vote shares, alone they do not imply that they can 
boost the impact that Facebook has. Rather, the previous models merely show that Facebook can 
have an impact which is independent of these variables. Hence, in order to test the assumptions 
made in the last three hypotheses (8, 9 and 10), one last set of regression estimates are presented 
in table 7, which shows three separate interaction models based on the first logged SM model 
presented in table 6. The three models are designed to test whether candidates with different age, 
incumbent status or campaign funding have different slopes associated with the most impactful 
like and share variables14.  
If, for example, the coefficient in the interaction term is significantly different from zero between 
incumbent status and the logged like variable, this implies that those who are incumbents gain 
differently from Facebook likes in contrast to non-incumbents. To avoid problems arriving from 
multicollinearity, each of the models only uses one of the three mentioned control variables (age, 
incumbent status, and funding) and first adds an interaction term between the control variable and 
the like variable and then again the same interactions for the share variable. To make this procedure 
clear, to test whether an interaction effect exists between different levels of funding, for example, 
and the amount likes and shares a candidate received on average, two separate regressions were 
run: first with an interaction term between the funding variable and the like variable, and then 
another between the funding variable and the share variable. This procedure was then repeated for 
age and incumbent status15. 
 
                                                          
14 The precense of an interaction effect within the post variable was investigated aswell, but this always resulted in 
a non-significant regressor estimates. 
15 This one-by-one approach was selected because including multiple interactions within the same regression 
resulted in a hihgly correlated regressors, which prevented from making inferences on which interaction terms were 
significant as the model could not separate the independent impact that each of the regressors had on the model.  
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 Table 7.  Third set of regression models 
 Dependent variable:               
  log(votes) Age Model  Funding Model  Incumbent Model 
    Coefficient SE t-Statistic   Coefficient SE t-Statistic   Coefficient SE t-Statistic 
SM
 V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
log(Posts) 0.149 *** 0.031 4.768  0.152 *** 0.031 4.859  0.152 *** 0.031 4.887 
log(Friends) 0.064 0.038 1.687  0.066 0.038 1.729  0.066 0.038 1.740 
log(Likes) 0.397 *** 0.094 4.223  0.338 *** 0.058 5.795  0.324 *** 0.053 6.174 
log(Comments) 0.002 0.039 0.041  0.002 0.039 0.044  0.012 0.038 0.300 
log(Shares) 0.101 *** 0.029 3.476  0.100 *** 0.029 3.445  0.099 *** 0.029 3.423 
log(Likes) x Age -0.002 0.002 -1.160          
log(Likes) x 5,000-20,000 €      -0.074 0.058 -1.277      
log(Likes) x Over 20,000 €      -0.038 0.074 -0.516      
log(Likes) x Incumbent             -0.240 ** 0.078 -3.091 
C
o
n
tr
o
l V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
Age 0.006 0.005 1.205  0.001 0.002 0.408  0.001 0.002 0.378 
Male -0.116 * 0.049 -2.384  -0.117 * 0.049 -2.405  -0.125 * 0.048 -2.579 
List Position -0.010 ** 0.003 -3.032  -0.010 ** 0.003 -3.126  -0.010 ** 0.003 -3.106 
First Female 0.100 0.116 0.861  0.106 0.116 0.909  0.096 0.116 0.829 
Incumbent 0.746 *** 0.099 7.531  0.741 *** 0.100 7.379  1.475 *** 0.260 5.679 
Campaign Experience 0.295 *** 0.055 5.402  0.299 *** 0.055 5.480  0.294 *** 0.054 5.416 
Education: Primary 0.295 0.247 1.195  0.299 0.247 1.213  0.317 0.246 1.291 
Education: Vocational -0.008 0.132 -0.064  -0.006 0.132 -0.046  0.007 0.131 0.053 
Education: Upper Secondary -0.131 0.140 -0.936  -0.135 0.141 -0.957  -0.106 0.140 -0.760 
Education: Higher Education 0.152 0.123 1.236  0.151 0.123 1.223  0.166 0.123 1.352 
Funding: 5,000-20,000 € 0.519 *** 0.061 8.504  0.670 *** 0.134 5.006  0.500 *** 0.061 8.212 
Funding: Over 20,000 € 0.926 *** 0.083 11.158  0.990 *** 0.205 4.838  0.912 *** 0.083 11.042 
Party Size: Medium 0.703 *** 0.095 7.374  0.694 *** 0.096 7.210  0.695 *** 0.094 7.374 
Party Size: Large 1.199 *** 0.101 11.910  1.183 *** 0.103 11.484  1.189 *** 0.010 11.905 
(Intercept) 4.354 *** 0.300 14.516   4.495 *** 0.261 17.226   4.513 *** 0.257 17.554 
 n 844    844     844   
 R-squared 0.757    0.7566    0.759   
 Adjusted R-squared 0.751    0.7504    0.753   
  F-statistic 127.9 ***     121.7 ***       129.6 ***     
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
P O L I T I C A L  C O M P E T I T I O N  A N D  S O C I A L  M E D I A                  P a g e  | 92 
 
 
 
In almost all cases, the coefficient in the interaction term could not be established to differ 
significantly enough from zero. Adding interaction terms in the logged post variable is non-
significant in all of the control variables, and the logged share variable is only significant with the 
Incumbent status variable, although only at a low p < .05 level. In the interest of compactness, 
table 7 only shows the interaction term results from the logged like variable, since only here any 
clear differences are found and including all of the other regression models would take 
considerable amount of space without providing much additional information.  
As it can be seen from the table, the coefficient associated with the interaction terms are non-
significant in all cases with one notable exception. The interaction between incumbent status and 
log-transformed likes is significant (at .01 level) and, moreover, it shows a negative relationship! 
According to the regression estimates, the impact that likes have on the vote shares for incumbents 
is 0.324 − 0.240 × 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡. Since the Incumbent variable is 0 for non-incumbents, this implies 
that non-incumbents are able to get a 0.324% boost on their votes for a percent change in the 
average number of likes they receive, while incumbents receive only a 0.084% boost. In other 
words, the non-incumbents are gaining almost four times more from likes than incumbents are. A 
similar pattern is apparent for shares, though the difference is not as great as it is for likes.   
Indeed, a graphical examination confirms this intuition. Figure 9 shows the linear relationship of 
logged likes and shares to logged vote counts for both incumbents and non-incumbents on the top 
of the figure and below the impact of the funding variable is similarly placed for contrast. These 
four plots show that while funding impacts the intercepts of the two social media variables, it does 
not affect the slopes themselves. Those candidates with bigger funding are automatically 
guaranteed to receive more votes, but the increase they can have from Facebook likes is the same 
for all funding levels. Incumbents, on the other hand, start from a higher intercept, but non-
incumbents are able to compensate with a steeper slope.  
Considering the non-linear impact that likes have on electoral performance, this result is perhaps 
not all that surprising. On average, incumbents perform better electorally and are more popular on 
Facebook, but since the impact that Facebook has on votes declines as higher values are reached 
incumbents belong precisely to the group where the impact of Facebook has reduced the most. If 
the assumptions behind the SEI model are correct, this is perhaps explainable after factors external 
to social media are considered. It is plausible that incumbents have multiple other channels through 
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which they can interact with voters and they often already possess a high degree of recognizability. 
Thus, the added benefit that Facebook can bring to them is minimal and the comparatively 
unknown non-incumbents are able to gain more from visibility on Facebook because they have 
few other sources to gain attention. This seems like a plausible assumption, but it should be tested 
with further data. Social media data alone cannot give us further insight on the credibility of this, 
and further studies should expand its scope outside of social media and include variables form 
alternative media channels. 
     Figure 9. The interaction effects of the Incumbent and Funding variables 
 
 
Taken together, the interaction terms revealed that the major difference between groups resides 
within the incumbent status. Neither the age of the candidate nor the funding level was able to 
boost the impact that Facebook had. This suggests that younger voters are not more apt at using 
Facebook for campaigning purposes and that funding alone does not help candidates to gain more 
from the platform. The funding variable, however, is somewhat problematic due to its self-reported 
nature and inaccurate measurement. Because of this, the variable is not precise and might not even 
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be accurate in that it does not measure what we wish it should measure. Moreover, the variable 
does not tell us whether or not the candidates actually allocated their funds to social media 
campaigning or did they mostly spend them in other activities. Hence, we should be wary of 
making too broad interpretations based on this particular result. The incumbent effect, however, 
remains intriguing and is one of the few empirical findings that favor the equalization thesis. It 
remains to be seen whether this is a robust result and holds in further elections, but for now it gives 
some hope for the equalization thesis after a long run of studies which mainly favor normalization. 
With these considerations, hypothesis 8 and 10 are not supported, but hypothesis 9 is partially 
supported. 
Thus, the final result of these regression estimates is that Facebook can indeed be associated with 
electoral gains and it seems that, at least in these particular elections, that non-incumbents are 
enjoying most from these gains. This is a rather surprising result given all of the other studies 
which have come before and showed opposite results. As the literature review above has shown, 
most candidates who first start adopting social media can be considered as elite politicians who 
have the greatest resources and are placed in the political limelight. On the other hand, many 
studies have shown that there are some clear differences in the behavioral patterns of social media 
use by different candidates, which are more favorable towards marginal political actors. Indeed, 
as William & Gulati (2008) and Spierings and Jacobs (2014) have shown, more active social media 
users can gain more from the platform than passive users which suggests that normalization is 
possible if marginal actors are the once who exhibit more intensive use patterns. However, none 
of these previous studies have considered how different functions of diverse set of platforms 
impact the effectiveness of social media strategies for electoral gains and have, at most, looked at 
the number of followers or friends and the level of activity a candidate has spent during the 
campaigning season. Especially Facebook is a rare subject of study in this regard, and no studies 
have attempted to include its internal performance metrics – likes, comments, and shares – to the 
analysis.  
What these results show is that if these metrics are left out from the analysis, the impact that social 
media has to the electoral context can be vastly underestimated. Furthermore, the results give some 
support for the SEI model outlined above. Although not all of the assumptions that were made 
prior to the empirical investigation hold under statistical testing, they do confirm the most 
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fundamental building blocks of the model. If we assume that visibility is the first necessary 
condition for a candidate to gain from social media, then we should expect that those who can 
neither attain it through first-degree friend networks or from infectious interactions will not be able 
to gain full benefits from the medium regardless of the amount of effort they put into it. Indeed, 
the results show that increasing effort on Facebook, sending more posts per day, is not nearly as 
impactful as it is to get more likes for the same amount of posts sent.  
Rather than discrediting the SEI model, the results, then, suggest alterations and improvements 
which can be made to it. For one, it seems that the “level of effort” hypothesis is not solid and it is 
dubious whether comments or shares create a wider reach in contrast to likes because users need 
to spend more effort on them. However, at the very least, the results highlight that likes should be 
considered as a special variable which should not be mixed with comments or shares. Moreover, 
since likes take the least amount of effort by other users, it might be the case that they work more 
closely to what the SEI model suggest than the other two variables do. Likes can be given without 
careful consideration when to do so and thus Facebook users are like to push the like button merely 
when they “feel” to do so. In contrast, shares and comments require more clicks and types from 
the user who is consequently more likely to contribute them only in special circumstances. What 
these special circumstances are, is an important avenue for further research, and it could be the 
case that they represent untapped potential for effective social media campaigning for those 
candidates who are able to figure out what posts get shared and commented upon. At this point, 
the low overall levels of these interactions either tells us that candidates just do not know how to 
get them, or that voters are just overall less likely to be interested in commenting or sharing 
political content.   
In terms of the normalization and equalization debate, the results presented here give us reason to 
hope that Facebook can be an equalizing force. While incumbents can be expected to have a higher 
vote share overall, they do not get as significant boosts from the most important Facebook variables 
than non-incumbents do. Furthermore, in spite of a number of different ways in which financial 
resources can be used to influence the reach that Facebook can achieve, the funding level of a 
candidate did not seem to influence how effective Facebook was. Although the used funding 
variable cannot distinguish how much a given candidate used resources specifically for social 
media, it nevertheless gives us preliminary intuition on the matter. This, of course, does not mean 
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that financial resources do not matter in campaigning on Facebook. One alternative explanation is 
that those political candidates with large resources had multiple of other areas where they could 
use them and opted not to prioritize social media. This can easily change in future elections. As 
Jacobs and Spierings (2016) argue, if bigger parties and elite candidates feel that social media 
threatens their status, they can use their extensive resources catch up with more experienced users. 
Perhaps incumbents were not yet threatened by social media during 2015 but will be in 2019 when 
the next parliamentary elections are held. If so, funding can play a greater role then than it has in 
2015.  
Thus far, we have advanced on almost all of the research objectives set forth at the beginning of 
this thesis. We have sought answers on how we can define social media, established a theoretical 
framework on how it can function as a campaigning tool, estimated the impact that social media 
had on the vote share of individual candidates, investigated whether differences and patterns 
existed on how social media impacted different candidates, and analyzed these results from the 
normalization v. equalization debate. It is thus time to return to the original research questions 
formulated at the beginning of this thesis, which is the task of the final concluding chapter. 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
The main research question that drove the formulation of all subsequent questions and research 
goals of this thesis asked whether social media can truly have an impact on the status quo of Finnish 
politics. All new advancements in communication and information technologies tend to be 
accompanied by enthusiastic and positive expectations from all of the new possibilities that can be 
now imagined. The same holds true with social media, and while it is truly characterized by 
innovative and novel ways to communicate with vast audiences, it is far from certain that the hopes 
placed in it will materialize as imagined. Indeed, Tim Wu (2010) perfectly describes why 
communication technologies can inspire such optimism in their early days: 
When in the course of human affairs things go wrong, the root cause is often described as some 
failure to communicate, whether it be between husband and wife, a general and a front-line 
commander, a pilot and a radio controller, or among several nations. Better communications, 
it is believed, lead to better mutual understanding, perhaps a recognition of a shared humanity, 
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and the avoidance of needless disaster. Perhaps it is for this reason that the advent of every 
new technology of communication always brings with it a hope for ameliorating all the ills of 
society. (p. 36) 
As Wu (2010) continues to describe, the advent of the radio in the United States at the start of 19th 
century made people hope it would bring the remote federal government closer to the citizens, 
improve public discourse and even create a more cultured society. The reality, as it always is, 
proved to be much murkier, and all of the hopes and expectations placed on this new technology 
proved not to work out quite as imagined. Now at the age of social media, it is no surprise that this 
new medium has yet again given fuel to optimistic voices and is surrounded with hopeful theories, 
such as the equalization thesis or the mobilization thesis. However, we should treat these voices 
with caution and thoroughly investigate their claims before jumping to conclusions. While social 
media may indeed be a force for a more equal political competition and give voices to marginalized 
groups, multiple other forces are at play simultaneously, which make the reality the murky place 
that it is. As newspapers, radio and television exemplify, we have been at this juncture of a new 
technological age multiple times before, and we would be wise recall all of the hopes placed in 
them and continue to remember how those hopes were eventually realized as the new technologies 
matured and became old technologies.  
During this thesis, one of the most underlying expectation placed on social media is that it truly 
can have an impact on the lives of individuals and further influence our institutions and political 
systems. Similarly, both the normalization and equalization theses have this expectation as well, 
although the direction of the impact is vastly different. Hence, it is here where we must first shed 
light and see how murky the reality really is. As has been done in the United States and the 
Netherlands before, there seem to be strong grounds to argue that social media has had an impact 
within the Finnish electoral context. Those who use social media and perform well there are indeed 
associated with direct electoral gains in terms of the number of votes they receive. Moreover, not 
every candidate is equal in this endeavor. Rather, it seems to be the case that non-incumbent 
politicians can benefit more from social media platforms. Although the reason behind this cannot 
be fully investigated within this study, a plausible hypothesis is that incumbents can already gain 
visibility from multiple other sources, such as from news stories that cover their daily political 
activities. In most cases, non-incumbents do not have the resources or necessary pre-established 
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recognizability to be confident that a sizable portion of the electorate is already familiar with them. 
Social media, then, can be the sole source for visibility that they can acquire and, if used properly, 
it can help them to gain more votes. 
These answer the first two sub-questions formulated at the start of the study, but the final sub-
question “If the answers to questions 1.1 or 1.2 are positive, are there mechanisms internal or 
external to social media that can explain them?” is not as easily answered. The main reason for 
this has to do with the fact that the data used during this thesis is collected almost solely from 
social media, and only from Facebook at that, and it has next to no information on forces external 
to it. As the hybrid media system theory states (Chadwick 2017), our current media system cannot 
be fully understood through any one medium. Rather, the current system is a network of multiple 
fractured media systems that interact, compete, and intersect with one other constantly. This is 
especially topical when studying social media since it is one of the most versatile and 
interconnected medium out there. Social media can be used to read news from traditional 
broadcasters, distribute campaigning videos by political candidates, organize political events at a 
moments notice, and much, much more. Thus, how individuals use social media cannot be 
understood without knowing how it is used in relation to other external media channels and 
consequently we cannot have a full understanding on how it affects politics without taking external 
factors into account. Unfortunately, more data is needed for us to go further in this direction, which 
is currently out of reach for this thesis. 
We can, however, start making preliminary observations and hypothesizes on the main internal 
mechanisms through which social media functions and gives its users political capital. While the 
SEI model is by no means meant to be the only mechanism imaginable, it illustrates the first and 
absolutely necessary condition that political actors must meet in order to use the platform 
effectively for political purposes. Before political candidates can induce social presence with 
voters, before they can promote themselves and their actions, and before they can try to influence 
the public agenda through social media, they need to be made visible within the platform. In social 
media, no candidate is guaranteed to have this resource a priori. How this visibility is allocated to 
users is one of the most important mechanisms we must understand before we can have a full 
picture on how social media benefits political actors and who can benefit the most from it.  
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This thesis has made few steps towards this goal and furthered our understanding on the 
importance of social media to the Finnish political system. While social media activity in itself can 
have a meaningful impact to the electoral prospects of candidates, by far the most influential factor 
is the internal functions and interactions that Facebook allows its users to use, such as liking or 
sharing posts. As Bucher (2012) and DeVito (2017) have illustrated, these interactions do influence 
the visibility that a post in Facebook can achieve. While the magnitude of the impact was revealed 
to be rather small for individual candidates, in the aggregate it can sum up to significant changes. 
Since the Finnish electoral system uses proportional representation, which allocates seats 
proportional to the total number of votes that a party receives, even a 2% increase to the vote share 
of individual candidates can have consequences for the formation of the parliament if multiple 
candidates within the same party can achieve this boost. Party officials could then increase the 
influence their party has by systematically teaching and guiding their candidates how to use social 
media for campaign purposes in the hopes that this increased ability will bring them a boost to 
their overall vote share and reward them with extra seats within the legislature. 
The importance of these internal functions is something that has not been studied before in the 
context of Facebook and political campaigning. Many previous studies have focused at examining 
how raw posting frequency and the number of Facebook Friends or supporters contribute to 
candidates electoral success, but, due to data collection or other constraints, have ignored other 
relevant Facebook metrics. This study has shown that both the raw posting frequency and the 
number of Friends can have a rather marginal effect and are dwarfed by the internal Facebook 
functions, such as creating likes to Facebook posts. Moreover, some of the results revealed in this 
thesis cast doubt upon the few arguments which state that social media can influence voters by 
creating tighter interactions between the candidates and voters (e.g. Kruikemeier, 2014; Parmelee 
& Bichard, 2012). According to this line of thought, since social media can facilitate intimate and 
one-to-one communications with voters, the platform can be used to draw voters closer to 
candidates and their campaigns, which in turn makes voters feel more involved and more inclined 
to give their only vote to the candidate who has been the most successful in interaction with them. 
However, the results of this thesis have shown that the ability to generate conversation and 
comments within Facebook is not associated with electoral gains.  
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This gives us reason to reconsider the plausibility of the interaction argument. Indeed, recalling 
the studies outlined in the literature review chapter, multiple examples from the United States and 
Europe have shown that most politicians are not particularly interested in the interactive and 
conversational form of campaign. This suggests that even if more interactive social media 
approach could be helpful electorally, most candidates cannot practice it because it would exhaust 
too many resources, are afraid of negative unintended consequences from an uncontrolled 
communication environment or find other campaigning tactics more efficient to spend resources 
on, for example. Indeed, it could be the case that the relative unimportance of comments within 
this thesis is due to the fact that they are extremely scarce and are just not created in the degree in 
which they can have a meaningful impact. Whichever the case might be, at the very least the results 
of this thesis show that interactive or conversational campaign is not necessary in order to have 
political gains from social media use. Pushing the like button is certainly not as interactive or 
communicative as it is to write comments and is a rather a one-directional and simplistic way to 
communicate between candidates and voters. The candidate cannot, for example, further interact 
with a voter who has liked his post or know why the like button was pushed in the first place. If 
the visibility argument advanced in this thesis holds true, it might not even matter why the like 
button was pushed. That is to say, there is no such thing as bad publicity within Facebook; all that 
matters is that your posts are infectious enough to get reacted to and in this way spread to as many 
people as possible. 
However, before broad generalizations are made based on this study, its faults and shortcomings 
must be recognized. The clearest issue with the results of this study comes from the fact that it is 
impossible to have a definite conclusion on the issue of causality. What this thesis proposes, after 
all, is that there exists a causal connection between Facebook and electoral performance, but we 
cannot be sure of this with the cross-sectional data at our current disposal. Even after controlling 
for various alternative explanations, we cannot tell in which way the arrow of causality goes. Does 
good performance on Facebook result in better electoral prospects or is it merely the case that 
electorally strong candidates often have active social media followers who continuously like and 
share the posts of their favorite candidate? If the latter is closer to the truth, then the impact of likes 
and shares that we have discovered is not due to direct causal connection but rather they are an 
indication of the underlying enthusiasm felt towards the candidate.  
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In order for us to be more confident in the causal interpretation, we need to collect better data 
which allows us to bypass the ever-present omitted variable problem through Instrumental 
Variable methods, for example, by conducting controlled experiments where we have more control 
over the research environment, or by focusing on cases where it is possible to collect time series 
data. In this regard, focusing only on vote shares is problematic since it does not allow us to adopt 
a time series approach because elections are usually held after a long time-interval between 
elections during which the candidates also change. This creates non-comparable datasets which 
are not easily used for analysis. The alternative is to shift our focus to other areas where we can 
have multiple observations from different time periods from the same individuals or entities. One 
plausible option is to focus on the parties themselves rather than on individual candidates. Regular 
opinion polls published by various sources allow us to track the changes that occur on the level of 
support that a party enjoys and to test whether social media can affect how popular the party is. 
This can prove to be a promising avenue for further research. 
The second major issue within this thesis comes from one of the most common problems related 
with regression models: not including all relevant control variables. In this case, an obvious issue 
with the used variables is that they do not control for the influence of pre-existing fame or 
recognizability of the candidates. The more famous or recognizable the candidate is, the more 
likely it is that the candidate will perform well during the elections because the sheer number of 
people who can plausibly consider voting for him is greater than it is for less-known individuals. 
Moreover, the same can be said about social media performance and the more well-known the 
candidate is the more likely it is that he has a large social media following and more users who 
can interact and react to the messages he sends on any given platform. Thus, this factor clearly 
influences both the dependent variable and our main independent variable of interest, which likely 
leads to overestimating the influence of our social media variables since part of the impact they 
have can be due to the fame of the candidate and does not come from social media itself.  
It could be argued that the influence of fame is somewhat controlled by including a variable 
indicating incumbent status because incumbents are usually the most well-known political figures 
within any political system. However, there are multiple of other ways in which a candidate can 
be recognizable that has nothing to do with politics. This is true for actors, athletes, and other 
media personalities, for example. This is a problem that the political study of social media needs 
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to solve, and we need to consider what solutions arrive at the best results. We can, as Jacobs and 
Spierings (2014) have done, try to control for fame by collecting secondary data from various news 
sources and count the number of time a candidate has appeared within the news prior to the election 
period. Further paths come from a more qualitative approach and device coding strategies where 
candidates are coded either well-known or not well-known based on the judgment of ordinary 
citizens who must recognize the candidate only based on the name and face of the candidate. One 
more alternative path is to use other sources where only accomplished or well-known individuals 
appear. Wikipedia is one of such sources that could be considered since having a Wikipedia article 
that remains on the site for a long period of time can be considered as an indication of fame. All 
of these solutions can help with the omitted variable problem, but for now the uncertainty it brings 
to this study must be kept in mind alongside with the results of this study. 
Finally, the nature of the research subject brings some considerable complications for the external 
validity of the study. Since most algorithms that function beneath various social media platforms 
are vastly different with different internal functions and logic, we cannot draw straightforward 
conclusions on the overall of influence of social media to the Finnish political system based solely 
on data from Facebook. Moreover, even within a single platform the algorithm can change almost 
from day to day which makes the study of Facebook, for example, in different time periods almost 
a study of two completely different topics. This is the main reason why the SEI model is as general 
as possible and does not make any prior assumptions on the degree to which different internal 
functions impact the spread of messages. However, it is precisely because of the huge variety and 
volatility of social media platforms why we need a generalized model such as the SEI model. 
While the specific mechanism through which visibility is gained within social media tends to 
change over time, the fact that all social media can be thought of as a network of individual users 
who influence how information spreads within the overall network gives us the necessary solid 
ground to which we can root overarching theories. The importance of individual users for the 
dissemination of information is the greatest in social media than it has ever been in any of the prior 
communication technologies that have come before, and the SEI model aims to capture this main 
mechanism.  
While the disease analogy is nothing new when discussing social media, it has not been used 
explicitly through a systematic model that describes the relationship in detail, and it is here that 
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this thesis gives its major contribution within the research field. Going forward, the model can be 
improved, and our intuition strengthened on the specific differences between different social media 
platforms by conducting further research with dual data on multiple platforms at the same time. 
Indeed, the differences between Twitter and Facebook is something that has not been examined 
closely thus far, and most studies use data only from one of the two platforms.  
Even after taking account the above-cited shortcomings of this thesis, the results we have arrived 
at are nevertheless intriguing and further gives us confidence that social media is an important area 
of study for political scientists. Together with the numerous studies which have come before, this 
thesis highlights the fact that social media is connected with direct political gains for those political 
actors who have chosen to use it as a political tool. Moreover, it is plausible that the importance 
of social media will continue to grow in the future and its use is certainly not declining among 
candidates nor ordinary citizens. The implications that this brings are numerous, and it is difficult 
to tell how social media continues to shape the political sphere. While the future is always difficult 
to predict accurately and there is no way of telling how social media matures, with these kinds of 
studies we can start to picture different set of outcomes and trends that social media can bring.  
For one, if the main arguments in this thesis are standing on a solid ground, the way internal social 
media functions such as the like button shapes our political discourse and outcomes can be 
worrisome. If there truly is no such thing as bad publicity on Facebook, then the ultimate measure 
in which political actors measure their success on the platform is based on the amount of reactions 
they are able to generate. It matters not what one posts, how accurate the information within it is 
or how carefully it is formulated. What matters is that it gets noticed, interacted with and shared 
with others. In this kind of environment it is easy to imagine a form of deliberation that does not 
focus on difficult policy issues, thoughtfully considerations of current issues, or solid arguments 
for or against particular topics. Rather, the environment favors easily digestible, thought-
provoking and perhaps even poorly confirmed information. Indeed, as a recent study from MIT 
shows, those news which contain confirmed and solid information spread six times slower on 
Twitter than those news which contain false or unconfirmed information (Vosoughi, Roy and Aral 
2018).  
Moreover, the fact that the most popular social media platforms are corporate entities that have 
not been constructed with deliberation or political communication more generally in mind but are 
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rather primarily concerned with the underlying logic of the market system and with profit 
maximization should give us some pause. This aspect is highly relevant to the functioning and 
health of a democratic system because if such social networks are becoming ever more important 
for the eventual success of political candidates and if at the same time political actors are becoming 
incrementally reliant on them to gain a voice, the internal logic of social media companies can 
become embedded to the political process. Like the Panopticon described by Michel Foucault, 
social media platforms are designed to make objects and users visible or invisible based on a 
criterion that the owners of the platform ultimately decide. If this visibility is increasingly acquired 
through social media and translates to better chances to perform well electorally, it not only 
influences who wields power but also impacts the very heart of any democratic system: how 
democratic deliberation is conducted and who gets heard. This is more than enough reason for us 
to continue to study social media. 
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10. APPENDIX 
Appendix 1. Interaction models between post intensity and friend, like, comment, and share variables 
 Dependent variable:               
  log(votes) Friend Model  Like Model  Share Model 
    Coefficient SE t-Statistic  Coefficient SE t-Statistic 
 Coefficient SE t-Statistic 
SM
 V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
log(Posts) 0.048  0.136 0.356  0.118 * 0.058 2.024  0.146 *** 0.037 3.963 
log(Friends) 0.071  0.039 1.822  0.063  0.038 1.670  0.064  0.038 1.678 
log(Likes) 0.304 *** 0.053 5.783  0.313 *** 0.053 5.868  0.308 *** 0.053 5.821 
log(Comments) 0.000  0.039 -0.009  -0.002  0.039 -0.041  0.000  0.039 -0.008 
log(Shares) 0.099 *** 0.029 3.402  0.098 *** 0.029 3.365  0.097 ** 0.030 3.186 
log(Likes) x log(Friends) 0.019  0.024 0.772          
log(Post) x log(Likes)      0.017  0.026 0.659      
log(Post) x log(Shares)                   -0.005   0.022 -0.238 
C
o
n
tr
o
l V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
Age 0.001  0.002 0.392  0.001  0.002 0.413  0.001  0.002 0.382 
Male -0.116 * 0.049 -2.379  -0.115 * 0.049 -2.364  -0.118 * 0.049 -2.422 
List Position -0.010 ** 0.003 -3.039  -0.010 ** 0.003 -3.070  -0.010 ** 0.003 -3.093 
First Female 0.103  0.116 0.889  0.103  0.116 0.886  0.100  0.116 0.856 
Incumbent 0.733 *** 0.098 7.457  0.733 *** 0.098 7.456  0.731 *** 0.098 7.429 
Campaign Experience 0.293 *** 0.055 5.366  0.294 *** 0.055 5.378  0.297 *** 0.055 5.437 
Education: Primary 0.295  0.247 1.197  0.291  0.247 1.178  0.290  0.247 1.174 
Education: Vocational -0.007  0.132 -0.055  -0.009  0.132 -0.067  -0.009  0.132 -0.070 
Education: Upper Secondary -0.123  0.140 -0.878  -0.122  0.140 -0.867  -0.125  0.141 -0.890 
Education: Higher Education 0.153  0.123 1.240  0.152  0.123 1.230  0.152  0.123 1.237 
Funding: 5,000-20,000 € 0.515 *** 0.061 8.430  0.515 *** 0.061 8.412  0.518 *** 0.061 8.489 
Funding: Over 20,000 € 0.917 *** 0.083 11.020  0.915 *** 0.084 10.959  0.922 *** 0.083 11.106 
Party Size: Medium 0.726 *** 0.095 7.623  0.727 *** 0.096 7.593  0.716 *** 0.095 7.571 
Party Size: Large 1.225 *** 0.102 12.072  1.227 *** 0.102 11.977  1.210 *** 0.101 12.017 
(Intercept) 4.480 *** 0.267 16.785   4.507 *** 0.261 17.257   4.531 *** 0.259 17.525 
 n 844    844    844   
 R-squared 0.756    0.7563    0.756   
 Adjusted R-squared 0.750    0.7504    0.750   
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  F-statistic 127.7 ***     127.7 ***       127.6 ***     
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
Note: The models include three dummy variables: First Female (First Female in candidate list = 1), Incumbent (Candidate served as an MP during 
the election = 1), and Campaign Experience (candidate was running in the previous 2011 elections = 1). Education, Funding and Party Size are 
categorical variables, where reference categories are: Education = Other; Funding = less than 5,000 €; Party Size = Small. 
 
Appendix 2. Interaction terms with log-transformed share variable 
 Dependent variable:               
  log(votes) Age Model  Funding Model  Incumbent Model 
    Coefficient SE t-Statistic  Coefficient SE t-Statistic  Coefficient SE t-Statistic 
SM
 V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
log(Posts) 0.150 *** 0.031 4.810  0.149 *** 0.031 4.769  0.150 *** 0.031 4.843 
log(Friends) 0.064  0.038 1.687  0.063  0.038 1.666  0.064  0.038 1.690 
log(Likes) 0.307 *** 0.052 5.844  0.313 *** 0.053 5.941  0.313 *** 0.052 5.995 
log(Comments) -0.001  0.038 -0.019  0.004  0.037 0.105  0.010  0.038 0.260 
log(Shares) 0.223 ** 0.079 2.811  0.132 *** 0.034 3.843  0.110 *** 0.029 3.794 
log(Shares) x Age -0.003  0.002 -1.681           
log(Shares) x 5,000-20,000 €     -0.070  0.045 -1.539      
log(Shares) x Over 20,000 €     -0.096  0.066 -1.473      
log(Shares) x Incumbent             -0.224 ** 0.072 -3.114 
C
o
n
tr
o
l V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
Age -0.002  0.003 -0.712  0.001  0.002 0.323  0.001  0.002 0.387 
Male -0.114 * 0.049 -2.348  -0.115 * 0.049 -2.372  -0.122 * 0.048 -2.517 
List Position -0.010 ** 0.003 -3.063  -0.011 ** 0.003 -3.198  -0.010 ** 0.003 -3.172 
First Female 0.089  0.116 0.766  0.104  0.116 0.891  0.099  0.116 0.856 
Incumbent 0.742 *** 0.098 7.545  0.745 *** 0.098 7.564  0.693 *** 0.099 7.032 
Campaign Experience 0.295 *** 0.054 5.422  0.297 *** 0.055 5.458  0.292 *** 0.054 5.378 
Education: Primary 0.295  0.246 1.197  0.312  0.247 1.263  0.301  0.245 1.225 
Education: Vocational -0.010  0.132 -0.077  0.003  0.132 0.026  -0.005  0.131 -0.041 
Education: Upper Secondary -0.126  0.140 -0.898  -0.123  0.140 -0.876  -0.113  0.140 -0.807 
Education: Higher Education 0.154  0.123 1.253  0.166  0.123 1.347  0.153  0.122 1.248 
Funding: 5,000-20,000 € 0.515 *** 0.061 8.447  0.451 *** 0.074 6.110  0.509 *** 0.061 8.376 
P O L I T I C A L  C O M P E T I T I O N  A N D  S O C I A L  M E D I A                                                 P a g e  | 115 
 
 
 
Funding: Over 20,000 € 0.920 *** 0.083 11.105  0.857 *** 0.090 9.524  0.907 *** 0.083 10.973 
Party Size: Medium 0.710 *** 0.094 7.511  0.729 *** 0.095 7.702  0.708 *** 0.094 7.532 
Party Size: Large 1.206 *** 0.100 12.059  1.211 *** 0.100 12.104  1.199 *** 0.100 12.034 
(Intercept) 4.648 *** 0.267 17.389  4.557 *** 0.259 17.626  4.554 *** 0.257 17.713 
 n 844    844    844   
 R-squared 0.757    0.7572    0.759   
 Adjusted R-squared 0.751    0.751    0.753   
  F-statistic 128.2 ***     122 ***       129.6 ***     
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
Note: The models include three dummy variables: First Female (First Female in candidate list = 1), Incumbent (Candidate served as an MP during 
the election = 1), and Campaign Experience (candidate was running in the previous 2011 elections = 1). Education, Funding and Party Size are 
categorical variables, where reference categories are: Education = Other; Funding = less than 5,000 €; Party Size = Small. 
 
